D  A 


UC-NRLF 


B    M    D71    DDl 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS 


BETWEEN 


CROMWELL 


AND 


CHARLES  X.  GUSTAVUS  OF  SWEDEN 


INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF 

PHILOSOPHY,  SUBMITTED   TO    THE    PHILOSOPHICAL 

FACULTY  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  HEIDELBERG. 


"   .    "  »o    :: 


BY 

Gl^  ERXSEY  JOXES, 

INSTRUCTOR  IN  EUROPEAN  HISTORY  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  NEBRASKA. 


LI^X'OL^^  neb.: 

STATK   .JOURNAL   COMPANY,    PRINTERS. 

1897. 


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PREFACE. 


Civil  wars  aiv  not  favorable  to  the  preservation  of  letters  and  papers 
of  historical  value,  since  no  one  is  willing  to  preserve  material  which 
may,  on  the  failure  of  his  cause,  compromise  him  in  the  eyes  of  his 
victorious  enemies.  No  one  is  willing  to  preserve  evidence  which 
may  subsequently  convict  him  of  treason.  ''  Burn  this  letter  after  the 
perusal  of  it,"  w^rote  Col.  Gilbert  Talbot  to  the  Marquis  of  Ormond  in 
1655,  "'tis  not  good  to  have  papers,  fearing  some  misfortune."  In 
the  case  of  the  English  Puritan  Revolution,  we  know  that  some  of  its 
prominent  men  destroyed  their  papers,  for  they  have  told  us  so.  We 
infer  from  the  general  scantiness  of  tliese  records  that  many  others  did 
the  same. 

There  is  another  reason  why  our  records  for  the  Interreoiium  are 
so  meagre.  Charles  I.  had  the  commendable  practice  on  the  death  of 
a  secretary  of  state  of  seizing  all  his  papers,  which  are  novr  kept  in 
the  Public  Record  Office.  But  Cromwell  paid  no  attention  to  such 
matters.  Possession  of  a  public  document  during  his  time  was  synony- 
mous with  ownersiiip ;  consequently  much  the  greater  part  of  them 
are  not  to  be  found  in  the  public  archives,  but  in  private  collections. 
These  have,  to  be  sure,  in  large  measure,  come  into  the  possession  of 
the  Bodleian  Library  and  of  the  British  Museum,  and  are  therefore 
accessible,  but  the  period  of  migration  which  they  went  through  before 
finding  their  final  depository  was  not  favorable  to  their  preservation, 
and  they  still  remain  not  only  fragmentary  but  scattered  to  an  exas- 
perating degree.^ 

The  great  mine  of  information  for  the  diplomatic  history  of  the  In- 
terregnum is  the  collection  of  dispatches  kno\yn  as  the  Thurloe  Papers, 
which,  after  a  career  of  adventure,  finally  came  into  the  possession  of 
th^  Bodleian   Lil)rary.     Ihe  greater  part  of  them  were  published  in 

1742  bv   Thomas  Birch  in  seven  folio  volumes.     There  is  nothino: 

^ o 

1  The  Reports  of  the  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission  give  information  concerning  such 
collections  as  are  still  in  private  possession. 

(3) 


4  ,  .       PREFACE. 

material  among  the  unpublished  clispatehes.  Reference  to  the  collec- 
tion has  been  facilitated  somewhat  by  Setterwall's  "Forteckning  ofver 
Acta  Svecia  in  'A  Collection  of  the  State  Papers  of  John  Thurloe,' " 
Historisk  Tidskrift  (Stockholm),  1890.  The  dispatches  which  relate 
to  Meadowe's  and  Jephson's  embassies  should  be  supplemented  by  the 
letters  recently  found  in  New  Zealand  by  Professor  Edward  Jenks 
and  published  in  the  English  Historical  Reyiew,  yii.,  720-742. 

The  Carte  MSS.  at  the  Bodleian  contain  some  important  letters. 
I  examined  the  Clarendon  State  Papers  with  care,  but  hardly  felt 
repaid  for  my  laljor.  Some  of  the  Carte  Papers  have  been  published 
under  the  title  "A  Collection  of  Original  Letters  and  Papers  Concern- 
ing the  Affairs  of  England,  1641-1660,  by  T.  C.  [Thomas  Carte],  2 
vols.,  London,  1739."  Three  large  folio  volumes  of  the  Clarendon 
Papers  were  published  at  Oxford  in  1767.  The  Tanner  collection 
contains  some  negotiations  between  England  and  the  countries  about 
the  Baltic,  but  they  refer  chiefly  to  the  period  of  the  Commonwealth. 
The  greater  part  of  the  existing  diplomatic  documents  of  the  Interreg- 
num are  contained  in  these  collections  in  the  Bodleian. 

The  college  libraries  at  Oxford  have  nothing  of  consequence  touch- 
ing our  subject.^  There  is,  however,  among  the  AVilliamson  MSS. 
belonging  to  Queen's  College  a  manuscript  catalogue  ^  which  contains 
l)rief  notes  of  negotiations  between  England  and  foreign  states  from 
about  the  year  1540  to  1662,  with  references  to  other  volumes  where 
they  are  more  fully  detailed.  One  of  these  volumes,  designated  by  the 
mark  §§§,  presumably  a  manuscript  volume  belonging  to  Williamson's 
own  library,  has  much  material  bearing  upon  English  relations  with 
Sweden  and  Denmark  during  Cromwell's  time,  and  referring  especially 
to  matters  of  trade.  It  would  seem  to  be  valuable,  but  I  have  not 
been  able  to  find  any  further  trace  of  it. 

There  is  nothing  at  tlie  Public  Record  Office^  worthy  of  mention 
except  Bliss'  Transcripts  from  the  S\yedish  Archiyes,  containing  a  copy 
of  Bonders  Diary,  and  Baschet's  Transcripts  of  Bordeaux's  correspond- 
ence with  Mazarin  and  Brienne.     The  hitter,  howeyer,  is  much  less  in- 

1  Coxe,  Catalogus  Codicum  MSS.  qui  in  Collegiis  AuUsque.  Oxonieusibus  hodie  adservantur, 
2  vols. 

-Queen's  College  MSS.,  xxxix.    Williamson  was  secretary  of  state  from  1(174  to  1G78. 

3R.  S.  Scargill-Bird,  Guide  to  the  Principal  Classes  of  Documents  preserved  in  the  Public 
Record  Office.  Detailed  information  is  given  in  the  various  Reports  of  the  Deputy  Keeper  of 
Public  Records. 


PKEFAOE.  5 


striictivo  than  one  niioht  be  led  to  expeet  from  the  siniihirity  of  English 
and  Freneh  polieies  toward  Sweden.  There  were  various  eauses  for 
mutual  suspieion,  and  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  were  by  no 
means  so  cordial  as  they  appeared  outwardly.  The  domestic  papers 
for  this  period  have  been  calendared  by  Mrs.  Greenland  this  Calendar 
has  in  turn  been  calendared,  so  far  as  Sweden  is  concerned,  by  Setter- 
wall  in  Historisk  'I'idskrift,  1889.  Macray's  Report  on  the  Tiibraries 
of  Sweden  and  the  Archives  and  Libraries  of  Denmark  in  the  Reports 
of  the  Deputy  Keeper  of  Public  Records  (Reports  xliii.,  xlv.,  xlvi.,  and 
xlvii.)  are  valuable  for  reference. 

The  dispatches  of  the  Swedish  ambassadors  in  England  have  not 
been  available  to  me.  Those  of  Xieui)oort,  the  Dutch  ambassador,  are 
contained  in  De  Witt's  I^rieven,  vol.  iii.  Tlie  relations  between  Eng- 
land, Sweden,  and  the  Netherlands  were  so  inextricablv  interwoven 
that  the  letters  of  Xieupoort  are  often  as  valuable  as  the  dispatches  of 
the  Sw(^dish  ambassadors  themselves.  They  appear  to  have  been  but 
little  used  in  this  connection.  The  correspondence  of  Schlezer,  the 
ambassador  from  Brandenburg,  published  by  Erdmannsdchffer  in  vol- 
ume vii.  of  Urkunden  und  Actenstiicke,  should  not  be  neglected. 

Thurloe  has  given  us  two  accounts  of  the  Protector's  policy  in  the 
North.  One  was  furnished  the  House  of  Commons,  February  18, 
1659,  in  a  speech  reported  by  Burton.  The  other,  an  account  of  the 
Protector's  foreign  relations  as  a  whole,  was  furnished  the  ministry  of 
the  Restoration  in  1660,  of  which  a  manuscript  copy  is  among  the 
Stowe  j\lSS.  in  the  British  Museum.  The  second  account  has  l3een 
used  by  the  author  of  the  anonymous  tract  "  Concerning  the  Forraigne 
Affaires  in  the  Protector's  Time,"  printed  in  volume  vi.  of  Lord  Somer's 
Tracts,  but  without  mentioning  his  source.  The  changes  in  the  printed 
tract  are  in  fact  mere  changes  in  arrangement  and  style.  A  copy  of 
the  latter  part  of  the  manuscript,  which  deals  with  affairs  in  the  North, 
was  made  bv  Professor  Grimur  Thorkelin,  the  celebrated  editor  of  the 
first  edition  of  Beowulf,  for  the  Royal  Library  of  Copeniiagen.^ 

These  accounts  by  Thurloe  may  be  supplemented  by  a  similar  one 


lit  is  contained  in  the  new  (not  oUI.  as  Macray's  Report  gives  it)  collection  of  MSS.,  649c,  in 
folio.  It  was  through  information  kindly  furnished  by  the  Rev.  Mr.  Macray  and  Justitsr.  Dr. 
Chr.  Bruun,  Librarian  of  the  Royal  Library  at  Copenhagen,  that  I  was  able  to  trace  the  Stowe 
manuscript.  It  is.  however,  not  the  original,  Init  an  undated  copy,  with  many  errors  in  copy- 
ing.   The  part  which  deals  with  affairs  in  the  North  is  printed  as  Appendix  (A)  to  this  work. 


t/ 


6  PREFACE. 

by  Meadowe,  who  from  his  experience  as  ambassador  in  the  North  is 
entitled  to  speak  with  some  authority.  It  is  entitled  ''A  Xarrative  of 
the  Principal  Actions  occurring  in  the  Wars  between  Sueden  and 
Denmark,  before  and  after  the  Roschild  Treaty,  t~  ^  ^  together 
with  a  View  of  the  Suedish  and  other  Affairs,  as  they  stood  in  Ger- 
many  in  the  year  1675,  wdth  relation  to  England.''  The  first  part 
was  in  manuscript  for  some  years  before  it  was  printed  in  1677.  A 
copy  of  the  manuscript  having,  as  I  infer,  come  into  the  hands  of  Sir 
Roger  Manley,  he  did  not  hestitate  to  incorporate  it  into  his  ''  History 
of  the  late  Warres  in  Denmark,"  published  in  1670.  The  two  ac- 
counts run  parallel  for  pages  witli  only  verbal  changes.  Manley  was 
a  soldier  in  these  wars  and  could  not  very  well  have  had  so  intimate  a 
knowledge  of  diplomatic  events.  In  Wieselgren's  Dela  Gardiska 
Archivet,  xii.,  p.  145,  we  are  informed  of  another  work  by  Meadowe, 
"  The  Interest  of  the  English  in  the  Sound  as  Affaires  now  stand,  Lon- 
don, 1660,"  but  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  a  copy  of  it. 

Among  historical  works  Avhich  deal  with  this  subject,  Pufendorff's 
De  rebus  a  Carolo  Gustavo  Suecice  Bege  gestis  is  tlie  only  one  which 
covers  the  whole  ground.  Apparently  it  is  based  almost  entirely 
upon  the  dispatches  of  the  Swedish  ambassadors,  and  is  invaluable  to 
those  to  whom  the  original  correspondence  is  not  available.  It  has 
been  entirely  superseded,  however,  for  part  of  the  period  by  Kalling's 
^'Riksradet  Frih.  C.  Bondes  ambassad  till  England,  1655,  akad.  afh., 
Upsala,  1851."  In  this  account  the  author  has  not  attempted  to 
make  a  critical  estimate  of  the  value  of  his  sources,  but  has  merely 
reduced  Bonde's  dispatches  to  narrative  form.  Indeed,  he  tells  us  that 
in  all  important  passages  he  has  used  Bonde's  own  words.  His  narra- 
tive is  nevertheless  of  great  value.  It  is  more  detailed  than  Pufen- 
dorff's  and  pays  more  attention  to  exact  chronology  than  Pufendorif 
seems  to  have  thought  necessary.  It  ends  abruptly  with  November 
25,  1655.     The  promised  second  part  seems  never  to  liave  appeared. 

In  recent  historical  literature  there  is  little  to  mention.'  The  state 
of  English  records  is  not  such  as  to  tempt  investigators  to  the  subject. 
Gnrdinei''s  History  of  the  Commonwealth  and  Prote<'torate  has  not 
yet  reached  this  point.     The  Danish  work  of   Fridericia,  Danmarks 

1  "Eine  eingehende  acteiimassige  Darstellung  derselbcn  (d.  h.,  der  .englisch-schwedischen 
Beziehungen  zur  Zeit  Cromwells)  steht  iioch  aus."  Pribram  in  Archiv  fiir  Osterreichische 
Geschichte,  Ixx.,  100.  Anm. 


PREFACE.  ( 

ydiv  politiske  historic,  has  not  l)eeii  continued  beyond  lG4o.  The 
Swcilish  published  sources  have  a  provoking-  way  of  stopping  just 
before  our  period  begins.  Rydberg's  Sveriges  Traktater  med  frani- 
niandc  niagtcr,  has  only  reached  (in  1891)  the  year  Ki.'^O.  Carlson's 
Sveriges  historia  under  Konungarne  af  Pialziska  Huset  ((lerinan  trans- 
lation by  Petersen)  gives  a  detailed  account  of  Swedish  affairs  during 
this  ])eriod.  Erdmannsddrifer's  Deutsche  Geschichte,  vol.  i.,  p.  211, 
neq.,  gives  a  more  sunuiiary  account,  and  devotes  some  pages  to  Crom- 
well's plan  of  getting  a  foothold  in  Northern  Germany  (vol.  i.,  284, 
seq.)     Other  sources  will  be  indicated  as  occasion  offers. 

It  will  be  noticed  how  few  references  are  made  to  the  records  of 
Parliament,  to  newspapers,  or  to  contemporary  pamphlets.  Foreign 
affairs  were  controlled  entirely  bv  the  Protector  and  his  Council,  and 
they  kept  their  secrets  so  well  ^  that  little  is  to  be  learned  from  other 
than  official  sources.  Even  if  information  did  occasionally  leak  out, 
the  gazettes  W'Ould  of  course  not  have  been  allowed  to  publish  it.  A 
convenient  collection  of  newspaper  cuttings  has  been  published  by  Stace 
under  the  title  ''Cromwelliana." 

I  have  taken  the  liberty  of  modernizing  the  spelling  in  all  the  ex- 
tracts quoted.  The  spelling  of  the  1 7th  century  was  notably  careless, 
and  I  see  no  advantage  to  be  derived  from  retaining  it. 

I  cannot  neglect  this  opportunity  to  acknowledge  the  kindness  and 
never-failing  patience  of  Dr.  Neubauer  of  the  Bodleian  Library,  who 
rendered  me  the  greatest  assistance  in  eveiy  difficulty  which  arose  in 
connection  with  the  manuscripts  in  Oxford. 

GUERNSEY  JONES. 

British  Museum,  April  15,  1896. 
lUrk.  u.  Actenst.,  vii.,  742,  Anm. 


INTRODUCTION. 


RELATIONS  Iit:T^VP:EX    ENCrLAND  AND    SWEDEN    BEFORE    THE    liECUN- 

NINCJ  OF  THE  NORTHERN  AVAR.^ 

The  diplomatic  relations  between  England  and  Sweden  before  the 
Enoflish  Pnritan  Revolution  were  not  so  close  nor  so  fruitful  as  the 
circumstances  of  the  time  would  seem  to  have  rendered  inevitable. 
It  was  a  period  of  religious  wars,  yet  no  alliance  was  ft)rmed  between 
these  two  pillars  of  the  Protestant  faith. 

The  fanlt  of  this  mnst  be  laid  at  the  door  of  the  first  two  Stuarts, 
but  it  was  not,  as  has  been  often  said,  the  fault  of  their  secret  Catho- 
lic sympathies,  but  of  their  blundering  personal  incompetence.  Their 
foreign  policies  were  based  upon  dreams  of  religious  toleration  and 
mediation,  upon  consideration  of  supposed  personal  honor,  upon  the 
interests  of  blood  relations,  upon  the  influence  of  incompetent  favor- 
ites, upon  everything,  it  would  seem,  except  the  real  points  at  issue. 

James'  attempt  to  secure  a  position  in  Europe  by  means  of  which 
he  could  mediate  l^etween  the  hostile  creeds  and  soften  their  intolerance 
was  indeed  a  noble  one,  but  it  required  a  higher  order  of  al)ility  f  >!' 
its  execution  than  he  could  tolerate  in  his  councils.  The  humiliating 
outcome  of  the  Spanish  marriage  project  in  1623  marked  the  final 
failure  of  this  policy.  Just  at  this  time,  as  if  by  happy  chance, 
Gustavus  Adolphus  ascended  the  throne  of  Sweden,  prepared  to  take 
advantage  of  the  change  in  Englisli  councils.  He  proposed  a  plan  for 
a  great  Protestant  alliance,  which  bears  many  analogies  to  Cromwell's 
project  of  thirty  years  later,  but  which  was  too  thorough-going  for  the 
timid  Stuart  court.  James  was  in  no  position  to  meet  its  financial 
ref^uirements,  and  the  more  moderate  proposals  of  Christian  IV.  were 
accepted  instead.  Gustavus  Adol})hus  was  compelled  to  resign  his 
mission  for  a  time  to  weaker  and  less  wortliy  hands. 

iDe  diplomatiska  forbindelserna  mellan  Sverige  och  England  1624-Maj  1630.  Akad.  afh. 
af  Aron  Rydfors,  Upsala,  1890.  De  diplomatiska  rorbind«;lserna  radian  Sverige  och  England 
1633-M.  Akad.  afh.  af  August  Heimer.  Lund,  189'2.  Gardiner's  English  History,  1603-1642.  lb., 
1642-49.    History  of  the  Commonwealth  and  Protectorate,  vol.  i.,  1649-.52. 


10  INTRODUCTION. 

Restitution  of  the  Palatinate. — In  so  far  as  Charles  I.  could  be  said 
to  have  had  a  definite  foreign  policy  at  all,  it  had  but  one  object,  the 
restitution  of  the  Palatinate  to  his  relations.  In  this  of  itself  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus  had  no  interest,  and  there  seemed  but  little  chance  of 
an  agreement  between  them.  Yet,  as  Charles  blundered  in  every 
direction,  he  must  sometimes  blunder  in  the  direction  of  Sweden. 
There  were  several  times  when  his  interference  in  behalf  of  the  Ger- 
man Protestants  seemed  imminent. 

In  1629,  Sir  Thomas  Roe,  an  ardent  advocate  of  a  vigorous  Protest- 
ant policy,  was  allowed  to  mediate  a  peace  between  Poland  and 
Sweden,  in  order  that  Gustavus  Adolphus  might  have  free  hand  to 
interfere  in  Germany,  though  Charles  would  not  promise  in  advance 
any  active  support.  It  was  thus  due  to  English  influence  under  Sir 
Thomas  Roe  that  Gustavus  Adolphus  was  able  to  make  his  descent 
upon  Germany  in  the  summer  of  1630. 

The  victories  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  roused  the  greatest  enthusiasm 
among  the  English  people,  but  not  in  the  English  Court.  Yet  even 
Charles,  moved  by  the  ill  success  of  his  negotiations  with  Spain,  France, 
and  Austria,^  found  himself,  as  if  by  accident,  drifting  with  the  current 
of  national  feelino^.  Sir  Henry  Vane  was  sent  to  Germany  in  the  lat- 
ter  part  of  1631  to  treat  for  an  alliance  for  ''the  restitution  of  both 
Palatinates  and  the  liberty  of  Germany."  Gustavus  Adolphus,  how- 
ever, inconsiderately  demanded  men  and  money  as  the  price  of  his 
assistance.  An  English  fleet  must  protect  his  communications  with 
Sweden,  and  the  military  resources  of  the  Palatinate,  in  case  it  were 
restored,  must  be  placed  at  his  disposal  during  the  continuance  of  the 
war.  Otherwise  he  had  no  interest  in  the  project.  The  English 
Privy  Council  urged  upon  Charles  the  acceptance  of  these  terms,  but 
he  found  them  too  straightforward.  They  might  bring  him  into 
collision  with  France  or  Spain.  He  therefore  proposed  instead  a 
subsidy  of  £10,000  a  month,  for  which  the  Swedish  king  must  use 
every  possible  endeavor  to  restore  the  Palatinate.  This  proposal  was 
rejected.  Gustavus  Adolphus  knew  very  well  how  little  Charles' 
promises  to  })ay  money  could  be  relied  upon. 

So  deep  Avas  the  emotion   aroused   in   England   by   the   Swedish 

1  The  clearest  account  of  this  part  of  Charles'  tortuous  policy  is  given  by  Gardiner,  English 
History,  1603-1642,  vii.,  169-219. 


INTRODUCTION.  11 

victories  in  Gcnnany,  that  Charles  siiw  in  it  a  nproach  again>t  his  own 
inactivity  and  th()Uo:ht  it  necessary  to  ]>roliil)it  tlie  gazettes  from  pub- 
lishing news  of  them.  Xothing  coiikl  show  more  strikingly  his  failure 
to  icU'ntify  himself  with  the  spirit  of  his  j)e()ple.  It  w^as  the  fatal 
ditierence  between  Tudor  and  Stuart  al)S()lutism.  Charles  received  the 
news  of  the  death  of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  which  seemed  to  the  English 
people  a  national  disaster,  with  the  greatest  equanimity.  It  would  be 
easy  now,  he  thought,  for  Frederick  V.  to  place  himself  at  the  head 
of  the  German  Protestants  and  to  win  back  his  own.  He  sent  him 
£1(3,000  for  this  purpose,  but  Frederick  died  before  he  heard  what 
was  expected  of  him. 

Another  opportunity  for  making  English  influence  felt  in  Germany 
offered  itself  in  the  formation  of  the  League  of  Heilbronn.  The 
League  in  its  weakness  had  been  obliged  to  accept  French  support,  and 
consequently  to  submit  to  French  control,  but  it  was  anxious  to  bal- 
ance the  influence  of  France  by  that  of  England.  It  promised  to 
do  all  that  could  be  reasonably  expected  tow^ard  restoring  the  Palati- 
nate. Yet  Charles  could  not  resign  hope  of  gaining  his  object  with 
less  trouble  through  negotiation  with  Spain,  and  against  the  advice  of 
his  Council,  he  allowed  this  opportunity  to  slip.  John  Oxenstierna, 
son  of  the  great  Swedish  chancellor,  came  to  England  to  ask  for  as- 
sistance, but  though  he  w^as  received  with  every  show  of  respect,  he 
accomplished  notliing.  Somewhat  later,  Charles  sent  one  ambassador 
after  another  to  Sweden,  but  his  foreign  policy  had  long  lost  all  coher- 
ence.^ Even  his  own  councilors  were  in  the  dark  as  to  his  true  aims. 
As  an  inevitable  result,  he  ceased  to  be  courted.  *  After  the  battle  of 
Xordlingen,  which  he  regarded  wath  the  greatest  equanimity,  he  sent 
the  usual  hollow  promises  to  Oxenstierna,  but  "  the  Swedish  chan- 
cellor rode  off  to  nesfotiate  with  the  French  ambassador  without 
vouchsafing  a  word  in  answer."  Charles'  duplicity  had  isolated  Eng- 
land and  driven  the  Swedes  and  the  German  Protestants  into  the  arms 
of  France.- 

During  the  Long  Parliament  and  the  Bepublic. — The  relations  be- 

1  "The  schemes  of  Charles  were  so  complicated  and  unreal,  that  they  only  serve  to  make 
the  brain  dizzy."    Gardiner,  Eng.  Hist.,  160o-ir>42,  vii.,  ;^52. 

- "  No  word  of  condemnation  is  too  strong  for  the  manner  in  which  Charles  treated  the  whole 
subject  of  his  relations  with  the  Continent.  It  had  all  the  weakness  of  a  purely  selfish  policy, 
without  any  of  the  apparent  and  momentary  strength  which  a  selfish  policy  receives  from 
vigour  of  conception  and  boldness  of  action.''    lb.,  391. 


12  INTRODUCTION. 

tween  Charles  and  Sweden  were  tluis  far  from  cordial  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  English  Civil  War.  In  fact,  Swedish  sympathies  were 
so  strongly  with  the  rebellious  Scotch  that  in  1640  ships  and  ammuni- 
tion were  promised  them  in  case  of  necessity,  though  under  the  disguise 
of  purchase.  Oxenstierna  was  no  friend  to  rebels,  yet  "  he  enumer- 
ated the  breaches  of  the  laws  of  the  land  Avhich  Charles  had  been 
guilty  of,  both  in  political  and  religious  matters,"  ^  and  thought  that 
under  certain  conditions  rebellion  was  justifiable. 

Nor  was  the  cordiality  which  existed  between  Charles  and  his  uncle, 
the  king  of  Denmark,  calculated  to  conciliate  the  Swedes.  It  was 
difficult  to  be  a  friend  to  Denmark  and  not  an  enemy  to  Sweden. 
When  the  war  broke  out  between  these  two  powers  in  1643,  an  am- 
bassador was  sent  by  Sweden  to  the  English  Parliament  asking  for  the 
cooperation  of  an  English  fleet  in  protecting  commerce  in  the  Baltic 
Sea — i.  c,  in  operating  against  Denmark.  The  immediate  cause  for 
seeking  this  alliance  with  the  English  Parliament,  however,  disap- 
peared after  the  Treaty  of  Bromsebro,  and  in  deference  to  the  feelings 
of  the  French,  the  negotiations  were  broken  off,  although  the  English 
Parliament  was,  in  consequence  of  rumors  of  a  Danish-French  agree- 
ment to  come  to  the  aid  of  Charles,  more  anxious  than  ever  to  pro- 
ceed with  them. 

The  execution  of  Charles  I.  brought  with  it  naturally  enough  a  cer- 
tain revolution  of  feeling  in  favor  of  his  successor.  Spiring  Silver- 
crona,  the  Swedish  resident  at  the  Hague,  received  orders  to  visit 
Charles  II.,  and  to  show  him  the  same  respect  as  though  he  were  in 
full  possession  of  his  royal  authority.  Yet  when  Montrose  in  his  tour 
of  the  northern  courts  reached  Gothenburg,  expecting  great  things,  he 
was  sadly  disappointed.  Christina  sold  him  a  small  ship,  but  had  no 
further  help  to  offer.  Great  as  had  been  the  outcry  throughout  Eu- 
rope at  the  execution  of  Charles  I.,  the  cause  of  his  successor  was  not 
regarded  as  it  would  have  been  one  hundred  and  fifty  years  later,  as 
the  cause  of  kings.^  No  European  court  would  liesitate  to  desert  him 
if  it  served  its  interests  to  do  so.  The  reasons  why  Sweden  was  again 
driven  to  seek  the  friendship  of  the  English  Parliament  must  be 
sought,  as  before,  in  its  relations  with  Denmark.^ 

1  neimer,  p.  43,  seq. 

2  Clarendon,  History  of  the  RebeUion,  xi.,  g  250. 

3  Perhaps  Christina  had  already  conceived  that  great  admiration  for  Cromwell  which  she 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

The  treaties  of  Rronisebro  and  Westplialia  had  so  strengthened  the 
influence  of  Sweden  in  the  Baltic  that  the  United  Provinces  could  not 
but  be  ap})rehensive  of  the  future  of  their  connnerce,  and  they  were 
endeavoring  to  maintain  the  balance  of  power  in  that  region  bv  sup- 
porting Denmark  against  its  too  powerful  rival.  In  February,  1649, 
a  detensive  alliance  was  formed  between  them,  although  the  Swedish 
envoys  at  the  Hague,  Appelboom  and  Spiring  Silvercrona,  i^iade  everv 
effort  to  prevent  it.  Spiring  had  not  only  been  instructed  to  cultivate 
the  friendship  of  the  English  ambassadors  at  the  Hague,  but  in  certain 
events  to  recognize  the  CoinmonwTalth,  and  to  inform  them  that  an 
English  embassy  would  be  well  received  in  Sweden.  He  now  pro- 
posed to  the  queen  that  he  be  sent  to  London  to  prevent  the  success 
of  the  negotiations  for  an  English-Dutch  alliance  which  were  being 
carried  on  there.  The  proposal  ^vas  received  with  favor.  His  letter 
of  credence  was  dated  at  Stockholm,  September  26,  1651.^  His  in- 
structions related  merely  to  the  protection  of  commerce  between  the 
two  nations  and  to  the  sending  of  an  English  ambassador  to  Sweden 
to  carry  on  further  negotiations.  He  died,  however,  before  he  had  re- 
ceived audience,  so  the  nature  of  the  proposals  which  he  was  author- 
ized to  make  remained  unknown  to  Parliament.  A  letter  of  condo- 
lence was  sent  to  the  queen  on  the  event.^  Both  Denmark  and  the 
States  General  had  thouo-ht  it  necessary  to  send  embassies  to  Enoland 
t(j  counteract  the  efforts  of  Sw^eden.  Even  France  took  the  opportu- 
nitv  to  make  advances  to  Parliament  thronoh  the  Swedish  ambassador.^ 

A  few  months  after  Spiring's  death,  Appelboom  \vas  sent  over  from 
Holland  for  a  short  time  to  continue  the  negotiations.  His  instruc- 
tions contained  proposals  for  transferring  the  English-Pussian  trade 

afterwards  expressed  so  freely.  "I  may  tell  yon  this  wild  queen  of  Swede  extols  beyond 
measure  the  Pr.  of  Conde  and  Cromwell,"  wrote  Sec.  Nicholas,  December  8,  16.54  (Nicholas 
Papers,  ii.,  112),  "  and  speaks  very  slightly  both  of  our  blessed  Master  that  is  with  God  and  of 
the  K.,  whos£;shoes  she  is  not  worthy  to  tie."  See  also  lb.,  142,  and  various  passages  in  Whiie- 
loeke's  Journal  of  the  Swedish  Embassy.  Cromwell  o:ice  sent  his  picture  to  her  Avith  a  very 
elaborate  compliment  (usually  printed  among  Milton's  poetical  works  :  but  Masson  thinks  it 
was  written  by  Marwell.  Milton's  Poetical  Works,  ii.,  343,  stY/.),  but  after  her  apostasy  he 
would  hear  nothing  more  of  her.    Whitelocke's  Memorials  of  English  Affairs,  599. 

1  A  translation  is  contained  in  the  Tanner  Papers,  Iv.,  fol.  64.  It  was  to  the  effect  that  "  the 
friendship  and  nearness  of  commerce  which  from  ancient  times  and  even  to  this  day  uninter- 
rupted hath  flourished  between  the  Swedish  and  English  nations  may  more  and  more  for  the 
future  be  rooted  and  moreover  receive  greater  increase. "  It  is  indorsed,  "Read,  27  January. 
1651 [2]." 

-A  copy  is  among  the  Tanner  Papers,  Ii.,  fol.  219.    He  died  February  9, 1652, 

•*  Ueimer,  77,  saj. 


1 4  INTRODUCTION. 

from  Archangel  to  Xarva,  Reval,  and  Nvea,  which  afterwards  figured 
so  prominently  in  Bonde's  mission.  He  was  also  to  try  to  mediate  an 
ajrreement  l3et\yeen  Eno^land  and  France. 
/  Toward  the  latter  part  of  the  year  Benjamin  Bonnell  Nyas  commis- 
sioned as  Swedish  resident  in  London.^  On  April  7,  1653,  Israel 
La>:erfeldt  arriyed,  ostensibly  to  mediate  a  peace  between  England  and 
the  Datch  on  the  ground  of  "  the  peace  and  welfare  of  the  Protestant 
churches,"  but  in  reality  for  a  yery  different  purpose.  The  spirit 
and  object  of  his  mission  is  shown  by  the  much  debated  proposal  which 
he  made  on  August  3,  1653,  to  the  effect  that  the  Swedes  should  "con- 
tribute all  their  endeayours"  to  supply  the  English  with  such  materials 
of  war  at  a  reasonable  price  as  they  needed  from  the  Xorth  (copper, 
iron,  hemp,  masts,  etc.),  in  return  for  the  priyilege  of  fishing  off  the 
coast  of  Great  Britain;  but  this  was  to  be  on  condition  that  Swedish 
vessels  should  suffer  no  further  molestation  and  capture  by  English 
ships  of  war.-  The  letter  of  Parliament  to  the  queen  on  Lager- 
feldt's  return  is  dated  October  29,  1653.^  Bonnell  was  continued  as 
resident  until  1655. 

Whltelocke^s  Embassy,  IGblf.} — Appelboom  had  found  the  English, 
now  that  their  relations  witli  Holland  were  becoming  strained,  yery 
eager  to  close  an  alliance  with  Sweden,  and  they  were  much  disap- 
pointed that  he  did  not  remain  to  complete  it.  Hitherto  all  advances 
liad  been  made  by  Sweden.  They  were  now  to  come  from  Parlia- 
ment. On  December  23,  1652,  even  before  Lagerfeldt's  arrival,  it 
was  determined  to  send  an  ambassador  thither,  and  on  December  31 
^"iscount  Lisle  Nvas  selected.  His  instructions'"  were  not  ready  till 
^larch  22,  1653.  After  the  expulsion  of  the  Rump,  however,  he 
asked  to  be  excused  on  tlie  plea  of  ill  healtli,  and  it  was  decided  to 
send  Richard  Salwev  and  Mr.  Strickland  in  his  stead.^     But  Salwev 

1  Tanner  Papers,  liii.,  fol.  1-11.    Dated  October  23,  1652.    '•  Read  22d  of  Febniary,^6'i2[:i] ." 

-  Lagerfeldt's  mission  is  usually  referred  lo  as  though  its  only  significance  lay  in  its  religious 
character,  of  which,  in  fact,  it  had  very  little.  There  is  a  manuscript  volume  in  the  Public 
Record  Office,  "Council  of  State:  Negociations  with  Sweden."  S.  P.  Sweden,  xi.,  containing 
copies  of  the  various  letters,  papers,  etc.,  exchanged  in  the  course  of  the  negotiations,  in  wliich 
little  effort  is  made  to  conceal  tht.nr  real  nature. 

•'  Tanner  Papers,  liii.,  fol.  57.    His  letter  of  credence  was  dated  January  20,  1G53. 

*  Whitelocke's  Journals  of  tlie  Swedish  Emlnissy,  Reeve's  edition.  Ranke,  Eng.  Gesch..  iii.. 
459.  Heimer,  ch.  iv.  Fries,  Erik  Oxcnstierna,  149,  scvy.  Thurloe  State  Papers,  vols.  i.  and  ii. 
There  are  many  papers  relating  to  this  embassy  in  the  private  collection  of  the  Marquis  of 
Bath.    Hist.  MSS.  Commission,  3d  Rept.,  App.,  p.  192. 

y  Thurloe  State  Papers,  i.,  227. 

cEarl  of  Westmoreland's  Papers,  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.,  10th  Rept.,  App.  4,  p.  410.    Cromwell  to 


IXTRODUCTIOX.  15 

beo-trod  to  be  excused  on  the  oround  of  "untitiiess  throiiirh  want  of 
freedom  of  spirit  and  l)odily  health."  The  Swedisli  enil)assy  was 
never  popuhir  and  it  was  ditiicuk  t>)  persuade  any  cue  to  undertake 
it.  Finally,  however,  Whiteloeke  was  frlii'htened  into  accepting-  it.' 
He  left  England  on  the  ()th  of  Xovember  and  arrived  at  Upsala  on 
the  2()th  of  December,  1 6o3. 

Whitelocke's  instructions-  were  identical  with  those  of  Lisle  except 
in  one  point;  but  the  diiference  is  noteworthy.  The  war  with  the 
Dutch  had  in  the  meantime  lost  some  of  its  bitterness,  and  some  of  the 
more  severe  paragraphs  relating  to  them  were  omitted.  Yet  even  with 
this  mitigation,  the  significance  of  the  embassy  still  lay  in  its  hostility 
to  Holland.  Whatever  expressions  may  have  been  used  pointing  to 
an  underlvino;  relioious  motive,'^  these  onlv  give  evidence  of  the  extent 
to  which  religious  feeling  prevaded  public  life  in  England  at  this  time; 
but  in  the  course  of  the  negotiations  these  motives  have  no  material 
significance.^  When  AMiitelocke  in  his  first  private  audience  with  the 
queen  dwelt  upon  religious  matters,  he  was  met  with  pleasant  raillery. 
"  ]\Iethinks  you  preach  very  well,  and  have  now  made  a  good  sermon," 
she  said.  In  his  next  interview,  however,  when  he  showed  her  a  list 
of  the  Parliamentary  fleet,  her  demeanor  was  very  different.  "  This  is  a 
gallant  navy  indeed,"  she  said;  "1  am  exceedingly  taken  with  the 
description  of  it.  *  *  =^  Some  of  these  ships  of  yours  would  do 
good  service  to  open  the  Sound.     What  do  you  think  fit  to  be  taken 


R.  Salwey,  August  11,  lG5o.  informing  him  that  the  Council  desires  to  send  him  with  Mr.  Strick- 
land to  "Swethesland,  a  thing  too  long  neglected  by  us  already,  and  may  be  of  greater  im- 
portance than  aTiy  design  we  have  of  that  kind  anywhere  else."  Somewhat  later,  Cromwell 
spoke  in  a  similar  strain  of  the  relations  between  England  and  Sweden.'  "And  the  business 
is  of  exceeding  great  importance  to  the  Commonwealth,  as  any  can  be  ;  that  it  is  :  and  there 
is  no  prince  or  State  in  Christe  ;dom  with  whom  there  is  any  probability  for  us  to  have  a  friend- 
ship, but  only  the  queen  of  Sweden."    Whitelocke's  Swedish  Embassy,  p.  14. 

1  ••  Rather  to  go  the  journey  in  great  danger  than  to  stay  at  home  in  greater."  Whitelocke's 
Swedish  Embassy,  i.,  85. 

2  ibid.,  i ,  85,  srq.  The  public  instructions  were  dated  October  21,  16J3,  the  private  instruc- 
tions a  week  later. 

■<Ib.,  i.,  29,  i^cq.    Advantages  of  the  Embas.5y  to  the  Protestant  Cause. 

*Even  with  Cromwell  this  motive  does  not  appear  to  be  nearly  so  prominent  as  it  afterwards 
became  "  If  I  tind  the  queen  willing  to  join  with  you,"  asked  Whitelocke,  "  for  the  gainingof 
the  Sound,  and  against  the  Dutch  and  Danes,  and  that  heartily  and  hopefully,  shall  I  put  that 
business  to  the  utmost  and  are  you  willing  to  enter  into  such  a  conjunction?"  To  which 
Cromwell  replied,  ••  If  you  tind  them  inclinable  to  it,  put  it  on  as  far  as  you  can,  and  let  us 
hear  from  you  what  you  judge  best  to  be  done  in  it.  Xo  business  can  be  of  greater  consequence 
to  us  and  our  trade,  wherein  the  Dutch  will  endeavour  to  overreach  us  ;  and  it  were  good  t-) 
prevent  them  and  the  Dane,  and  first  to  serve  our  own  interest."  Whitelocke's  Swedish  Em- 
ba.'-sy,  i.,  94. 


1 6  INTEODUCTION. 

to  open  and  make  free  the  passage  thereof?"  '^It  cannot  be  taken  out 
of  their  [the  Danes']  hands  but  by  force,"  she  continued.  "Do  you 
think  that  the  Commonwealth  of  England  will  give  assistance  in  that 
business?  "  "  Madam,  I  think  they  will,"  replied  Whitelocke,  "  upon 
such  just  and  honourable  terms  as  may  be  agreed."  "  Do  you  think  they 
will  send  any  ships  for  that  purpose  ?  "  "  I  believe  upon  fit  terms 
they  will."  "  AVhat  would  you  propose  as  fit  to  be  done  in  that  busi- 
ness?"^ Here  was  the  real  point  of  contact  between  English  and 
Swedish  interests. 

The  old  Chancellor  Oxenstierna,  however,  held  back.  He  was  too 
clear-sighted  not  to  see  what  far-reaching  changes  in  Sweden's  policy 
such  an  alliance  would  have.  He  also  questioned  the  stability  of  the 
existing  o-overnment  in  Eno-land,  althouoh  his  fears  were  somewhat 
allaved  bv  Cromwell's  assuming  the  title  of  Protector.  Pimentelli, 
the  Spanish  ambassador,  who  had  much  influence  at  court,  advised 
Whitelocke  to  negotiate  directly  with  the  queen.  But  although  she 
took  much  interest  in  tlie  project  of  an  alliance  between  Sweden,  Eng- 
land, and  Spain  Avhich  Pimentelli  proposed  to  meet  the  existing  alliance 
between  Denmark,  the  Netherlands,  and  France,  she  was  too  much  oc- 
cupied with  her  abdication  to  exert  her  authority  in  other  matters. 
When  Pimentelli  found  Whitelocke  not  inclined  to  admit  Spain  into 
the  alliance,  he  too  used  his  influence  against  it. 

Erik  Oxenstierna,  who  conducted  the  negotiations  during  the  ill- 
ness of  his  father,  placed  the  greatest  stress  upon  commercial  matters, 
desiring  permission  for  Swedish  subjects  to  trade  with  America,  and 
to  fish  on  the  coasts  of  (jreat  Britain,  and  that  English  traders  might 
be  established  at  Xarva,  Reval,  and  Gothenburg ;  but  Whitelocke  pro- 
posed that  these  matters  be  left  to  future  negotiations  in  England. 
The  time  was  in  fact  unfavorable  for  deciding  momentous  questions 
of  policy.  The  accession  of  a  new  sovereign  and  the  close  of  the 
Dutch  war  mvAit  hrhvx  chanj^es  in  the  council  of  both  Sweden  and 
England.  It  was  therefore  thouglit  best  to  leave  the  matter  unde- 
cided. The  treaty  which  bears  the  date  April  11,  l)ut  wliicli  was 
not  really  concluded  till  April  2<S,  provides  in  general .  terms  for  "a 
good,  firm,  sincere,  and  perpetual  peace,  amity,  alliance,  and  correspond- 
ence "  but  leaves  all  means  bv  which  the  alliance  would  be  made 

1  Whitelocke's  Swedish  Embassy,  i.,  258,  seq. 


INTRODUCTION.  1 7 

effective  to  liirtlKT  uogotiations,  for  wliidi   pm-pose  it  was  uiulerstood 
an  ainbassiKlor  would  l)e  sent  to  Enodand. 

Tlie  treaty  was  hut  an  ex[)ression,  in  general  terms,  of  friendship  and 
amity  and  was  in  laet  a  i)Ostponement  of  the  whole  matter.  On  May 
20,  W'hiteloeke  took  his  dei)artnre,  two  weeks  l)efore  the  accession 
of  the  new  sovereign  \\'lio  was  to  continue,  though  under  very  dif- 
ferent cireumstanees,  the  policy  of  interference  on  the  continent  which 
had  been  inaugurated  by  his  uncle,  Gustavus  Adolphus. 


Dll^LOMATIC  RELATIO]N^S  BETWEEjST  CROM- 
WELL A]N^D  CH.VRLES  GUSTAYUS. 


Rcrival  of  SicecUsh  Aggression  and  Necessity  of  English  Support. — 
Ever  since  Swediii  liad  emerged  under  Gustavus  Adolphus  from  its 
position  uf  comparative  isolation  it  had  been  driven  to  seek  English 
aid  in  its  nndcrtakini>"s  on  the  continent.  The  two  nations  seemed  not 
onlv  bv  their  cjnimunitv  of  relioion  and  similarity  of  national  char- 
acter,  l)ut  by  their  mutual  interest  in  opposing  the  commercial  suprem- 
acv  of  the  Dutch,  as  if  destined  bv  nature  to  be  each  other's  allies.^ 
When  Charles  Gustavus  on  his  accession  to  the  Swedish  crown  set  out 
in  his  "endeavour  to  follow  the  example  of  his  famous  predecessors, 
which  was  to  enlarge  as  well  as  defend  their  dominions/'"  he  was 
likel}',  in  view  of  the  resentment  already  arous,ed  by  Swedish  aggres- 
sion, to  need  English  aid  more  than  ever;  for,  with  all  the  brilliant 
successes  which  had  crowned  Swedish  arms,  its  position  with  regard 
to  its  neighbors  at  this  time  was  a  desperate  one.  Each  success  had 
been  at  the  expense  of  some  other  state,  until  its  extended  border  was 
threatened  bv  an  unbroken  circle  of  foes.  Denmark  was  smarting 
under  the  disiirace  of  the  treaty  of  Bromsebro,  bv  which  it  had  lost 
not  only  the  provinces  of  Holland,  Jjimtland,  Herjeadalen,  and  the 
islands  Gottland  and  Oesel,  l)iit  also  its  monopoly  of  the  tolls  in  the 
Sound.  Brandenburg  had  been  alienated  by  the  loss  of  Pommerania 
and  the  petty  acts  of  violence  in  settling  its  boundary.  Mecklenburg 
had  lost  Wismar  and  the  customs  duties  in  its  remaining  ports.  The 
German  Empire  had  been  brought  into  a  position  of  commercial  de- 
pendence, and  had  been  compelled  to  yield  to  the  Swedish  intruder  a 
voice   in   its   imperial   government.     Ferdinand   III.  had    nuuiy   old 

'  Whitelocke's  Memorials  of  English  Affiiirs,  602  Also  Lagerfeldt  in  the  volume  mentioned 
above.  S.  P.  Sweden,  xi.  "  For  God  and  nature  having  so  seated  these  two  lands  and  nations, 
that  neither  a  too  great  distance  between  both  can  deprive  them  of  all  communication,  or  ren- 
der it  dilUcult,  nor  a  too  great  vicinity  make  them  obnoxious  to  the  fatal  animosities  incident 
ordinarily  to  neighbors."    This  was  a  favorite  argument  at  that  time. 

2  "The  most  Heavenly  and  Christian  Speech  of  the  Magnanimous  and  Victorious  King  of 
Sweden,  Charles  Gustavus  Adolphus,  on  his  Death-Bed,  etc."    Pamphlet,  London,  1660. 

(19) 


20  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

scores  to  settle,  both  as  emperor  of  Germany  and  as  king  of  Hungary. 
Poland,  like  Denmark,  was  in  a  state  of  chronic  hostility,  for  various 
reasons,  among  others  from  the  loss  of  territory.  Finally,  the  rising 
Russian  power  was  already  conscious  of  the  necessity  of  piercing  the 
slender  slip  of  Swedish  territory  which  threatened  to  transform  the 
Baltic  into  an  inland  sea.  Some  or  all  of  these  powers  were  only 
waiting  for  a  favorable  opportunity  to  turn  the  scale  of  fortune.  To 
all  this  came  a  crowning  danger.  The  success  which  had  attended 
Sweden's  efforts  to  get  possession  of  the  Baltic  ports  for  the  purpose 
of  controlling  trade,  had  brought  with  it  the  uncompromising  hostility 
of  the  Dutch.  Any  attempt  to  extend  this  oppressive  rule  would  in- 
evitablv  be  met  by  the  despatch  of  an  overwhelming  Dutch  fleet  into 
the  Baltic,  the  very  heart  of  the  Swedish  dominions. 

It  would  seem  as  if  Charles  Gustavus'  safest  course  under  the  cir- 
cumstances would  have  been  to  adopt  a  waiting  policy  with  Walpole's 
motto,  Qitieta  non  movere.  But  internal  difficulties  prevented.  Sweden 
was  too  poor  to  wait.  Its  army  must  be  kept  together  at  all  hazards, 
which  could  only  be  done  by  throwing  the  expense  of  its  maintenance 
upon  Sweden's  enemies,  i,  e.,  by  declaring  war. 

But  against  whom  ?  The  extreme  danger  of  setting  the  surround- 
ing hostile  forces  in  motion  was  not  lost  sight  of.  Christopher  Bonde 
called  the  attention  of  the  Swedish  Council  to  the  special  danger  from 
the  side  of  the  Dutch,  in  which  opinion  he  was  seconded  by  Wrangel 
and  Wittenberg.^  He  argued  tliat  if,  as  had  been  proposed,  Poland 
were  made  the  seat  of  the  war  which  thev  were  about  to  declare,  and 
Sweden  thus  left  exposed,  it  must  not  be  expected  that  Denmark  and 
Holland,  to  say  nothing  of  the  German  princes,  would  remain  idle 
spectators.  Affairs  in  this  quarter  must  hrst  be  made  secure  by  a 
double  attack  on  Denmark,  from  Sweden  and  from  Bremen.  After 
the  Danes  had  been  subdued  and  the  slow-acting  States  General  not 
only  divided  and  disconcerted,  but  fearful  of  renewed  hostilities  on  the 
part  of  the  English,^  the  war  against  Poland  might  be  undertaken  with- 

1  Bedenken  des  Sclnvedischeii  Senats,  iiber  die  Frage :  Wer  von  den  benachbarten  Potentaten, 
well  Krieg  zii  fiihren  notig  erachtet  vvorden,  zu  attaquiren  sei?  Liinig,  Staats-Goncilia,  ii.,557. 
This  meeting  of  tlie  Council  was  held  December  11,  1654.  See,  also,  Carlson,  Schwedische 
Geschichte,  iv..  39,  seq.  Following  an  ancient  custom,  two  speakers  were  chosen  to  conduct 
the  debate  on  the  question  under  consideration.  Christopher  Bonde  was  chosen  to  defend  the 
policy  of  renewing  the  war. 

2Pufendorff',  De  rebus  a  Carolo  Gustavo  gestis,  lib.  i.,  ^  57. 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  21 

out  unduly  ex})(tsin<i:  Swodi'u.  Rut  to  this  argument  answer  was 
made,  and  sustained  l)y  tlie  ()[)inion  of  tlie  Council,  that  any  serions 
menaee  to  Denmark's  existence  or  welfare  would  be  resented  not  only 
by  the  Germans  and  Dutch  but  by  the  English  as  well ;  ^  an  o})inion 
wliii'h  subsequent  events  proved  to  be  well  founded. 

The  Swtxlish  statesmen  thus  fonnd  themselves  confronted  with  a 
dilennna,  either  horn  of  which  threatened  to  involve  them  in  a  war 
with  Holland,  to  whose  maritime  strength  Sweden  was  particularly 
vulnerable.  There  seemed  but  one  alternative  open,  to  secure  the  snp- 
port  of  a  maritime  power  strong  enough  to  hold  the  Dutch  in  check ; 
and  who  should  this  bo  but  the  enemies  of  Holland,  the  English?  It 
was  possible,  it  is  true,  that  this  English  aid  might  be  dispensed  w^ith. 
If  Sweden's  enemies  were  numerous,  they  were  also  weak  and  divided, 
and  no  one  conld  tell  what  effect  a  bold  attack  might  have,  or  what 
circumstances  might  arise  to  prevent  them  from  uniting.  Yet,  on  the 
other  hand,  English  snpport  might  proVe  to  be  the  very  keystone  to 
the  whole  Swedish  position. 

Appointment  of  Swedish  Ambassadors.  —  That  Charles  Gustavus 
appreciated  from  the  first  the  impoilance  which  his  relations  with  Eng- 
land might  have,  there  is  abundant  evidence  to  show\^  It  was  some 
months  before  his  plans  began  to  take  definite  form,'^  and  it  was  of 
conrse  desirable  to  postpone  the  formal  embassy  to  England  until  they 
had  been  fully  matured.  Bnt,  in  the  meantime,  a  disquieting  rumor, 
trifling  in  itself,  showed  the  desirability  of  having  a  representative  at 
Westminster  to  counteract  certain  influences  unfriendly  to  Sweden 
which  appeared  to  be  at  work  there.  It  was  said  that  Cromwell  had 
expressed  his  surprise  that  Danzig  and  the  Hanse  towns  had  not  of- 
fered their  mediation  between  Sweden  and  Poland,  since  their  interests 
lay  so  clearly  in  the  maintenance  of  peace.  This  report  troubled 
Charles  Gustavns  exceedingly.  It  was  true  the  Protector  conld  hardly 
l)e  expecte<l,  now  that  he  w^as  at  peace  with  both  Denmark  and  Hol- 
land, to  be  as  anxions  for  an  alliance  with  Sweden  as  he  had  been  the 
year  before ;  but  could  it  be  that  he  was  now  inclined  to  join  these 

1  "Und  die  Teutschen,  Holl-  und  Engellander  werden  es  niemals  zugeben,  dassDanemark  von 
Schweden  xmterdruckt,  und  die  Nordischen  Kouigsreiehe  in  eine,  alien  Nachbarn  formidable 
Monarchie  gebracht  werden  sollton."    Liinig,  Staats-Concilia,  ii.,  557. 

2  For  example,  the  favor  shown  to  Whitelocke.    Swedish  Embassy,  ii.,  256  and  261. 

3 ' '  Annu  i  slutet  af  1654  svafande  och  obestamda,  antogo  dessa  [konungens  planer  for  den 
utrikes  politiken]  smaningom  en  fastare  gestalt."    Carlson,  i.,  88  (German  trans.,  iv.,  76). 


22  DIPLOMATIC   RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

powers  whose  interests  lay  in  maintaininu;  peace* in  the  Xortli?  It  was 
decided  to  send  an  informal  embassy  to  England  to  inquire  whether 
this  report  was  trne.  Peter  Julius  Covet  ^  was  chosen  for  the  mission. 
His  departure  was  delayed  for  some  time  l)y  Cromwell's  dela^'  in  the 
exchange  of  certain  formalities,^  until  a  sharp  reminder  through  the 
Swedish  resident  in  London  set  the  matter  rio;ht.  His  instructions 
were  dated  November  25,  1654.  He  sailed  from  Gothenburg  early 
in  December,  but  did  not  reach  London  till  ]March,  being  some  three 
months  on  the  way.  The  object  of  his  embassy  was  to  obtain  the  ear 
of  the  Protector  in  order  to  present  the  king's  plans  in  a  favorable  light 
and  to  meet  any  misrepresentations  which  the  Dutch  or  others  might 
make  as  to  his  intentions,  and,  in  general,  to  prepare  the  way  for  the 
more  formal  embassy  which  was  to  follow.^ 

Coyet  Avas  followed  shortly  by  George  Fleetwood,  an  Englishman 
in  Swedish  service,  whose  appointment  proved  to  be  exceedingly  im- 
portant on  account  of  his  connection   with  Cromwell's   family.^     He 

^  Coyet  was  secretary  and  assessor  in  the  Swedish  commerce  collegium,  and  in  high  favor  Avith 
Charles  Gustavus.  He  was  only  thirty-six  years  old,  of  handsome  presence,  we  are  told,  and 
of  considerable  scientific  and  linguistic  attainments.  His  name  appears  often  in  the  records 
of  the  following  negotiations,  and  the  part  he  played,  though  not  distinguishable  from  that 
of  his  colleagues,  seems  to  have  been  important.  Cromwell  testified  his  regard  by  making  him 
Knight  of  the  Garter,  and  by  a  valuable  present  and  a  letter  to  Charles  Gustavus  commending 
him  highly  (Milton.  Literie,  117).  He  played  an  important  part  in  subsequent  Swedish  affairs, 
being  one  of  the  principal  Swedish  negotiators  of  the  treaty  of  Roeskilde. 

2  As  soon  as  the  festivities  attending  his  coronation  ceremony  were  over,  Charles  Gustavus 
had  sent  a  letter  to  Cromwell  announcing  his  accession  and  expressing  a  desire  to  maintain 
the  existing  friendship  with  him  (Thurloe,  State  Papers,  ii..  37;i).  Cromwell  answered  in  a 
similar  strain  (Milton,  Literaj,  78),  but  though  his  reply  is  dated  July  4  (or  July  14  ;  see  Mason's 
Life  of  Milton,  iv.,  636),  it  was  not  sent  for  some  time,  as  I  suspect  through  motives  of  economy. 
He  hoped  some  less  expensive  way  would  present  itself  for  presenting  his  compliments  than 
through  a  special  envoy.  (  See  Coyet's  instructions.  I S,  in  which  he  is  told  to  decline  to  carry 
the  Protector's  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  Upsalaback  for  him.  in  case  he  should  be  asked  to.) 
The  delay  caused  some  apprehension  in  Sweden.  Not  only  was  Coyet  held  back  by  it,  but  it 
might  indicate  an  indifference  on  Cromwell's  part.  There  appears  to  be  some  correspondence 
in  the  Swedish  archives  between  Coyet  and  Oxenstierna  concerning  the  matter.  See  Fries, 
Erik  Oxen.stierna,  note  15,  p.  352. 

'^Coyet's  instructions  have  been  printed  by  Treffenberg,  "K.  Carl  X  Gustafs  instruction  for 
Secreterarcn  Coyet  under  dess  beskickning  till  England  ar  1G54.  Ur  Upsala  Universitets  Hand- 
skriftsamlingar.  Akad.  afh.  Upsala,  1851."  Pufendorif  gives  a  more  convenient  summary  of 
their  contents  in  two  passages,  lib.  i.,  §9,  and  lib.  ii.,  §86,  to  the  latter  of  which  the  reader  is 
referred  for  details.  Pufendorff,  however,  mentions  some  matters  not  included  in  the  instruc- 
tions of  November  25,  for  which  I  have  not  been  able  to  trace  his  authority  :  but  they  probably 
rest  upon  some  subsequent  instructions.    See  Fries.  Erik  Oxenstierna,  130. 

■*  His  brother,  Charles  Fleetwood,  was  Cromwell's  son-in-law,  and  held  a  leading  position  in 
the  Protector's  court.  He  was  lord-deputy  of  Ireland,  a  member  of  the  council  of  state,  one 
of  the  major-generals,  and  the  officer  highest  in  rank  in  the  armies  of  the  three  kingdoms. 
He  was  in  complete  accord  with  both  Cromwell's  foreign  and  domestic  policy,  and  wa^  so  high 
in  favor  that  it  was  said  Cromwell  intended  him  to  be  his  successor.  He  was  absent  in  Ireland 
when  his  bro'.her  was  sent  as  envoy  extraordinary  to  England,  but  he  returned  in  September, 


CROMWKLL    AND    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  23 

was  to  proceed  to  Eiiolaiid  uiuU'i-  the  pretense  of  looking  after  liis'pri- 
vate  interests,  and  was  to  sonnd  Cromwell's  attitnde  towards  Sweden 
and  the  ])rospivts  for  a  closer  alliance,  together  with  tlie  conditions 
whicli  Cromwell  might  be  expected  to  demand,  and  also  to  obtiiin  })er- 
mission  to  enlist  six  or  eiuht  thonsand  Scottish  recrnits  for  Swedish 
service.  His  instrnctions  were  dated  May  15,  bnt  he  did  not  reach 
London  nntil  Jnly. 

]>nt  the  principal  embassy  was  entrusted  to  Christopher  Bonde. 
That  Charles  Gustavns  should  dispatch  three  envoys  to  England 
within  so  short  a  time  shows  what  importance  he  attached  to  his  rela- 
tions with  that  country.  If  this  needed  further  confirmation,  it  is  fur- 
nished by  the  tact  that  the  one  first  intended  for  this  principal  embassy 
was  none  other  tlian  Erik  Oxenstierna,  the  Swedish  chancellor,  who 
directed  the  foreign  aftairs  of  Sweden  from  October,  1654,  till  his 
death.^  The  news  that  he  might  be  expected  was  received  with  satis- 
faction in  England  as  a  special  mark  of  honor,  but  the  press  of  busi- 
ness required  his  presence  at  home,  and  Christopher  Bonde,  who  stood 
next  to  him  in  the  commerce  collegium,  was  named  in  his  stead.^  In 
view  of  Bonde's  warning  against  the  Dutch,  which  we  have  already 
noticed,  and  liis  extensive  knowledge  of  matters  of  trade,  with  which 
his  negotiations  were  expected  to  be  chiefly  concerned,  his  appointment 
appeared  to  be  a  most  appropriate  one. 

Bonde's  instructions  were    dated  June   14,  1655.-^     So  far  as  the 

1655.  George  Fleetwood  entered  Swedish  service  in  1629,  when  he  conducted  a  troop  of  horse 
which  he  had  raised  in  England  to  Gustavus  Adolphus'  aid.  He  rendered  important  services 
to  Sweden,  and  received  many  honors  in  recognition  of  them.  He  was  made  successively 
Swedish  knight,  baron,  lieutenant-general,  and  member  of  the  council  of  war.  This  was  his 
third  mission  to  England.  The  other  two  missions,  in  1630  and  1636,  respectively,  had  also  the 
object  of  raising  troops  for  Swedish  service,  and  both  of  them  had  been  successful.  The  influ- 
ence which  he  was  able  to  exert  in  England  was  so  considerable  that  he  was  retained  at  the 
post  until  1660.  He  must  be  carefully  distinguished  from  George  Fleetwood,  the  regicide, 
whose  name  appears  so  often  in  English  records  of  this  date,  else  one  will  be  sorely  puzzled  at 
the  double  role  which  he  seems  to  be  playing. 

1  Fries,  Erik  Oxenstierna,  22-2.    He  died  October  23,  105G. 

2 Bonde  was  one  of  the  most  trusted  of  Charles  Gustavus'  councilors,  "a  God-fearing,  hon- 
orable, eloquent,  and  learned  man,"  whom  even  his  political  enemies  spoke  of  with  respect. 
He  had  studied  at  Oxford  in  his  youth,  and  probably  had  a  fair  knowledge  of  the  English  lan- 
guage and  of  English  ways,  which  must  have  been  of  great  value  to  him  at  the  Protector's 
court,  where  Latin  was  not  extensively  cultivated.  Though  he  was  but  thirty-three  years  of 
age,  he  had  already  tilled  important  positions,  and  was  a  member  of  several  Swedish  councils. 
But  he  was  most  at  home  in  matters  of  administration  and  trade,  in  which  he  appears  to  have 
had  Charles  Gustavus'  absolute  confidence,  especially  in  his  somewhat  ambitious  plan  for 
breaking  up  the  Dutch  monopoly  of  trade  in  the  Baltic. 

3  Riksregister.  A  copy  is  in  the  library  of  the  University  of  Upsala.  So  far  as  I  can  discover, 
they  have  not  been  printed  and  I  have  been  compelled  to  rely  solely  on  Pufendorti',  ii.,  j  88. 


24  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

points  left  by  the  treaty  of  Upsala  to  be  determined  by  farther  nego- 
tiations are  concerned,  they  a)'e  essentially  the  same  as  those  of  Coyet. 
But  as  concerned  the  question  of  a  closer  alliance,  it  was  otherwise. 
In  place  of  mere  suggestion  or  inquiries,  he  was  authorized  to  make 
a  definite  proposal  in  the  following  terms :  Cromwell  should,  in  return 
for  concessions  in  point  of  trade,  place  at  the  king's  disposal  and 
maintain  at  his  own  expense,  as  long  as  it  might  prove  necessary,  twenty 
ships  of  war,  fully  equipped  and  mannetl ;  he  should  further  guarantee 
the  safety  of  the  English  Channel  and  the  open  sea  for  Swedish  com- 
merce, should  allow  the  king  to  recruit  soldiers  in  England  and  to 
hire  ships,  and  should  grant  to  Swedish  merchants  certain  advantages 
in  England  over  other  foreigners,  the  exact  nature  of  which  was  not 
stated. 

The  concessions  which  were  to  be  offered  in  return  for  this  support 
were,  it  must  be  said,  indefinite  and  illusory.  The  king  engaged  not 
to  interfere  with  English  commerce  in  such  ports  and  lands  as  he 
should  conquer;  the  English  staple  in  Danzig  would  not  be  interfered 
with,  and  might  even  be  transferred  to  Riga ;  English  ships  would  be 
allowed  the  same  advantages  in  Swedish  ports  as  Swedish  ships  desig- 
nated half-free,^  provided  the  English  would  grant  equal  privileges  to 
Swedish  ships  in  other  places,  or  some  equivalent  advantage.  Bonde 
was  also  instructed  to  call  the  Protector's  attention  to  the  extraordinary 
value  of  the  Baltic  trade,  and  the  possibility  for  still  greater  expansion, 
the  undeveloped  resources  of  the  surrounding  country  and  the  rivers 
which  flowed  into  it.  The  advantages  of  this  trade  had  hitherto  been 
reaped  by  the  Dutch,  but  the  king  was  now  anxious  to  divide  it 
with  the  Protector  in  return  for  the  support  which  he  asked.  Thus 
behind  the  immediate  grounds  for  seeking  an  English  alliance  is  the 
shadow  of  this  great  project  involving  the  destruction  of  the  Dutch  as 
a  maritime  and  sea  power.  Domlnimn  maris  balticl  in  the  hands  of 
this  ambitious  prince  would  have  become  not  merely  the  means  of 
plundering  the  Dutch  trade  through  exorbitant  tolls,  but  the  means  of 
supplanting  it  altogether."     The   manner  in  which   he  would  divide 

1  Swedish  free,  half- free,  and  ordinary  ships  paid  duties  in  the  ratio  of  3,  4,  and  5  respectively. 

2These  plans  were  not  entirely  unknown  in  Holland.  See,  for  example,  the  pamphlet  enti- 
tled "  Copye  Translaet,  van  seecker  Sweedsen  Brief  gcschreven  aen  den  Konick  van  Sweeden, 
etc.,  door  desselfs  Rycks-Raedt,  Heer  Christer  Bonde,  etc.,  waer  van  de  geintercipieerde  Orig- 
eneele  noch  voor  handen,  ende  onder  anderen  klaerlijck  daer  uyt  te  lesen  is,  Hoe  ende  Waerom 
de  Sweeden  tracten,  de  geheele  Oosterse  Negocie  en  commercie  van  Amsterdam  nae  andere 


CROMWKI.L    AND    CHAKLES    (iUSTAVUS.  25 

the  spoils  witli  his  Enghsh  ally,  however,  was  left  for  the  future  to 
decide. 

BomWs  Arrind  in  Kngland ;  Inffiienceof  the  Dutch. — As  his  royal 
master  was  on  the  point  of  embarkinu:  for  Poland,  Bonde  sailed  for 
England  on  the  l()th  of  June,  1654,  witli  a  stately  train  of  no  less 
than  200  attendants,  '^  all  generally  proper  and  handsome  men,"  and 
arrived  at  Gravesend  on  the  18th  of  July.^  He  was  met  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  by  Covet,  who  gave  him  a  most  flattering  aecount  of  the 
Protector's  attitude.  The  king's  plans  in  the  Baltic,  he  said,  stood  in 
no  danger  of  being  interrupted ;  the  Protector  had  spoken  very  openly 
with  him.  On  the  28th  of  July,  Bonde  w^as  conducted  to  London  by 
the  Protector's  master  of  ceremonies,  Oliver  Fleming,  where  he  was 
met  by  Whitelocke  and  Strickland  on  behalf  of  the  Council.  Three 
days  of  generous  entertainment  followed,  after  which  came  the  first 
pul)lic  audience.^  "^o  ambassador  had  been  received  with  snch 
elaborate  ceremony  since  the  late  king's  execution,"  wrote  one  of 
Bonde's  suite.^  However,  notwithstanding  this  flattering  reception, 
the  ground  had  been  made  somewhat  unfavorable  for  Bonde  by  the 
well  directed  efforts  of  the  Dutch  ambassador,  Xieupoort.  After  the 
treaty  of  peace  l)etween  England  and  the  States  General  in  1654, 
Xieupoort  had  remained  in  England  to  negotiate  a  further  treaty  con- 
cerning matters  of  trade  and  to  obtain  some  relaxation  of  English 
measures  directed  against  Dutch  commerce."*  When  Charles  Gustavus' 
intention  of  renewing  the  war  in  the  North  was  no  longer  concealed,  it 
became  his  duty  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  Protector's  views  concerning 
aflairs  in  this  region. 

The  republican  party  in  Holland  under  the  leadership  of  DeWitt 
had  many  interests  in  common  with  Cromwell,  and  it  was  by  no  means 
impossible  that  the  two  leaders  might  agree  upon  a  common  policy  in 

Plaetsen  en  Quartieren,  jae,  uyt  Holland  selfs,  (was  't  mogelyck)  op  Vrecmde  Ghewesten  te 
diverteren,  tot  af  breuck  en  niyne  van  de  goede  Ingeseetenen  van  de  Provantie  van  Hollant 
en  West-Vrieslandt,  als  mede  der  Stadt  Amsterdam  voorsz.    Coppenhage,  lG-26  October,  1658." 

1  Carlson  gives  several  incorrect  dates  with  reference  to  these  embassies  to  England. 

•  This  is  described  in  detail  by  Whitelocke,  in  Memorials  of  English  Affairs,  626.  Whitelocke's 
description  has  been  used  by  Masson  in  his  account  of  Bonde's  embassy.  Life  of  Milton  in 
Connection  with  the  History  of  his  Time,  v.,  246,  s((j. 

3 Extracts  of  Johan  Ekeblad's  letters  have  been  published  in  Wieselgren's  Dela  Gardiska 
Arehivet,  viii.,  216,  serj.  They  bear  evidence  to  the  spirit  of  exalting  confidence  which  pervaded 
the  embassy.  "The  Dutch  ask  trembling  what  the  king  proposes  to  do,"  he  wrote.  "The  Sultan 
of  Turkey  sent  an  envoy  to  the  Prince  of  Siebenburgen  to  enquire  about  this  king  who  swallows 
up  whole  kingdoms  ;  what  lands  he  had,  where  they  lay,  etc." 

♦De  Witt's  Brieven,  vol.  iii.,  and  Aitzema,  Saken  van  Staet  en  Oorlogh,  vol.  iii..  1155,  seq. 


26  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

the  Xorth.  On  May  7,  1655/  Xieupoort  wrote  that  news  of  the  siege 
of  Danzig  by  the  king  of  Sweden  had  arrived  in  London,  causing  much 
uneasiness  among  English  merchants.  He  thought  a  proposition  for 
an  alliance  between  England,  Denmark,  and  the  Netherlands  for  the 
protection  of  the  Baltic  trade  might  be  listened  to.  Brandenburg, 
however,  was  distrusted  in  England  and  could  not  be  included.  In 
his  next  dispatch,  May  14,  he  tells  of  two  conferences  which  he  had 
with  Thurloe  in  which  his  references  to  a  possible  alliance  had  been 
well  received.  The  Protector,  he  was  told,  had  considered  the  matter 
with  his  Council  and  Nieupoort's  suggestions  had  been  most  agreeable. 
The  Protector  had  expressed  his  surprise  that  Danzig  did  not  try  to 
secure  allies.  It  was  evident  that  the  king  of  Sweden's  movements 
were  a  source  of  some  apprehension  in  England.  On  June  10,  Hol- 
land ordered  Nieupoort  to  propose  to  the  Protector  an  alliance  with 
Denmark  and  the  Netherlands  for  the  preservation  of  the  Baltic  trade." 
Yet  it  will  be  remembered  that  at  this  same  time  Covet  was  receiv- 
ino-  assurances  from  the  Protector  which  he  considered  verv  satisfac- 
tory.  It  might  appear  at  first  sight  as  though  the  Protector  was  play- 
ing a  double  and  confused  part;  but  it  seems  sufficiently  clear  that  this 
was  not  the  case.  A  clue  to  his  motives  is  furnished  by  Nieupoort's 
account  of  certain  conferences  with  Thurloe.  On  the  news  of  the  mas- 
sacres in  Piedmont,  Cromwell  had  sent  letters  to  the  various  powers  in 
Europe  protesting  or  exhorting,  as  the  case  was,  and  among  others  to 
the  king  of  Sweden.^  As  soon  as  Charles  Gustavus'  answer  had  been 
received,  said  Thurloe,  they  could  then  confer  together  as  to  what 
course  it  would  be  best  to  adopt.  The  Protector's  policy  ^vould  be 
largely  influenced  by  the  nature  of  the  king  of  Sweden's  reply ;  in  the 
meantime,  he  could  be  assured  that  nothing  would  be  done  to  prejudice 
the  interests  of  Holland.  It  would  be  a  s^reat  thino-  continued  Xieu- 
poort,  anticipating  tlie  Protector's  whole  policy  in  the  North,  if  the 
king  of  Sweden  could  be  moved,  even  if  through  a  subsidy,  to  turn  his 
arms  from  the  Protestant  places  in  Prussia  against  the  Roman  Catho- 
lics in  the  hereditary  lands  of  the  emperor,  and  to  consent  to  an  agreement 

lAU  of  Nieupoort's  and  Bordeaux's  dispatches  are  dated  according  to  the  present  mode  of 
reckoning. 

-Secrete  Resolutien,  i.,  186.  Pufendorff  mentions  Brandenburg  and  Poland  in  this  connec- 
tion, but  the  attempt  to  reconcile  England  and  Brandenburg  was  a  ditl'erent  matter,  and  was 
kept  separate  by  the  Dutch.    The  mention  of  Poland  seems  to  be  an  error. 

3  Milton,  Literce,  91 ;  but  undated.    The  date  is  May  25. 


CROMWELL    AM)    CHARLES    (iUSTAVUS.  27 

with  HoUaud,  or  witli  Holland,  Dcuiuark,  and  England,  for  the  regn- 
lation  of  oommorce  in  the  Baltic.^  Soon  atUT,  he  snggested  to  Thurloe 
that  Charles  Gustavns  inioht  be  persuaded  to  leave  Danzig  and  Prus- 
sia undisturbed  and  seek  his  advantage  in  other  ([uarters;  to  wliieh 
Thurloe  had  rv'})lied  that  he  would  do  what  he  could  to  further  such 
result.-  On  duly  l>,  Xieu])oort  wrote  of  an  interview  in  which  the  Pro- 
tector had  said  that  "he  also  would  rather  that  the  king  of  Sweden 
would  leave  the  seaport^  unmolested  and  seek  his  advantage  in  the 
hercditarv  lands  in  the  house  of  Austria,  to  which  he  would  contribute 
what  he  could,  and  that  he,  too,  understood  perfeetly  the  consequences 
of  the  present  Swedish  designs."  The  plan  of  a  common  movement 
against  Austria  was  quite  in  keeping  with  the  negotiations  with  France 
wliieh  he  was  then  carrying  on,  and  ^vhich  Xieupoort  was  trying,  not 
without  some  influence,  to  further. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  on  Bonde's  arrival  in  Eupfland. 
Xieupoort,  though  he  stood  Avell  with  the  Protector,  and  had  actually 
anticipated  and  proposed  the  policy  which  the  Protector  was  then  cher- 
ishing and  afterwards  followed  so  persistently,  was  openly  expressing 
his  suspicion  that  England  and  Sweden  had  come  to  a  secret  under- 
standing;^ and  was  receiving  in  return  assurances  that  the  alliance 
with  Holland  m  as  the  very  ground  and  foundation  upon  which  subse- 
quent treaties  must  rest.^  Cromwell,  on  his  part,  was  uneasy  at  Swe- 
den's designs  against  Prussia,  and  was  not  at  all  inclined  to  permit 
them.  Not  oiilv  was  Charles  Gustavus  embarkino;  in  his  new  war 
without  first  consulting  the  Protector,^  but  his  relations  with  Charles 
II.,  though  they  had  no  particular  significance,  may  have  added  to  the 

!'■  *  *  *  ende  rorsoght  my,  dat  wy  niet  jalours  \vilden  wesen,  dat  nogh  met  dien  Ko- 
ningh  nogh  metiemant  anders  iet  soude  gehandelt  werden  tot  prejudice  van  onsen  Staet,  ende 
als  se  ant woordt  op  den  voorgeroerden  brief  souden  ontfangen  hebben,  dat  men  dan  t'samen 
soude  konnen  overleggen,  wat  best  soude  dienen  gedaen  to  werden  ;  Het  soude  myns  be- 
dunckens  al  een  groot  werck  wesen,  koude  die  Koningh  siende  de  animositeyt  van  't  Paus- 
dom  in  Savoyen,  ende  ook  hoe  de  Roomsehe  Geestelyckheyt  gestadigh  woelt  in  de  Erflanden 
van  den  Keyser,  bewogen  werden,  al  waere  bet  met  een  geldt-subsidie.  als  voor  desen  Gustavus, 
omme  syne  Wapenen  in  plaetse  van  tegens  Protestantse  Stedeu  in  Pruyssen,  in  de  voorge- 
oemde  Erflanden  tot  afweringe  van  de  voorgeroerde  oppressien  te  willen  gebruycken,  ende  ver- 
nieuwen  met  onsen  Staet  ofte  alleen,  of  gemeen  met  desen  Staet  ende  Denemarckcn.  een 
defensive  Alliance  met  ons  Reglemont  van  de  Commercie  ende  Navigatie  op  de  Oost-zee." 
><'ieupoort  to  De  Witt.  June  11,  1G55. 

-  Nieupoort  to  De  Witt,  June  18,  1655. 

3  Ibid. 

<  Ibid.,  July  30. 

5  Thurloe,  Foreign  Affairs  in  Cromwell's  Time,  Stowe  MSS.,  clxxxv.,  fol.  187. 


28  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

Protector's  distrust.^  The  politics  of  Europe  were  in  fact  in  an  un- 
settled and  confused  state,  in  which  radical  changes  were  easily  possi- 
ble, when  the  occurrence  of  the  massacres  in  Piedmont  decided  the 
Protector  as  to  a  definite  line  of  policy.  The  negotiations  with  France, 
the  Netherlands,  and  Sweden  came  to  a  standstill  until  answers  to 
Cromwell's  letters  on  this  subject  had  been  received.  A  great  deal  de- 
pended upon  the  attitude  of  Sweden,  and  Bonde's  arrival  was  awaited 
with  keen  interest. 

Rumors  and  First  Dijjiculties. — The  brilliant  audience  and  the  sub- 
sequent courtesies  shown  the  Swedish  ambassador  did  not  escape  the 
attention  of  the  foreign  ministers  at  Westminster.  The  Protector 
showed  Bonde  great  attention  and  often  took  him  to  Hampton  Court. 
"  The  other  ambassadors,  who  have  been  here  a  long  time  but  can 
hardly  obtain  an  interview  with  the  Protector,  are  very  jealous  of  us," 
wrote  Ekeblad,  "and  cannot  imagine  why  we  are  courted  so."  This 
conspicuous  favoritism  was  thought  to  have  great  significance,  as  in- 
deed it  had ;  but  those  who  had  most  to  fear  from  an  English-Swedish 
alliance  inferred  too  much  from  it.  "  I  have  advertisement  from  Eng- 
land from  a  very  good  hand,  that  there  has  been  long  a  very  good  un- 
derstanding between  the  king  of  Sweden  and  Cromwell,"  wrote 
Charles  II.'s  secretary  of  state.  "  I  have  also  advertisement,  that 
Cromwell  and  the  Swedish  ambassador  are  exceedingly  intimate.  They 
dine,  sup,  hunt,  and  play  at  bowls  together,  and  never  was  ambassador, 
or  indeed  any  man,  so  much  caressed  and  regarded  by  Cromwell  as 
this  man  is  (who  is  a  person  of  great  esteem  in  Swedland),  nor  did  he 
ever  seek  the  friendship  of  any  one  so  much  as  of  this  king  of  Swede. 
Some  believe  that  France  will  also  join  with  these,  but  I  know  not  how 
that  may  stand  with  the  interest  of  France,  for  I  am  persuaded  that 
Sweden  and  Cromwell  will  endeavour  to  render  themselves  the  protec- 
tors of  all  the  reformed  churches  in  Germany,  France,  etc.,  or  at  least 
])r()cure  from  them  all  a  kind  of  dependence  on  these  godly  reformers. 
*     *     I  am  persuaded  that  if  there  be  any  such  close  league  between 

1  Charles  Gustavus  sent  a  letter  to  Charles  II.  announcing  his  accession,  in  which  he  gave 
him  the  title  King  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Ireland,  arid  professed  his  good  will  and  de- 
sire to  assist.  A  copy  of  it,  together  with  Charles'  reply,  came  into  Thurloe's  hands  (Clar.  S.  P., 
xlix.,  fol.  333).  Correspondents  sent  in  alarming  rumors  of  intended  Swedish  aid  to  Charles 
II.  Charles  sent  an  ambassador.  Sir  Wm.  Bellenden,  to  Sweden,  who  of  course  accomplished 
nothing.  "The  king  is  kindly  disposed,  but  cannot  alter  at  once  what  has  been  done  by  the 
queen,"  he  wrote.  Nicholas  Papers,  ii.,  73.  All  this  was  of  little  or  no  importance,  yet  Crom- 
well was  sensitive  on  this  point,  and  it  may  have  had  some  influence. 


CRinrWELL    AND    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  29 

Cromwell  and  Sweden,  one  part  of  the  desion  is  to  make  Sweden 
master  of  the  Baltie  Sea,  and  that  therein,  and  otherwise,  it  may  prove 
as  rninons  to  the  States  as  to  many  others."  ^ 

This  rnmor  f  )nnd  credenee  elsewhere,  to  the  benefit  of  both  Crom- 
well and  Charles  Gustavus.  On  the  one  hand,  Spain  tnrned  a  deaf 
ear  iov  a  time  to  the  appeals  of  Charles  11.,^  while  on  the  other  hand 
not  only  was  Anstria  diseonraged  from  actively  supporting  Poland/^ 
but  the  Dutch  wisely  refrained  from  assuming  an  aggressive  attitude, 
which  would  certainly  have  offended  the  Protector  and  lessened  the 
chances  tor  a  peaceful  settlement. 

However,  notwithstanding  these  marked  favors,  Bonde's  efforts  to 
hasten  the  ne2:otiations  met  at  first  with  no  success.  Bonde  mio;ht  re- 
ceive  the  most  dinners,  but  Xieupoort  received  the  most  conferences, 
and  Dutch  interests  had  full  hearing;.  Bonde,  like  his  roval  master, 
stood  very  much  on  his  dignity.  He  complained  that  there  was  no 
proper  place  for  him  to  confer  with  any  one.  He  could  not  visit  Thur- 
loe  at  his  house,  like  a  private  solicitor,  he  said,  as  the  Dutch  ambassa- 
dor did.  To  be  sure,  commissioners  were  appointed  to  confer  with 
liim,  with  wJiom  he  had  his  first  conference  on  August  15;  but  Strick- 
land, who  Avas  thought  to  favor  the  Dutch  strongly,  was  one  of  the 
numi)er,  which  made  Bonde  cautious,  while  the  commissioners  on  their 
part  were  extremely  noncommittal.  They  dare  not  for  their  lives  com- 
mit themselves  to  anvthino^,  he  wrote.  It  was  evident  that  while  the 
Protector  was  willing  to  hear  what  Bonde  had  to  propose,  he  was  not 
prepared  as  yet  to  go  further.  Not  only  did  his  ill  health,  the  nego- 
tiations with  France,  and  other  matters  engage  his  attention  at  this 
time,  ])ut  it  was  no  easy  matter  to  reconcile  Charles  Gustavus'  plans 
with  his  own.  The  verv  reason  why  the  Swedes  were  so  anxious  for 
an  English  alliance  was  the  reason  why  the  English  -were  unwilling 

1  Nicholas  to  Jos.  Jane    S.  P.,  Dom.,  Interreg.,  c,  fol.  84. 

•-'  harles  II. 's  ambassador  at  Madrid,  Sir  Henry  Bennet,  sent  most  discouraging  reports.  See 
letters  to  Uyde  in  Clarendon  State  Papers.  "  Indeed  their  [the  Spaniards']  wariness  in  oftend- 
ing  those  [the  English] ,  who  insult  them  upon  every  day  with  doing  them  new  injuries,  I  cannot 
enough  wonder  at.  or  that  they  can  still  imagine  it  possible  to  enter  upon  a  new  treaty  with 
them."    Hyde  to  Sir  II.  de  Vic,  Clar.  S.  P..  1..  fol.  233. 

3  Pribram,  Archiv  fur  Oesterreichische  Geschi^ate,  Ixxv.,  430.  Pribram,  however,  puts  it  a 
trifle  too  strong  when  he  says,  '  Am  Hofe  Charles  II.  hat  man  nie  gezweifelt  dass  welterschiit- 
ternde  Plane  getroflfen  waren."  They  were  strongly  inclined  to  believe  it,  it  is  true,  but  they 
would  hardly  have  sent  an  amVjassador  to  Charles  Gustavus  (p.  2S,  note)  had  they  not  thought 
there  was  still  some  hope  of  the  contrary.  "If  there  be  any  such  close  league,"  said  Nicholas  in 
the  letter  quoted  above. 


30  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

to  grant  it.  Charles  Fleetwood  told  Bonde  in  an  important  interview/ 
that  "  not  only  the  Protector,  but  everybody  who  understood  such  mat- 
ters, saw  that  a  nearer  alliance  with  Sweden  was  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance to  England,  and  that  Bonde's  proposals  were  most  advan- 
tageous ;  but  the  cause  of  the  long  hesitancy  had  been  the  help  which 
the  king  wished  in  the  Baltic,  which  seemed  directed  against  Holland. 
England  was  now  at  peace  with  that  power,  and  the  Protector  consid- 
ered himself  in  honor  bound  not  to  break  it.'^^  Another  cause  for 
the  delav  was  the  awaitino;  the  outcome  of  the  neo^otiations  with 
France,  to  which  the  Piedmont  incident  had  oifered  some  hinclerance.^ 
The  choice  between  an  alliance  with  France  or  Spain  was  the  founda- 
tion upon  which  the  Protector's  whole  foreign  policy  rested,  and  with 
it  his  policy  in  the  North.  He  could  not  well  proceed  with  the  latter 
until  the  former  had  been  settled  beyond  question.  "The  peace  with 
France  was  followed  with  a  war  with  Spain,  and  all  future  treaties 
were  for  the  most  part  managed  with  some  reference  thereunto."  ^ 

CromwelVs  Policy  in  the  North. — The  Piedmont  massacres  and  the 
peace  with  France  were  two  events  which  clariiied  the  Protector's 
foreign  relations.  After  this,  his  aims  were  clear  and  his  methods  of 
reaching  them  simple.  It  may  perhaps  be  well  at  this  point  to  take  a 
more  careful  survey  of  Cromwell's  policy  in  the  North,  of  ^vhich  w^e 
have  already  had  glimpses  in  Nieupoort's  letters. 

In  all  the  Protector's  foreign  relations,  there  were  three  objects 
which  he  never  lost  sight  of:  1.  The  maintenance  and  extension  of  the 
Protestant  religion.  2.  The  prevention  of  the  restoration  of  Charles 
II.     3.  The  encouragement  and  protection  of  English  trade. 

1.  The  tendency  of  recent  historians  of  the  English  Puritan  Revolu- 
tion is  to  lay  greater  stress  on  its  religious  character.  That  religious 
hatred  which  on  the  Continent  had  found  free  play  in  the  Tliirty 
Years'  War,  and  had  burnt  itself  out  to  a  certain  extent,  had  been 
pent  up  in  England  only  to  break  out  fiercer  than  ever  in  shame  at  the 
ignoble  part  England  had  played  in  this  struggle.  Cromwell  shared 
with  his  party  its  over-wrought  religious  feeling,  its  savage  intoler- 


1  October  23,  1655.     Railing,  p.  27,  «v/. 

2  "  De  Hcer  Protector  heeft  my  rondt  uyt  verseeckert,  dat  hy  ten  aensien  van  Sweden  geen 
offres  ofte  invitatic,  dat  waeren  de  eygen  woorden,  sonde  acnnemen  als  gemeen  met  Hollandt." 
Nieupoort  to  De  Witt,  October  29,  1655. 

3Xieupoort  to  De  Witt,  August  20.  1655. 

••  Thurloe,  Foreign  Affiiirs  in  Cromwell's  Time. 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  31 

aiuv  ill  matters  of  civecl,  aiiJ  Its  cuiistaiit  dread  of  a  violent  Catholic 
reaction.'  Already  in  Janiiarv,  l(jo4,  he  thought  he  saw  clear  signs 
of  the  coming  storm.  He  informed  the  Swiss  ambassador  tiiat  the 
Pope  had  formed  a  j^lan  for  reconciling  the  ancient  rivalry  Ix'tween 
France  and  Spain  and  turning  their  united  arms  against  tlie  Protest- 
ants, first  in  Switzerland  and  then  in  the  rest  of  the  world.  An  alli- 
ance between  England,  Switzerland,  and  the  Netherlands  seemed  to  him 
the  onlv  means  of  averting  the  disaster."  AVlien  the  massacres  occurred 
in  Piedmont,  the  already  excited  pul)lic  went  into  a  panic  over  the  event 
and  saw  in  it  only  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  similar  horrors,  all 
instigated  by  the  Ivomish  Antichrist.  The  part  which  Cromwell  played 
in  this  matter  is  well  known.  It  seems  to  me,  in  fact,  to  mark  the 
point  at  which  his  hitherto  somewhat  vague  plans  for  a  Protestant  alli- 
ance took  detinite  forni.^  Considerations  of  religion  took  for  a  time 
precedence  in  his  councils  over  all  other  interests  (p.  41).  A  treaty 
with  France  was  preferred  to  one  with  Spain  for  this  among  other  rea- 
sons,^ and  a  plan  for  a  Protestant  counter-alliance  w^as  conceived  which 

1  He  also  shared  the  prevailing  illusion  that  Charles  Gustavus  was  a  second  crustavus 
Adolphus.  See  Railing's  account  of  his  first  private  interview  with  Bonde,  also  his  speech  to 
Parliament,  poi!^  Even  in  Scotland  this  idea  was  prevalent  among  the  Puritans.  "A.  long 
.tract  of  dreams  I  have  on  the  success  of  Charles,  if  God  help  him  to  begin  where  his  heroic 
uncle  Gustave  left,  but  all  these  I  put  in  God's  hands,  who  knoweth  his  own  appointments." 
Letters  and  Journals  of  Robert  Baillie,  A.  M.,  Principal  of  the  University  of  Glasgow,  iii.,  371. 
"  For  myself,  since  the  battle  of  Leipsig,  I  have  loved  the  house  of  Sweden  to  this  day  above 
all  o  her  foreigners,  and  by  the  strange  successes  God  gives  to  their  valour,  I  expect  more  good 
to  the  Church  from  them  than  from  any  others  ;  hoAvever,  that  unhappy  Christina's  apostasy 
and  after  miscarriages,  has  grieved  my  heart."  Ibid.,  iii.,  370.  "  I  wish  Brandenburg  may  re- 
turn to  his  old  postour,  and  not  draw  ou  himself  next  the  Swedish  armies,  which  the  Lord  for- 
bid ;  for  after  Sweden,  we  love  Brandenburg  next."  Ibid.,  iii.,  371.  "  Det  gemena  folket  talar 
uppenbarligen  jm  borsen  och  gatorna,  att  alia  larda  man  hafva  visat  utaf  Daniels  Prophetia 
och  andra  skal,  att  en  Konung  i  Sverige  och  England  skola  omkullkasta  Pafvarnas  sate  och 
gifva  den  sauna  Guds  akallen  ater  sitt  nitta  flor  och  bruk  igen."  Sonde's  letter  of  August  23, 
1655.    Railing,  p.  18,  note  1. 

2For  this  incident,  as  well  as  for  the  religious  character  of  the  Protector's  policy  in  general, 
see  Stern's  "Oliver  Cromwell  und  die  evangelischen  Rantone  der  Schweiz,"  in  Sybel's  His- 
torische  Zeitschrift.  xl..  pp  52-99. 

3  How  prevalent  the  idea  of  a  Protestant  union  Avas  at  that  time,  not  only  in  England,  but  in 
the  Protestant  world  at  large,  is  shoAvn  by  Rakoczy's  sending  an  ambassador  in  the  latter  part 
of  ir.")4  to  Sweden.  Denmark,  the  Netherlands,  and  England,  asking  to  be  included  in  any  such 
alliance  which  might  be  formed  between  them.  The  ambassador  was  everywhere  well  re- 
ceived. On  May  4, 1655,  he  had  audience  in  London,  but  it  was  May  24  before  he  was  able  to 
present  his  mission  to  the  Protector.  (The  original  is  in  the  British  Museum,  Add.  MSS.,  4156, 
fol.  174.)  Alexander  SzilagA'i,  in  rn<:arische  Revue,  1892,  p.  635.  The  Protector  took  great  in- 
terest in  the  Prince  of  Transylvania.     Urk.  u.  Actenst.,  vii.,  730. 

*  "An  alliance  Avith  France  was  most  agreeable  to  the  strict  intelligence  the  Protector  had, 
and  intended  to  have  Avith  Sweden  and  other  princes  and  states  in  those  parts,  Avhich  Avere  of 
the  same  interest."  Thurloe,  Foreign  Affairs  in  CromAvell's  Time.  "  He  intended  a  good  cor- 
respondence with  the  Protestants  of  France,  and  to  lay  the  foun  'ation  thereof  in  his  interposi- 
tions to  the  French  king  on  their  behalf,  that  their  edict  for  liberty  of  conscience  might  be 


32  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

should  include  not  only  the  powers  of  the  Xorth,  but  Transylvania, 
Brandenburg,  and  even  France.  Brandenburg  was  given  to  under- 
stand that  an  ambassador  would  be  well  received  in  London  and  that 
the  nearotiations  with  Sweden  would  be  delaved  somewhat  to  that 
purpose/ 

2.  This  plan  of  a  great  Protestant  alliance  is  the  key  to  Cromwell's 
foreign  policy.  If  it  could  be  realized  it  would  be  found  to  have  very 
desirable  consequences  in  other  than  strictly  religious  matters.  One 
of  the  chief  dangers  which  threatened  the  Protector  was  the  incessant 
plots  of  the  royalists,  who  found  support  and  comfort  wherever  Crom- 
well had  enemies.  So  long  as  he  had  enemies  he  could  not  hope 
to  isolate  Charles  11.  entirely,  but  his  point  would  be  as  good  as  won 
if  he  could  force  the  king  to  throw  himself  into  the  arms  of  the  Catho- 
lics. The  proposed  alliance  would  have  accomplished  this  result. 
Charles  would  have  been  deprived  of  the  support  of  the  Dutch,  the 
active  assistance  of  Brandenburg  would  cease,  and,  especially,  the  sup- 
port of  France  and  consequently  that  of  the  Scotch,  would  be  taken 
away.  Charles  II.  would  be  thrown  into  the  arms  of  the  Spaniards 
and  the  Irish,  of  all  nations  the  most  hated  in  England.  With  the 
royal  cause  identified  in  the  minds  of  the  English  and  Scotch  with 
these  intense  national  animosities,  sharpened  by  religious  antipathies, 
Cromwell  could  feel  himself  from  this  side  fairly  secure.^ 

3.  The  2:eneral  alliance  would  have  the  final  advantao-e  of  briuffino: 
order  into  the  chaos  of  commercial  relations  in  the  North. 

Cromwell,  with  all  his  religious  fervor,  did  not  underestimate  the 
advantages  of  trade.     On  the  contrary,  he  regarded  it  as  a  producer 

observed  to  them,  whereby,  and  doing  them  on  all  occasions  other  good  offices,  the  oppor- 
tunity whereof  a  good  intelligence  with  the  crown  itself  could  only  give  him,  he  might  draw 
them  into  a  dependence  upon  himself  and  make  and  preserve  an  interest  in  France  in  all 
events,  and  do  that  also  which  would  be  most  acceptable  to  England  and  to  all  other  Protes- 
tants in  the  world,  whose  cause  and  interest  he  prolessedly  asserted,  as  the  head  and  Protec- 
tor of  them,  and  he  had  not  a  greater  consideration  than  this,  in  casting  his  alliance  that  way 
and  in  making  war  against  Spain  and  the  house  of  Austria,  the  head  and  Protector  of  the 
Papists.''  lb.  "  Ick  ben  bedught  ten  aensien  van  de  rupture  met  Spanic.  dat  men  sigh  hier 
ten  hooghsten  sal  gelegen  laeten  wesen  om  Sweden  tegens  den  Keyser  to  engageren,  ende  een 
Ligue  Offensive  ende  Defensive  op  te  reghten  tegens  het  Huys  van  Oostenryck,  funderende 
deselve  principalyken  op  het  interest  van  de  Religie."  Nieupoort  to  De  Witt,  October  22,  1655. 
There  was  much  truth  in  Cromwell's  remark  to  Schlezer  that  he  had  preferred  a  French  to  a 
Spanish  alliance  from  considerations  of  religion.  Schlezer  to  the  Great  Elector,  December 
14, 1655.     Urk.  u.  Actenst.,  vii.,  729. 

lUrk.  u.  Actenst.,  vii.,  717. 

•  Thurloe,  Foreign  Affairs  in  Cromwell's  Time.  The  Clarendon  State  Papers  are  our  chief 
source  of  information  for  the  royalist  plots. 


CROMWELL    AND    ClIAliLES    GUSTAVUS.  33 

of  tlio  sinews  of  war.'  The  Navigation  Act  and  the  eiforts  of  the 
Trade  and  Navigation  Committee  need  only  be  mentioned  in  this 
ennneetion.  It  was  not  indifference  to  these  interests,  therefore,  wliich 
canstnl  liim  to  hold  aloof  from  Charles  Gustavns'  offers  of  privileges  in 
tlie  Ixdtie,  but  the  unsatisfactoriness  of  tlie  offers  and  the  momentous 
eonsenuences  which  their  acceptance  would  have  involved.  Nieupoort 
was  repeatedly  assured  that  the  Protector  understood  perfectlv  the 
consequences  of  the  Swedish  designs  against  Prussia.  Crom\veirs 
acceptance  of  Charles  Gustavus'  proposals  would  have  meant  more  than 
Swedish  control  of  the  Baltic  with  all  the  evil  consequences  which  that 
involved.  It  would  have  brought  about  just  that  unfavorable  politi- 
cal combination  which  he  tried  until  the  end  to  prevent.  Charles 
Gustavus  would  have  been  called  off  from  his  conquest  of  Poland  and 
his  expecttxl  invasion  of  Austria,  to  turn  his  arms  against  Brandenburg, 
Prussia,  and  Denmark;  and  Brandenburg,  Denmark,  and  Holland 
would  have  been  added  to  the  Protector's  already  sufficiently  lonp;  list 
of  enemies.  The  dangers  of  such  a  course  were  plain,  but  the  benefits 
not  so  evident. 

It  had  always  been  the  policy  of  nations  having  commercial  inter- 
ests in  the  Baltic  to  keep  the  control  of  the  ports  in  this  region  di- 
videdjL  not  only  on  account  of  the  customs  duties,  but  because  this  was 
the  great  source  of  ship-building  supplies,  which  could  not  be  allowed 
to  fall  into  the  hands  of  any  one  power.  I  can  find  no  evidence  to 
show  that  the  Protector  was  ever  tempted  to  abandon  this  policy  to 
secure  special  trading  privileges.  Nor,  indeed,  until,  as  we  shall 
see,  at  the  very  last,  when  the  control  of  affairs  in  the  North  was  slip- 
ping from  his  hands,  was  he  willing  at  any  price  to  allow  the  exten- 
sion of  8^vedish  power  over  the  Baltic.^  This  may  perhaps  be  ex- 
})lained  in  part  by  the  fact  that  he  appears  never  to  have  mastered  the 
details  of  the  complicated  affairs  in  the  North,  and  was,  in  consequence, 

1  Carlyle,  Speech  XVIIL 

2  "  Xiim  Borussiam  tanquam  granariuin  Europse  haut  tuto  Svecorum  arbitrio  concedi  insin- 
uabani."  Puf.,  ii.,  \  89.  "  Eoque  Regem  ad  pacem  cum  Polonis  ineundam  urgebant.  ac  ut 
Borussia  decederet.  (luam  ipsam  &  Cromvellus.  amicissimum  so  quamvis  professus,  ipsi  in- 
videbat;  ac  ut  alibi  emolumentum  suum  qutureret  volebat."  Ibid.,  iv.,  g  45.  "  Ick  kan  wel 
bemercken,  datse  gantsch  ongaerne  souden  sieu  dat  Deuomarckcn  of  door  Tractaet  of  door 
Waepenen  aen  Sweden  soude  vastgemaeckt  werden."  Nieupoort  to  De  Witt,  Brieven,  iii.,  92. 
•'*  *  *  Ton  est  icy  bien  aise  dele  voir  puissant  et  capable  de  donner  de  la  jalousie  a  la 
Maison  d'Autriche,  mais  aussy  i>eut  on  trouver  quelque  inconvenient  que  tout  les  Ports  de  la 
mer  Baltique  tombent  soubz  une  mesme  pui.ssance,  et  lorsque  I'interest  particulier  le  permet, 
les  Ministres  de  cet  Estat,  sont  aussez  bous  mesnagers."    Bordeaux  to  Brienne,  July  17,  1656. 

3 


( 


L 


34  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

disinclined  to  break  with  the  traditional  policy  of  all  commercial  na- 
tions having  interests  there/  At  any  rate,  he  assured  Schlezer  that 
his  concern  was  not  so  much  to  secure  minor  trading  privileges,  but 
that  the  dominium  maris  might  be  properly  divided.  If  this  were 
maintained,  other  matters  would  right  themselves.^ 

But  while  the  Protector  could  not  bring  himself  to  support  Charles 
Gustavus  in  his  eifbrt  to  unite  all  the  countries  about  the  Baltic  into  a 
new  kingdom  of  the  North,  which  would  have  controlled  the  tolls  and 
the  maritime  supplies  of  the  Baltic,  neither  could  he  look  on  idly  while 
the  Dutch  and  Danes  destroyed  the  power  of  Sweden.  His  interest 
lay  in  maintaining  the  present  balance  and  in  keeping  matters  in  this 
region  quiet.  If  Sweden  could  only  be  brought  to  direct  its  arms  in 
the  proper  channel,  namely,  against  Austria,  all  this  imrest  in  the 
North  would  cease.  With  the  Protestant  alliance  an  accomplished 
fact,  the  Dutch  need  not  fear  for  their  commerce,  and  the  Swedes,  un- 
deterred by  fear  of  Dutch  and  Danish  forces  in  their  rear,  could  in- 
vade Austria,  and,  if  they  chose,  extend  their  conquests  in  this  direc- 
tion to  the  Caspian  Sea.^ 

Thus,  the  whole  northern  policy  of  Cromwell  may  be  summed  up  in 
one  phrase,  the  general  Protestant  alliance.  All  his  foreign  under- 
takings, and  he  had  a  great  many,  would  be  served  by  it,  and  could  be 
stated  in  terms  of  it.  That  many  motives  were  involved  in  it  there 
can  be  no  doubt.  I  shall  not  attempt  to  decide  which  was  the  domi- 
nant one.  Perhaps  Cromwell  himself  hardly  knew,  for  religious  and 
worldly  interests  were  inextricably  interwoven  in  the  politics  of  the 
17th  centurv.  But  we  can  at  least  sav  that  it  was  the  relio^ious  motiye 
which  furnished  the  key  to  the  solution  of  the  complicated  problem. 
Coming  between  the  religious  wars  of  the  first  half  of  the  1 7th  century 
and  the  dynastic  and  commercial  wars  of  the  second  lialf,  it  is  not  to 
be  wondered  at  that  Cromwell's  policy  was  influenced  by  each  of  these 

1  "Er  konnte  von  den  Ursachcn  der  Misshelligkeit.  die  zwischen  E.  Ch.  D.  iind  dem  Konig 
enlstanden  waren,  nichts  bestandigos  sagen,  und  es  wurde  ihm  nielit  zu  verdenken  sein,  wenn 
er  sich  so  eben  nicht  wiirde  darin  finden  konnen  ;  dann  die  Oerter  waren  etwas  weit  abgele- 
gen ;  hatte  keine  eigentliche  (lemeinschaft  mit  diesen  Landcn :  die  Intcresse,  die  jura,  die 
privilegia  Avaren  etwas  verwickelt  und  hicselbst  niclit  so  gar  wohl  bekannt."  Urk.  u.  Actenst, 
vii.,  734.    Also,  lb.,  p.  745. 

2  "  Denn  der  Herr  Protector  hat  die  Maxime,  dass  er  sich  nicht  um  die  Commercien  so  gross, 
als  um  das  dominium  maris  (denen  jene  folgcn  mussen)  bekiimmert."    Ibid.,  737. 

3  Kalling,  ]).  24.  The  Protector  was  indeed  willing  that  Charles  Gustavus  should  extend  his 
conquests  from  Poland  south  to  the  Caspian  Sea,  but  he  was  not  willing  that  he  should  conquer 
the  territory  from  Poland  north  to  the  Baltic  Sea. 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLES    GUST  A  V  US.  35 

interests,  and,  aceordino-  to  the  course  of  political  events,  in  varying 
dciJ-rees. 

Prof/re^sfi  of  the  Ncf/ofiafions;  Neiv  Difficulties. — On  the  24th  of 
October  the  treaty  with  France  was  brought  to  a  conclusion.  On  the 
2d  of  Xoveniber  there  were  sisrns  that  the  Council  was  readv  to  take 
up  the  Swedish  negotiations,  for  a  committee  was  appointed  to  confer 
with  the  Protector  concerning  certain  matters  comnuuiicated  bv  the 
Swedish  anil)assador.  On  the  14th  of  November  a  new  committee  was 
appointed  to  take  the  same  matter  in  hand,  and  was  ordered  to  meet 
daily  until  they  had  prepared  something  to  offer,  and  "to  report  the 
same  with  all  possible  speed.''  ^ 

Yet  the  negotiations  did  not  make  the  progress  Bonde  desired. 
The  Protector's  suspicions  had  been  aroused  that  the  king's  religious 
pretensions  were  not  entirely  sincere.  Bonde's  statement  to  the  first 
commissioners  was  unfortunate  and  mav  have  come  to  the  Protector's 
ear.^  Though  Bonde  afterwards  adopted  a  different  tone,  as  in  his 
intervicAv  with  Fleetwood,  October  25,  and  endeavored  to  give  all  his 
proposals  a  religious  color,  the  Protector  was  suspicious.  It  was 
nothing  new,  he  said  to  Schlezer,  to  use  religion  as  a  cloak  for  one's 
ambition.'^  Nor  did  Charles  Gustavus  improve  matters  by  granting 
religious  toleration  to  the  Catholics  in  Poland,  for  though  Cromwell 
was  exceedingly  tolerant  towards  Protestant  sects,  his  toleration  did 
not  extend  even  in  the  slightest  degree  to  the  adherents  of  Rome. 
Bonde  had,  indeed,  a  difficult  role  to  play,  and  though  it  is  not  clear 
how  he  could  have  proceeded  differently,  the  impression  he  made  was 
not  favorable.  Tt  ^vas  doubted  whether  he  had  sufficient  instructions 
to  enter  into  an  alliance  such  as  was  desired. 

The  Protector  always  preferred  playing  the  part  of  hammer  to 
that  of  anvil ;  consequently,  whenever  negotiations  proceeded  unsatis- 

1  S.  p.  Dom.,  Interreg.,  Lxxvi.,  364  and  374. 

2 '-The  Protestant  religion  had  now  nothing  to  fear,"  he  said  to  the  English  commissioners 
at  their  first  meeting.  "The  Catholics  had  made  no  attack  on  it  except  in  Savoy,  and  that  was 
a  matter  of  little  importance."  Railing,  p.  17.  "As  for  religion,"  Bonde  wrote  to  Charles  Gus- 
tavus, "  it  could,  to  be  sure,  be  made  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  a  closer  alliance,  but  the  mention  of 
it  in  the  treaty  should  be  avoided  :  for  its  main  purpose  is  to  protect  religion  and  its  confessors 
in  case  they  are  attacked  by  Catholics,  but  not  to  try  to  convert  the  Catholics  or  persecute 
them  through  a  Protestant  inquisition  ;  but  to  allow  them  free  exercise  of  their  rights  so  long 
as  they  do  not  plot  against  us,  and  to  seek  to  inlluence  them  through  kindness."  lb.,  p.  17.  I 
do  not  know  whether  this  was  Charles  Gustavus'  opinion  also.  In  response  to  Cromwell's  let- 
ter concerning  these  massacres,  he  had  sent  a  protest  to  the  Duke  of  Savoy,  which  is  now  in 
the  archives  at  Turin  (Lettere  di  principi,  Svezia). 

3  Schlezer  to  the  Cireat  Elector,  Januarv  11.  16')(3.     I'rk.  u.  Actenst..  vii..  733. 


36  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

factorilv,  or  visiting  ambassadors  tried  to  avoid  the  direct  issue  and  to 
bargain  with  liim,  he  immediately  began  to  discuss  the  plan  of  treat- 
ing through  his  own  ambassador  at  the  other  court.  Nieupoort  had 
noticed  the  Protector's  dissatisfaction  and  had  encouraged  it.  The 
plan  of  sending  an  ambassador  to  Charles  Gustavus  in  Poland  was 
earnestly  debated  for  some  time,  but  the  obstacles  seemed  insurmount- 
able. Not  only  did.  there  seem  to  be  no  suitable  person  to  send,  but 
the  journey  to  Poland  at  this  time  of  the  year  was  so  toilsome  and 
dangerous,  and  the  communication  so  difficult,  that  Thurloe  told  Nieu- 
poort  it  might  perhaps  be  better  to  begin  the  negotiations  with  Bonde, 
trusting  that  his  instructions  would  prove  sufficient.^ 

Bonde's  impatience  had  at  last  grown  so  demonstrative"  that  it  was 
necessary  to  make  some  show  of  coming  to  the  point.  Accordingly, 
on  December  5,  three  commissioners  were  named  to  carry  on  the 
negotiations.  They  Avere  Whitelocke/  Strickland,  and  Fiennes.  It 
was  by  these  that  the  commercial  treaty  of  July  17  was  signed.  The 
matter  of  a  closer  alliance  was  negotiated  by  Bonde  partly  with  them, 

1  Nieupoort  to  Do  Witt,  November  19  and  26.  Edward  Rolt,  who  had  been  sent  to  the  king  of 
Sweden  with  the  Protector's  ratitication  of  the  treaty  of  Upsala,  was  now  with  the  king  in 
Poland,  begging  constantly  to  be  recalled.  He  received  many  marks  of  preference  and  honor, 
which  of  course  did  not  escape  the  attention  of  the  other  ambassadors  there,  but  his  mission 
appears  to  have  had  no  further  significance.  No  news  had  been  received  from  him  for  a  num- 
ber of  weeks,  which  must  have  convinced  the  Protector  of  the  futility  of  sending  another 
ambassador  thither.  Rolfs  instructions  and  dispatches  are  printed  in  volumes  iii.  and  iv.  of 
the  Thurloe  Papers.  The  instructions  are  undated,  but  I  judge  from  internal  evidence  that 
they  were  written  between  the  10th  and  18th  of  July,  1655. 

-  Whitelocke's  Memorials,  p.  633. 

3  Whitelocke  was  the  most  favorably  inclined  towards  Sweden  of  any  one  of  influence  in 
England.  His  partisanship  appeared  indeed  so  marked  that  he  was  taken  severely  to  account 
for  it  in  the  Council,  and  when  he  attended  Bonde's  reception  of  the  birth  of  the  young  Prince 
Charles  of  Sweden,  he  tells  us  that  the  Dutch  ambassador  treated  him  coldly.  "  It  was  a  very 
great  feast  of  seven  courses,  the  Swedish  ambassador  was  very  courteous  to  me,  but  the  Dutch 
and  others  were  reserved  towards  me,  and  I  as  much  to  them."  Memorials,  p.  634.  He  was 
naturally  proud  of  his  treaty  of  Upsala,  1654,  and  was  anxious  that  something  further  should 
come  of  it.  He  appears  to  have  formed  a  friendship  with  the  Swedish  chancellor,  Erik  Ox- 
enstierna,  during  the  latter  part  of  his  stay  in  Sweden.  Fries.  Erik  Oxenstierna,  p.  140.  Coyet 
had  instructions  to  visit  him  with  assurances  of  the  king's  esteem,  and  to  ask  his  advice  as  to 
the  best  method  of  proceeding  in  the  objects  of  his  mission.  Instructions,  'i  9.  Bonde  sent  his 
secretary  with  greetings  as  soon  as  he  had  landed  at  Gravesend,  and  it  was  his  great  desire  to 
have  Whitelocke  appointed  commissioner,  which  was  prevented  for  some  time  by  the  strained 
relations  between  Whitelocke  and  Cromwell,  though  his  knowledge  of  Swedish  affairs  and 
trade  was  of  course  very  extensive.  His  name  occurs  constantly  in  connection  with  this  em- 
bassy, and  he  is  always  to  a  remarkable  degree  friendly  to  Sweden.  He  was  also  a  member 
of  the  new  Trade  and  Navigation  Committee.  His  Memorials  of  the  English  Affairs  contains 
cojnous  references  to  the  negotiations  after  the  appointment  of  the  new  commissioners  on  De- 
cember 5,  1655,  just  at  the  point  where  Kalling's  narrative  breaks  off.  The  references  in  the 
following  pages  to  the  Memorials  arc  to  the  folio  edition  of  1732,  or  to  the  marginal  pagination 
of  the  Oxford  edition  of  1853. 


:i 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLP:8    GU.STAVU8.  37 

l)ut  })rin('ij>ally  with  tlio  Prokx'tor  hiinscll'.  J^oiide's  diarv  gives  the 
dates  hut  not  tlic  suhjeet-niatter  of  audiences  wliich  he^an  to  1)6  fre- 
quent at  tliis  time,  and  wliicli  lie  tells  us  were  important.  Xieupoort 
also  had  more  frecpient  audienees,  and  his  letters  become  more  in- 
structive. 

Yet  if  Bonde  exjx'cted  that  now  finally  his  mission  would  make 
some  progress,  he  was  destined  to  be  again  disappointed.  Another 
cause  of  suspicion  and  delay  had  arisen,  for  Charles  Gustavus  had 
turned  his  arms  against  the  Elector  of  J^randenl)urg.  It  is  true  the 
initiative  had  been  taken  by  Brandenbiu-g,  but  Cromwell  could  not  be 
expected  from  the  fragmentary  reports  which  reached  him  to  know 
this.  He  saw  in  it  an  attack  on  a  Protestant  ])rince  (though  to  be 
sure  an  unfriendly  one),  for  the  purpose  of  getting  control  of  Prussia. 
There  were  omnious  signs  of  his  displeasure.  His  relations  w^ith  the 
Dutch  ambassador  became  more  cordial  and  confidential.  Bonde  ex 
plained  as  best  he  could,  but  with  little  success,  and  it  was  even  said 
that  when  he  beo;an  as  usual  to  testifv  to  his  roval  master's  devotion 
to  the  Protestant  cause,  the  Protector  had  interrupted  him.  The 
project  of  sending  an  English  ambassador  thither  was  revived,  and, 
naturally,  the  Dutch  encouraged  the  plan.^  AVhitelocke's  name  had  been 
mentioned  very  early,  but  he  appears  to  have  been  somewhat  distrusted. 
Af  last,  however,  it  was  decided  to  send  him  in  company  with  Chris- 
topher Pack,  the  lord  mayor  of  London."  But  AMiitelocke  objected 
strenuously,  and  "endeavoured  by  all  handsome  pretences  to  be  excused 
that  service."^  On  the  14th  of  eTanuary  Xieupoort  wrote  that  the 
Protector  had  said,  "If  the  king  of  Sweden  desisted,  wtII  and  good, 
but  if  he  continued,  he  would  require  something  else  than  ambassa- 
dors."^ 

The  news  that  he  had  desisted  was  received  bv  the  Protector  with 
great  pleasure,  and  in  a  reply  to  a  letter  announcing  the  birth  of  the 

1  De  Witt  to  Nieupoort,  January  7,  1656. 

2  He  was  later  the  mover  of  the  Petition  and  Advice. 

3 This  incident  attracted  con.siderable  attention  at  the  time.  Whitelocke  devotes  considera- 
ble space  to  it.    Memorials,  633,  .srr/.    See  alsoNieupoorf  s  dispatches  and  Pufendorff,  iii.,  §76. 

4  ••  *  *  de  Heer  Protector  seyde,  *  *  dat  hy  albereyts  met  ernst  over  de  sacken  van  den 
Koningh  van  Polen  ende  Pruyssen  met  Bond  en  Cojet  hadt  gesproocken,  dat  hy  nogh  naeder 
met  haer  sonde  handelen,  end  byaldien  de  Koningh  van  Sweden  desisteert,  dat  het  dan  wel 
sonde  wesen,  maer  gaet  hy  voort,  dat'er  wat  anders  als  Ambassadeurs  sal  verey.scht  Avorden." 
Thurloe  assured  Nieupoort  that  England  and  Holland  "  niet  superficielycken  maer  inner- 
lycken  aen  den  anderen  moesten  gebonden  houden."    Ibid. 


38  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

young  prince  of  Sweden  lie  expresses  his  satisfaction  at  the  treaty 
of  Konigsberg  in  the  following  terms  :  "  For  we  make  no  question 
but  the  wresting  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland  by  your  arms  from  the 
Papal  Empire,  as  it  were  a  horn  from  the  head  of  the  Beast,  and  your 
peace  made  with  the  Duke  of  Brandenburg,  to  the  great  satisfaction  of 
all  the  pious,  though  with  growls  from  your  adversaries,  will  be  of 
very  great  consequence  for  the  peace  and  profit  of  the  Church.  May 
God  grant  an  end  worthy  of  such  worthy  beginnings !  ^'  ^  This  "  we 
look  upon  here  as  a  very  good  advantage  to  the  Protestant  cause,'' 
wrote  Thurloe,  '^  hoping  that  if  the  SAvede  can  settle  his  affairs  in  those 
parts,  he  may  be  a  great  succour  to  the  Protestants,  who  are  every- 
where threatened  by  the  Popish  party.'' ^ 

Both  these  letters  bear  traces  of  the  renewed  apprehension  of  Cath- 
olic aggression  which  spread  over  England  at  this  time.^  The  Pope 
was  endeavoring  to  effect  a  union  of  France  and  Spain,  and  it  was  re- 
ported that  Queen  Christina  was  going  to  Paris  in  the  interest  of  it. 
"The  general  peace  between  the  Popish  party  advanceth,"  wrote 
Thurloe  to  General  Montague  on  April  28.  "It  is  probable  that  a 
truce  may  be  agreed  upon  between  Spain  and  France  for  six  years," 
he  wrote  on  the  1 3th.^  These  movements  were  watched  closely  by  the 
Protector.  They  were  partly  favorable  and  partly  unfavorable  to  the 
Swedish  designs ;  for  while  they  made  him  more  zealous  in  the  cause 
of  the  Protestant  union,  he  was  still  less  inclined  to  proceed  in  it  with- 
out the  Dutch.     If  a  Catholic  league  were  effected,  it  would  as  a 

1  Milton,  Literse,  110.  See  Masson,  v.,  246,  seq.,  whose  translation  I  have  used,  for  a  detailed 
account  of  this  letter ;  but  he  seems  to  me  to  miss  the  point  of  it  when  he  ascribes  its  lauda- 
tory tone  merely  to  a  desire  to  propitiate  the  king  for  the  delay  in  Sonde's  negotiations.  This 
explanation  would  rob  the  passage  I  have  quoted  of  its  significance.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the 
Protector  was  in  good  humor  with  Charles  Gustavus  for  the  moment,  and  for  the  reasons  given. 

2  Thurloe  to  Pell,  February  7,  1655-6.  Landsdowne  MSB.,  753,  fol.  259.  See  also  Urk.  u. 
Actenst.,  vii.,  735. 

3  "  Wie  ihm  aber  sei,  so  wird  man  alhicr  je  langer  je  mehr  in  dcr  Opinion  confirmiret,  dass 
aus  dcm  jetzigcn  Wesen  ein  rechter  generaler  und  pur  lauterer  Religionskrieg  werden  werde." 
Schlezer  to  the  Great  Elector,  March  16.    Urk.  u.  Actenst.,  vii.,  741.    Ibid.,  747. 

*  Carte  MSS.,  Ixxiv.,  fol.  52  and  .54.  Also  Puf.,  ii.,  §91.  It  was  this  lack  of  cordiality  and  mu- 
tual trust  thit  prevented  the  co-operation  of  England  and  France  in  the  North,  notwithstanding 
the  similarity  of  their  aims,  of  which  they  were  fully  conscious.  "*  *  *  il  est  d'ailleurs, 
autant  de  I'intcrest  du  Protecteur  que  de  Sa  Ma'te  que  la  tranquillite  ne  soit  pas  si  establie  en 
Allemagne,  ny  les  jalousies  si  esteintes,  que  les  Forces  de  I'Emporeur  ayent  libcrte  de  venir  a 
la  solde  d'Espagne."  Bordeaux  to  Brienne,  May  22.  "Je  parlay  [to  Thurloe]  des  Ditferens 
entre  le  Protectour  et  des  Provinces-Unies,  et  soubzles  nom  des  celles-cy,  des  affaires  de  Suede, 
de  la  jalousie  que  ses  progrez  luy  donnoient,  et  de  I'avantage  que  la  France  et  I'Anglet're  re- 
cevroiont  si  ceste  Couronne  tournoit  ses  armes  contre  le  pays  de  ceux  qui  envoyent  du  se- 
cours  a  I'Espagne."    lb.,  June  20. 


CROMUEI.L    AND    (  HARLES    GUSTAVUS.  39 

matter  of  course  espouse  the  cause  of*  Charles  II.  It  was  impossible 
to  drive  the  Dutch  and  Brandenburo-  to  that  side  also. 

The  first  stage  in  the  realization  of  tlie  Protector's  great  foreign 
policy  remained,  therefore,  now,  as  before,  the  pacification  of  the 
powers  of  the  North.  The  Treaty  of  Kdnigsberg  did  not  bring  this 
about,  but  it  was  a  long  step  in  that  direction.  The  more  difficult  task 
of  reconciling  Sweden  and  the  Xetherlands  yet  remained.  '^  It  is  true," 
wrote  Thurloe,^  "there  is  some  jealousy  between  him  [Charles  Gusta- 
vus]  and  the  Dutch,  and  some  unkindnesses  have  passed  between  them, 
but  my  Lord  Protector  is  resolved  to  use  all  possible  endeavours  to 
unite  and  reconcile  them."  ^ 

Two  Proposals  for  an  AlUance. — On  January  31,  after  much  im- 
patient chafing  on  the  part  of  the  Swedish  ambassador,  articles  for  a 
treaty  on  the  basis  of  this  policy  w^ere  submitted  to  him.  But  the  as- 
tonishment ^vith  which  they  were  received,  betrays  at  once  ho^v  much 
the  demands  of  Charles  Gustavus  and  Cromwell  w^ere  at  variance  and 
how  little  Bonde  had  succeeded  in  fathoming  Cromwell's  real  inten- 
tions." In  an  interview^  with  Charles  Fleetwood,  Bonde  expressed 
his  indignation  without  measure,^  though  to  the  English  commissioners 
he  appears  to  have  been  more  reserved.  "The  ambassador  seemed 
much  unsatisfied  with  divers  parts  of  the  articles,"  says  Whitelocke, 
"and  said  that  he  had  no  commission  to  treat  of  any  matter  con- 
cerning tlie  United  Provinces  to  be  included,  and  was  much  nettled 
at  that  business.  In  discourse  touching  a  general  union  of  the  Pro- 
testant interests,  he  said  it  would  be  a  difficult  work  ;  and  as  for  his 
master's  falling  upon  the  emperor,  he  said  that  they  in  Sweden  did 
not  wish  it  to  be  so,  because  they  doubted  that  then  Sweden  A\ould  be 

1  In  the  letter  to  Pell  quoted  above. 

2 Bonde  would  not  have  been  so  taken  aback  at  the  nature  of  these  proposals  if  he  had  had 
the  privilege  of  reading  Nieupoort's  dispatches.  As  early  as  September  28,  Xieupoort  had 
written  :  "  *  *  *  de  Protector  seyde,  dat  het  best  sonde  wesen  Sweden  mede  te  bewegen  tot 
een  gemeene  Alliancie  met  hem,  Engelandt,  Denemarcken,  de  Geunieerde  Provincien,  ende 
den  Keurvorst  van  Brandcnburgh  op  te  reghten,  in  dewelcke  men  den  anderen  sonde  verseeck- 
eren  de  vryheyt  van  de  Commercie  ende  Navigatie."  "*  *  *  hy  [Cromwell]  meende  om 
een  vast  ende  solide  werck  te  maken,  dat  men  Sweden  behoorde  te  inviteren,  omme  met  dcsen 
Staet,  Denemarcken,  de  Geunieerde  Provincien  ende  den  Heer  Keurvorst  een  naeder  defen- 
sive Ligue  te  maken,  ende  voorts  discourerende,  seyde,  dat  als  men  die  ook  offensive  sonde 
willen  maken,  tegens  het  Huys  van  Oostenryck,  dat  Vranckryck  daer  mede  wel  toe  be  te 
brengen  sonde  wesen."  Nieupoort  to  De  Witt.  January  14,  1G56.  One  infers  from  various 
phrases  in  Pufendorff  that  Cromwell  had  endeavored  to  make  the  matter  clear,  but  that  Bonde, 
in  his  impetuous  desire  to  believe  otherwise,  did  not  give  the  Protector's  words  due  weight. 

3Pufendorff,  iii.,  §77. 


40  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

neglected.  He  declared  his  opinion  to  be,  not  to  meddle  with  the 
great  business  of  the  Protestant  Union ;  nor  to  have  to  do  with  the 
United  Provinces  in  this  or  any  other  treaty  ;  but  he  said  that  they 
might  send  to  the  king  his  master  at  their  pleasure,  and  have  a  fitting 
answer."^  Cromwell's  suspicions  that  Bonde  was  not  authorized  to 
enter  into  an  agreement  such  as  he  desired  was  well  founded. 

The  negotiations  were  scarcely  interrupted  by  this  disagreement.     In 
consequence  of  the  Protector's  proposal  to  send  an  ambassador  to 
Charles  Gustavus,  new  instructions  had  been  sent  Bonde,  which  he  re- 
ceived on  February  8,  so  that  the  conferences  could  be  resumed  with 
hardly  an  interruption,  with  wider  powers  and  better  prospect  of  suc- 
cess.    The  favorable  outcome  of  the  mission  still  seemed  by  no  means 
improbable.     There  had  been  from  the  first  two  possible  ways  of  com- 
ing to  an  agreement;  either  Cromwell  might  be  bribed,  as  it  were,  to 
undertake  with  Sweden  the  spoliation  of  the  Dutch  trade,  or  Charles 
Grustavus  must  allow  his  arms  to  be  directed  against  Austria.     The 
first  alternative  had  already  proved  impracticable.     Bonde  was  in- 
structed not  to  renew  his  oflPers  of  trading  privileges,  since  the  English 
did  not  appreciate  their  value.     But  it  seemed  that  Charles  Gustavus 
must  be  driven  to  accept  the  second  alternative.     Affairs  in  Poland 
were  such  that  the  support  of  Cromwell  seemed  indispensable  to  Swe- 
den.    Lisola  reported  at  the  close  of  1655  that  everybody  in  the  king's 
following  admitted  that  another  war  must  follow  the  one  then  in  prog- 
ress, though  there  was  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  with  whom.     Some 
thought  with  Austria,  some  with  Russia  or  the  Turk,  some  with  Den- 
mark.    If  it  proved  to  be  with  Austria,  England  and  Sweden  would 
have  a  common  cause ;  if  with  Russia,  England  could  be  of  the  great- 
est aid  in  destroying  the  port  of  Archangel  and  drawing  the  Russian 
trade  to  the  Baltic;  if  with  Denmark,  the  Netherlands  must  first  be 
overthrown,  to  which  end  the  support  of  England  was  indispensable." 
Nevertheless,  Charles  Gustavus  could  not  bring  himself  to  make  the 
required  concession.     He  tried  in  an  ingenious  manner  to  avoid  the  di- 
rect issue.     But  no   subterfuge  could   be  ingenious  enough  to  satisfy 
Cromwell,  who  ^vas  not  the  man  to  be  either  trifled  or  bargained  ^vith.^ 
The  unsuccessful  outcome  of  Bonde's  mission  could  now  be  foreseen. 

1  Whiteloeke's  Memorials,  634. 

2  Ferdinand  Hirsch  in  Sybel's  Historische  Zeitschrift,  Ix.,  478. 

3  Gardiner,  vii.,  194. 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLE.S    (JU.STAVUS.  41 

"The  Swedish  ambassador,"  says  Whiteloeke,  "received  new  ad- 
vices from  the  kino-  liis  master,  concerniug  the  great  business  of  unit- 
inof  the  Protestant  interest;  and  owned  that  he  had  sufficient  instruc- 
tions  to  conchide  upon  the  general ;  but  that  [)articulars  could  not  so 
soon  be  determined,  nor  so  well  as  upon  the  place ;  that  it  would  be  a 
difficult  matter  to  unite  the  several  l*rotestants  who  have  different  in- 
terests, and  that  it  would  prove  a  long  business :  therefore  his  opin- 
ion was,  that  it  was  not  a  seasonable  time  for  a  general,  union  of  the 
Protestant  interest.  But  that  if  the  king  of  Sweden  and  the  Protector 
made  a  conjunction  first,  they  might  fall  upon  the  emperor  and  the 
house  of  Austria,  which  would  be  of  great  advantage  to  England,  es- 
pecially now  they  had  war  with  Spain :  and  that  some  supply  of  money 
and  men  afforded  to  the  king  upon  such  a  design,  would  be  of  more 
benefit  to  the  Protector  than  the  sending  out  of  great  fleets  to  the 
Indies,  and  to  the  coast  of  Spain,  which  would  return  no  benefit  to 
this  nation."  But  "the  opinion  of  the  Swedish  ambassador  was 
plainly  to  be  collected,  not  to  admit  the  Dutch  to  be  joined  in  a  treaty 
with  us."^  On  February  15,  a  plan  for  an  alliance,  ostensibly  on  this 
basis,  was  presented  by  Bonde,  the  details  of  which  are  stated  so  con- 
cisely by  Whiteloeke  that  I  shall  quote  the  passage  below.^ 

The  negotiations  for  the  next  few  weeks  turned  upon  this  Swedish 
proposal.  Cromwell,  in  his  desire  to  keep  the  peace  with  Holland  and 
to  direct  the  Swedish  arms  against  Austria,  demanded  that  the  alliance 
be  directed  expressly  against  Austria,  Poland,  and  Charles  Stuart. 
Cliarles  Gustavus,  however,  in  spite  of  what  Bonde  said  to  the  con- 
trary, wanted  to  leave  the  matter  of  attacking  Austria  more  or  less 
open,  to  be  decided  according  to  the  future  course  of  events ;  but  the 
treaty  of  alliance  must  be  so  worded  as  to  be  effective  against  the 
Dutch  and  Danes.  Consequently,  he  demanded  that  no  party  should 
be  expressly  named,  but  that  it  should  be  made  against  all  their  ene- 
mies. If  Cromwell  would  not  guarantee  him  his  Polish  conquests, 
es})ecially  against  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands,  he  wrote  on  January 
20,  tiie  alliance  would  be  of  little  advantage  to  him."^  Cromwell,  on 
the   other  hand,  demanded  that  the  league  should  be  offensive  and 

1  Whiteloeke,  Memorials,  033. 

2  They  are  also  given  by  Pufendorff  (iii.,  g  75)  under  date  of  January  6,  presumably  the  date 
of  the  instructions  which  Bonde  received  on  February  8. 

5  Pufendorff,  iii.,  3  75. 


42  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

defensive,  in  order  that  he  might  be  sure  that  Charles  Gustavus  would 
carry  out  the  agreement.  But  Charles  Gustavus  wanted  a  defensive 
league  only.  Cromwell's  proposal,  he  said,  would  be  regarded  and 
accepted  by  Austria  as  a  declaration  of  war.  Finally,  while  both 
Cromwell  and  Charles  Gustavus  professed  to  have  no  stronger  interest 
than  the  maintenance  of  the  Protestant  cause  and  the  promotion  of  the 
Protestant  union,. they  disagreed  as  to  the  best  method  of  bringing  it 
about.  Cromwell  was  for  immediate  union  of  all  the  Protestant  pow- 
ers. Bonde  dwelt  upon  the  difficulties  of  such  an  ambitious  plan,  and 
proposed  the  union  of  England  and  Sweden  as  a  beginning,  to  which 
other  powers  could  afterwards  be  drawn  in.  Even  Nieupoort  objected 
to  Cromwell's  plan  as  too  ambitious,^  but  it  seems  to  me  characteristic 
of  its  author.  All  these  diiferences  appeared  during  the  whole  course 
of  the  ensuing  negotiations,  and  both  sides  held  to  their  views  with 
great  presistency. 

That  the  negotiations  proceeded  so  slowly  is  explained  by  the 
Protector's  occupation  with  other  matters.  The  complaint  of  the 
slowness  with  which  business  was  dispatched  was  general  among  the 
ambassadors.  It  was  almost  impossible  to  obtain  audience.^  Conse- 
quently, though  Bonde's  proposition  was  made  February  15,  it  was 
some  weeks  before  he  began  to  realize  that  they  were  to  be  of  no  avail. 
But  as  the  prospect  for  an  agreement  became  more  distant  and  it 
began  to  be  evident  that  the  king  had  all  and  more  than  he  could  at- 
tend to  in  Poland,  the  Protector  began  to  grow  cold.^  At  this  Bonde's 
wrath  knew  no  bounds.  He  was  endowed  with  a  full  share  of  north- 
ern vigor,  and  expressed  himself  accordingly.  "  In  his  country,"  he 
said  to  Whitelocke,  ^^  when  a  man  professed  sincerity,  they  understood 
it  to  be  plain  and  clear  dealing ;  that  if  one  were  desired  to  do  a  thing, 

1  Nieupoort  to  De  Witt,  January ^14,  1656. 

2  Schlezer  to  the  Great  Elector,  April  25, 1656.    Bordeaux  to  Brienne,  May  29,  1656. 

^Thurloe  sent  General  Montague  (Carte  MSS.,  Ixxiii.,  fol.  13)  a  most  discouraging  account 
of  Charles  Gustavus'  affairs,  "  who  will  meet  with  many  difficulties  more  to  keep  his  con- 
quests than  he  had  to  make  them."  The  Cossacks  and  Tartars  were  on  the  side  of  Poland, 
Danzig  was  disposed  to  hold  out  to  the  last  extremity,  and  a  war  with  the  ISIuscovites  appeared 
very  likely.  "  These  things  make  me  think  that  the  Swede  is  like  to  have  a  hot  summer  of  it, 
especially  if  we  add  to  what  is  said  before  that  the  States  General  are  sending  48  ships  into  the 
Baltic  Sea  to  oppose  him  also,  and  are  labouring  all  they  can  to  engage  Denmark  with  them. 
Some  of  the  48  ships  are  already  sailed,  but  j'et  nothing  is  pretended  by  them  but  fairness,  and 
to  have  no  intention  but  to  preserve  their  navigation  and  commerce;  but  the  Swede  knows 
their  meaning."  There  had  been  rumors  of  the  king's  defeat  current  in  England  for  weeks 
together,  which  were  readily  believed. 


CK0M\VP:LI.    AM)    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  43 

if  lie  nu'aiit  to  do  it,  ho  would  siiy,  yea,  and  do  it  accordingly:  but  if 
lie  did  not  intend  to  do  it,  tluMi  lie  would  at  tlie  first  desire  to  be  ex- 
cused, and  not  seem  at  one  time  to  be  willing  to  do  it,  and  at  another 
time  to  deny  it,  *  *  that  he  should  have  l)een  contented  if  he 
might  have  had  the  honour  to  have  laid  the  foundation  of  that  great 
business  for  the  glory  of  God,  to  unite  the  Protestant  interest;  and  the 
particulars  thereof  to  have  been  left  to  a  new  treaty  with  the  king, 
by  an  ambassador  from  the  Protector,  when  there  might  be  full  time 
to  consider  all  grounds  and  circumstances  thereof."' 

At  a  conference  a  few  days  later  Whitelocke  was  commissioned  by 
the  Protector  to  visit  Bonde  and  assure  him  of  the  sinceritv  of  the 
Protector's  attentions.  ^^According  to  the  direction  of  his  Highness," 
he  tells  us  under  date  of  April  7,  '^  I  went  this  morning  to  the  Swed- 
ish ambassador,  and  delivered  to  him  what  I  was  directed  from  the 
Protector,  as  much  to  his  Highness'  advantage  as  I  could  improve  it; 
and  endeavoured  to  satisfy  the  ambassador  that  his  Highness'  inten- 
tions and  inclinationsas  to  a  nearer  alliance  with  the  king  of  Sweden 
were  the  same  still  as  at  first,  and  that  he  had  a  very  good  inclination 
to  it,  and  was  reallv  desirous  of  it. 

''The  ambassador  answered,  'That  perhaps  his  Highness  had  no 
great  mind  at  the  first  to  a  nearer  alliance  with  the  king  of  Sweden,  and 
so  might  have  the  same  intentions  still :  That  he  could  not  but  wonder 
that  his  Highness  should  heretofore  express  himself  so  well  inclined 
to  that  nearer  alliance,  and  at  his  last  audience  to  be  so  cold  in  it,  and 
of  another  opinion  tliaii  he  was  before;  which  would  make  him  seem 
to  his  master  either  negligent  as  to  his  service,  or  not  at  all  thought 
worthy  of  regard  here ;  but  he  desired  to  know  a  certain  answer,  ay  or 
no,  whether  he  would  do  it  or  not ;  and  if  he  had  no  mind  to  it,  that 
then  there  might  lie  a  dispatch  of  what  was  left  to  be  done  upon  the 
treaty  made  by  me,  and  so  he  might  kiss  the  Protector's  hand  and  re- 
turn to  his  master.' 

"I,  seeing  him  in  such  a  humour  of  discontent,  sought  to  divert  him, 
and  to  satisfy  him  that  the  Protector  was  still  very  well  inclined  to  the 
point  of  a  nearer  alliance  with  the  king  of  Sweden,  but  found  it  diffi- 
cult to  make  him  of  that  persuasion  ;  yet  thought  it  fit  to  demand  of 
him  what  those  propositions  were  which  he  delivered  to  the  Protector 

1  Whitelocke's  Memorials,  G37. 


44  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

concerning  the  nearer  alliance.  Whereupon  the  ambassador  showed  me 
the  propositions  he  had  delivered  in  to  that  purpose^  which  were, '  To 
have  a  league  defensive  contra  omnes  gentes,  and  offensive  as  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  treaty  of  Augsburg ;  that  the  Protector  should  con- 
tribute 200,000/.  per  annum  to  that  design,  when  undertaken,  and  the 
king  should  have  30,000  foot  and  6,000  horse  in  service  upon  it.'  I 
asked  why  his  excellency  put  the  business  upon  the  maintenance  of  the 
treaty  of  Augsburg,  whereto  England  was  no  party ;  and  why  rather  it 
might  not  be  against  the  house  of  Austria,  whereof  the  emperor  was  one 
branch,  and  the  king  of  Spain  another;  and  said,  ^As  to  the  contribut- 
ing of  money,  he  knew  the  Protector  was  not  in  a  condition  at  this 
time  to  spare  money,  having  such  vast  occasions  of  expense  at  present 
for  maintenance  of  his  navy,  and  by  occasion  of  the  war  with  Spain.' 
The  ambassador  replied,  'That  he  did  believe  the  Protector  was 
at  present  in  no  condition  to  part  with  much  money,  and  that  there 
would  be  some  time  before  this  design  could  be  set  on  foot;  by  which 
time  probably  the  Protector  might  be  better  able  to  spare  money  than 
now  he  is ;  and  that  he  thought  it  would  be  better  husbandry  for  Eng- 
land to  spare  200,000/.  a  year  for  this  war,  which  would  be  a  good 
diversion,  and  trouble  the  king  of  Spain  more  than  we  do  by  spend- 
ing two  millions  a  year  upon  our  fleets,  and  in  sending  to  Jamaica. 
That  it  was  true  the  treaty  of  Augsburg  was  not  concerning  the  Eng- 
lish nation,  but  the  Protestants  of  Germany  were  highly  concerned  in 
it,  and  consequently  all  Christendom ;  and  the  emperor  having  broken 
that  treaty  in  many  points,  there  was  a  just  ground  thereby  of  falling 
upon  him;  and  the  reason  why  he  mentioned  the  maintenance  of  that 
treaty  was,  because  France  was  already  obliged  in  a  treaty  with  Swe- 
den for  the  maintenance  of  the  treaty  of  Augsburg;  and  England 
joining  likewise  therein,  France  would  be  engaged  with  them,  and  that 
crown  was  a  good  balance.  AYhereas,  if  tlie  union  with  the  king  of 
Sweden  should  be  against  the  house  of  Austria  and  the  king  of  Spain, 
it  would  cause  the  peace  which  was  so  much  endeavoured  between 
France  and  Spain  to  be  brought  to  effect;  and  France  would  hardly 
be  brouglit  into  such  an  union  against  the  liouse  of  Austria,  because 
it  would  seem  too  much  against  the  Papists  in  general,  wherein  France 
would  be  shy  to  join.'  " 

This  Swedish  proposal  and  its  unfavorable  reception  mark  the  last 


CROMWELL    A>'D    CHARLE.S    GUSTAVUS.  45 

phase  of  these  negotiiitions  which  luivc  any  interest  fur  us.     Though 
thev  were  continued  for  some  months  in  a  desultory  manner,  it  was 
more  for  the   purpose  of  keeping  up  appearances  before  the  Dutch, 
tlian  with  the  expectation  of  a  favorable  outcome.     The  relations  be- 
tween England  and  Sweden  had   in  fact   come  to  this  unsatisfactory 
stage,  that  each  party  sought  to  involve  the  other  but  to  avoid  commit- 
ting itself.     The  fatal  objection  to  the  Swedish  proposition  from  the  Pro- 
tectoi'^s  point  of  view  was  that  it  would  have  been  an  agreement  by 
which  Sweden  nu'ght  have  attacked  Austria,  but  not  one  by  which  it 
must  have  done  so.      It  would  also  probably  have  been  construed  by 
the  Dutch  as  a  menace,  and  it  contiuned  elements  foreign  to  the  matter 
inTianth     The  Protector  complained  that  he  did  not  know  what  might 
be  demanded  of  him   under  cover  of  the  treaty  of  Augsburg.     The 
Swedes,  on  the  other  hand,  complained   that  Cromw^ell  was  trying  to 
involve  them  in  a  war  with  Austria  to  further  his  own  interests,  only 
to  abandon  them  to  make  shift  as  best  they  could,  when  these  had 
been  secured.     Cromwell  had  refused  to  grant  the  subsidies  asked  for; 
indeed  he  could  not.     It  was  seldom  that  he  was  not  in  want  of  money, 
but  the  letters  of  this  date  show  tliat  it  ^vas  a  time  of  special  embar- 
rassment.    He  argued,  therefore,  that  as  w^ar  with  Austria  was  unavoid- 
able for  Sweden,  the  king  had  an   equal  interest  in  it  with  England 
and  should  not  demand  subsidies;^  thus  showing  that  Sweden's  fear  of 
having  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  struggle  was  not  without  foundation. 

A  Commercial  Treaty ;  Bonders  and  Coyefs  Departure. — AMiile 
these  fruitless  negotiations  concerning  a  nearer  alliance  and  mutual  aid 
had  been  going  on,  there  had  been  negotiating,  almost  independently  of 
them,  a  treaty  of  commerce,  which  was  brought  to  a  conclusion  on 
July  17.  It  liad  little  political  significance  and  consequently  lies  out- 
side the  sco})e  of  this  paper;  yet  it  may  be  well  to  mention  some  of 
the  matters  determined  by  it. 

The  plan  to  transfer  the  English  trade  from  Archangel  to  the  Baltic,^ 
though  pressed  hard  by  Bonde,  finally  came  to  nothing.  The  English 
merchants  feared  the  Sw^edish  tolls  more  than  the  long  and  perilous 
journey  through  the  Arctic  Ocean  and  refused  to  make  the  change. 

The  matter  of  contraband  and  the  closely  allied  matter  of  passes  were 

1  Pufendorff,  iii.,  g  78,  with  the  marginal  date  March  7. 
2Kalling,  p.  20,  gives  some  interesting  details. 


46  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

the  subjects  of  much  contention  and  of  some  bitter  words.  The  war 
with  Spain  Avas  chiefly  naval,  and  the  English  were  determined  to  cut 
off  the  naval  supplies  of  the  Xorth  from  their  rivals,  and  to  maintain 
a  strict  search  in  order  that  they  might  not  be  smuggled  under  false 
passes.  They  therefore  proposed  a  list  of  contraband  articles  which, 
Bonde  averred,  only  needed  the  addition  of  copper  and  iron  to  com- 
prise a  complete  list  of  Swedish  products.  The  discussions  over  this 
point  occupy  a  large  part  of  the  pages  which  Whitelock  gives  to  these 
negotiations.  Bonde  was  forced  in  the  end  to  give  way,  though  his 
instructions  required  him  to  refer  the  matter  to  Charles  Gustavus  for 
ratification.^  In  the  matter  of  passes  the  Swedes  fared  somewhat 
better. 

The  request  of  the  Swedes  for  permission  to  recruit  six  or  eight 
thousand  Scotch  for  the  king's  service  was  at  first  refused"  until  the 
return  of  the  English  fleet  from  the  West  Indies,  after  which  the 
Protector's  aflkirs  would  be  more  settled.  Permission  was  aftenvards 
granted,  chiefly,  it  would  appear,  if  not  entirely,  through  Fleetwood's 
influence.  The  reports  are  so  confused  that  I  cannot  discover  how 
many  men  were  actually  raised.  The  number  must  have  been  large, 
but  some  of  them,  at  least,  did  not  fulfill  what  was  expected  of  them.'^ 
The  Swedes  were  not  in  the  least  grateful  for  the  favor,  but  regarded 
it  as  serving  Cromwell's  own  interest,*  for  which  view  there  was  at 
least  some  color. ^^ 
^  As  to  the  trading  privileges  to  be  granted  the  English  in  return  for 
'  aid  against  the  Dutch,  of  which  we  hear  so  much  during  the  first  part 
of  Bonde's  embassy,  and  so  little  during  the  last,  I  regret  that  I  have 
not  been  able  to  discover  exactly  what  concessions  were  oflPered.  It 
seems  to  me  probable  that  Bonde  spoke  in  general  terms  merely,  and 
did  not  descend  to  particulars.  At  any  rate  he  made  but  little  im- 
pression on  the  English,  and  in  the  new  instructions  received  on  Feb- 

^  Coyet's  instructions,  §  14.  This  is  why  it  forms  a  special  article  of  the  treaty.  Pufendorff 
gives  an  abstract  of  the  treaty  (iii.,  §  81),  and  also  publishes  the  whole  text  in  the  appendix. 
Dumont  gives  the  main  part  of  the  treaty,  but  not  the  supplementary  articles.  Tom.  vi.,  part 
ii.,  p.  125. 

2Rolts'  instructions,  par.  6.  Thurloe  Papers,  iii.,  418.  Thurloe  told  Nieupoort  they  were  re- 
fused out  of  consideration  for  Dutch  feelings. 

3 "The  levies  of  England  which  are  sent  over  hither,  signify  little.  They  find  not  things 
answer  promise  or  expectation,  which  makes  them  mutiny  or  run  away,  to  the  dishonor  of 
our  nation."    Meadowe  to  Thurloe,  June  29,  1G5S.    Eng.  Hist.  Review,  vii.,  737. 

*  Pufendorff,  ii.,  §92. 

6 Charles  II.  to  Lord  Leven.    Clarendon  S.  P.,  1.,  fol.  120. 


CRO>nVEI.L    AND    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  47 

riiarv  8  lie  is  told  not  to  press  the  matter  further.  There  is  in  the 
Public  Record  office  an  undated  paper  containing  ^' ])ropositions  in 
order  to  a  treaty  witli  Sweden,"'  which  probably  belongs  to  this  }K3- 
riod.  It  asks  for  lower  custom  duties  and  more  freedom  in  the  hand- 
ling and  sale  of  goods.  But  to  English  propositions  of  this  kind 
Bonde  objected  that  ^'  the  demands  were  not  equal. " "  All  concessions 
were,  when  it  came  to  definite  particulars,  found  to  rest  after  all  on 
strict  reciprocity. 

Cromwell's  letter  to  Charles  Gustavus  on  Coyet's  departure  is  dated 
April  17,  1656.^  On  May  3,  Coyet  received  the  order  of  Knight  of 
the  Grarter  and  a  valuable  present  from  Cromwell.^  ^Mlitelocke  men- 
tions him  again  under  date  of  May  S/'  but  he  must  have  sailed  soon 
after. 

Bonde  was  ready  to  leave  in  July,  but  the  presents  which  the  Pro- 
tector intended  for  him  were  not  ready,  so  he  staid  on  until  Septem- 
ber 3.*^  In  his  letter  of  credence,  which  extols  him  highly,  we  read : 
*'As  for  the  transactions  that  yet  remain,  we  have  shortly  to  send  your 
majesty  a  special  embassy  for  those,  and  meanwhile  may  God  preserve 
your  majesty  safe,  to  be  a  pillar  in  his  Church's  defence  and  in  the 
affairs  of  Sweden."'' 

The  failure  of  Bonders  mission  was  generally  attributed  to  Xieu- 
poort's  influence.^  This  w'as  certainly  the  proximate  reason,  but  a 
deeper  reavSon  was  perhaps  the  divergences  between  the  aims  of  the  two 
rulers,  neither  of  whom  was  in  the  habit  of  making  concessions.  The 
doubtful  state  of  Charles  Gustavus'  fortunes  and  Cromwell's  financial 
embarrassment  also  had  undoubted  influence.^ 

Fleehvood  Remains  in  London. — After  the  departure  of  Covet  and 
Bonde,  Swedish  interests  were  leff  in  the  hands  of  Fleetwood,  who 

1  S.  p.,  Sweden,  165G. 

2  Whitelocke's  Memorials.  G35. 
•■'Milton,  Literte,  117. 

*  Whitelocke's  Memorials,  644. 

5 Ibid.,  645. 

''"  *  *  *  I'Ambas'r  s'est  retire  apres  avoir  receu  becoup  de  marques  extraordinaires." 
Bordeaux  to  Brienne,  September  11. 

'  Milton,  Li  terse,  125. 

8  "  Der  jetzt  a  tout  force  regleret."    Schlezer  to  Waldeck,  June  6,  1656. 

'  "Ceux  qui  croyent  co^noistre  I'estat  des  affaires  Doraestiques  du  Protecteur.  jugent  que  ce 
n'est  pas  le  temps  de  prendre  aucune  deliberation  sur  celles  de  dehors,  et  moins  encore  de 
s'engager  dans  une  Alliance  qui  renouvelle  la  guerre  avec  les  Provinces-Unies."  Bordeaux 
to  Brienne,  August  2.3,  1656. 


^ 


48  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

kept  his  character  of  ambassador  secret  in  order  to  frequent  the  court 
with  greater  freedom.  So  easily  could  he  do  this  under  cover  of  his 
family  connections  that  it  was  not  till  December  that  Xieupoort  dis- 
covered his  real  object/  There  appears  to  have  been  no  special  nego- 
tiations for  some  time,  although  the  Protector  had  not  abandoned  the 
plan  of  a  closer  alliance.  On  June  29,  before  Bonde's  departure,  the 
Council  voted  "that  his  Highness  be  reminded  of  speeding  an  am- 
bassador into  Sweden/^  ^  and  although  the  Protector's  relations  with  the 
Dutch  were  already  less  cordial,^  the  mediation  of  a  peace  between 
Sweden,  Denmark,  and  the  Netherlands  was  still  the  keystone  of  his 
policy  in  the  ISTorth.^  On  August  21  he  wrote  to  the  States  General 
earnestly  deprecating  the  disagreement  between  the  United  Provinces 
and  Sweden,  and  urging  the  necessity  of  union  amongst  .Protestant 
states  in  opposition  to  Spain. ^  During  this  same  month  he  Avrote  to 
the  king  of  Sweden,  and  on  December  4  to  the  king  of  Denmark''  in 
much  the  same  strain.  But  on  December  1  Xieupoort  wrote  that  he 
heard  no  more  of  sending  an  ambassador  to  Sweden.  The  calling  of 
Parliament,  the  war  with  Spain,  attempts  to  raise  money,  royalists 
and  assassination  plots,  and  the  Petition  and  Advice  were  sufficient 
to  keep  the  Protector  occupied  until  well  into  the  follo^^•ing  year. 
Even  as  late  as  July  29,  1657,  Xieupoort  thought  domestic  matters 
occupied  the  Protector's  attention  more  than  foreign  aifairs. 

Bremen. — But,  in  the  meantime,"  there  had  been  important  though 
fruitless  negotiations  going  on  that  Xieupoort  knew  nothing  of.  Ever 
since  the  beginning  of  the  Polish  war,  the  king  of  Denmark  had  been 
waiting  for  a  favorable  opportunity  to  strike  back  at  his  old  antagonist. 
As  the  position  of  Sweden  became  more  difficult  in  the  spring  of  1657, 
the  attitude  of  Denmark  grew  more  threatening,  and  it  was  evident 

1  Nieupoort  to  De  Witt,  December  1,  1656. 

2  a  P.  Dom.,  Interreg.,  Ixxvii.,  fol.  190. 

8  "  I  like  not  the  carriage  of  the  Hollanders  ;  our  ships  of  war  and  theirs  scarce  ever  meet  in 
the  Channel  but  they  have  some  scuffle  or  other."  Thurloe  to  Montague,  August  28,  1656. 
Carte  MSS.,  Ixxiii.,  fol.  26. 

*  "  Les  affaires  de  Siiede  et  de  Pologne  le  touchent  darvantage,  et  il  songe  encore  a  une  Union 
estroitte  avec  cestc  Couromie,  la  France,  le  Dannemark,  et  les  Estatz-Generaux,  comme  a  un 
moyon  asscure  de  balancer  la  puissance  de  la  Maison  d'Autriche."  Bordeaux  to  Brienne,  No- 
vember 27,  1656.    Also  Bordtjaux  to  Mazarin,  December  4, 1656. 

5  Milton,  Literae,  130,  and  Thurloe,  v.,  330,  from  which  the  date  is  taken.  The  reply  of  the 
Dutch  is  annexed,  dated  September  22. 

<>  Milton.  Literse,  151,  but  without  the  day  of  the  month.  The  original  in  the  Danish  archives 
is  dated  December  4,  1656  (Macray). 

'  Pufendorft' gives  the  marginal  date  as  February  13,  for  the  following  negotiations. 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLPIS    GUSTAVUS.  49 

that  a  rin)tiire  miglit  soon  bo  expected.  Charles  Ciiistavus  was  siilier- 
iiig  ehieHy  Iroiu  a  hiek  ul'  money,  and  turneil  again  to  Cromwell  for 
aid,  asking  the  loan  of  £'100,000.  Cromwell  expressed  his  willingness 
to  fnrnish  tlie  money  on  a  snffieient  gnarantee  of  repayment,  namelv, 
the  possession  of  the  I^ishoprie  l>remen.  Bremen  was  worth  so  mnch 
more  than  the  amonnt  of  the  proposed  loan  that  the  king  at  first  re- 
garded this  counter-demand  as  merely  a  means  of  parrying  his  request. 
Yet  this  was  not  the  case.  Cromwell  made  the  proposal  in  all  ear- 
nestness, and  clung  to  it  with  great  persistency.  It  was,  in  fact,  too 
much  in  keeping  with  his  procedure  elsewhere  for  us  to  doubt  his  sin- 
cerity in  it.  He  always  had  a  hankering  afler  ports  and  strong  places 
on  the  Continent,  and  we  have  only  to  take  his  motives  in  other  cases 
and  apply  them  to  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  Xorth  to  find  his  motives 
here. 

We  have  already  seen  how  Cromwell's  policy  in  the  North  required 
that  affairs  in  that  region  should  not  be  disturbed.  Considerations  of 
trade  demanded  that  the  control  of  the  Baltic  remain  divided  as  it  then 
was;  the  interests  of  religion  demanded  that  the  two  northern  Protest- 
ant powers  direct  their  arms  against  the  common  Catholic  enemy,  not 
against  each  other.  In  trying  to  secure  a  foothold  in  Bremen,  Crom- 
well nuist  have  had  a  very  definite  object.  It  Avas  directed  against  some 
one  in  particular,  and  who  could  this  be  but  those  who  were  conspiring 
against  the  existing  peace  in  the  Xorth,  a  peace  upon  which  his  north- 
ern policy,  and  with  it  his  whole  foreign  policy,  rested?  As  the  pos-A 
session  of  Dunkirk  and  Mardyke  w^as  desired  not  merely  as  an  inroad 
against  the  Spanish  power,  but  as  a  means  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear 
on  France  and  the  Netherlands,^  so  the  possession  of  Bremen  must  have 
been  designed,  in  part,  if  not  chiefly,  to  the  same  end  with  regard  to  Den- 
mark. This  view  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  Protector  Mas  'at 
the  same  time  on  the  point  of  sending  an  ambassador,  Mr.  ]\Ieadowe, 
to  Denmark  to  persuade  Frederick  to  refrain  from  his  attack  on  Swe- 
den.-    His  efforts  would  have  much  greater  prospect  of  success  if  they 

1  See  Thurloe,  Foreign  Affairs  in  Cromwell's  Time,  or  in  lieu  of  this,  Concerning  Forraigne  Af- 
faires in  the  Protector's  Time,  Lord  Somer's  Tracts,  vi.,  331,  for  a  very  lucid  and  concise  ex- 
planation of  the  Protector's  objects  in  Flanders. 

2  On  February  24, 1657,  the  Council  voted  that  the  Protector  be  recommended  to  send  Meadowe 
to  Denmark,  and  following  entries  in  the  Council  Order  Book  show  that  his  immediate  depart- 
ure was  intended  ;  but  lie  was  held  back,  for  reasons  which  are  not  stated,  until  September  ;i, 
the  day  of  Jephson's  departure. 

4 


^ 


50  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

could  be  supported  by  the  presence  of  an  English  force  on  the  Danish 
frontier. 

But  of  course,  as  usual,  Cromwell  may  liave  had  more  than  one 
object.  The  German  Protestants  would  be  encouraged  by  the  presence 
of  an  English  force,  and  this  influence  in  Germany  could  be  used  in 
various  ways,  among  others,  it  may  be,  to  the  advantage  of  English 
trade.^  '^  Being  now  on  the  continent,  and  considered  as  the  patron  of 
the  Protestant  interest,  he  stood  fair  for  the  undertaking  and  prose- 
cuting any  design,  to  which  the  vicissitude  of  human  affairs  might 
give  him  opportunity."^  Finally,  he  was  justified  in  demanding  a 
secure  military  base  of  operations  for  so  distant  an  midertaking.^  In 
short,  it  seems  that  we  may  accept  Cromwell's  own  explanation  of  his 
(  chief  objects,  when  he  told  Charles  Gustavus  that  English  possession 
]  of  Bremen  would  keep  the  Dutch  and  Danes  quiet  and  encourage  the 
Protestants,  while  the  king  would  be  free  to  make  better  use  of  its 
garrisons  elsewhere.* 

But  the  reason  why  Cromwell  wanted  Bremen  was  the  very  reason 
why  Charles  Gustavus  could  not  surrender  it.  He,  too,  wanted  a  com- 
manding position  over  Denmark,  but  for  a  different  reason.  Cromwell 
had  every  interest  in  preserving  peace.  Charles  Gustavus  wanted  war. 
He  was  tired  of  his  Polish  adventures,  with  their  unsubstantial  gains 
but  very  substantial  ills.  Denmark  offered  a  field  for  something  more 
than  barren  victories ;  to  surrender  Bremen  on  the  eve  of  the  struggle 
was  not   to  be  thought  of.^     He,  therefore,  urged  various  excuses, 

1  One  infers,  this  latter  more  from  the  prevailing  commercial  ideas  of  the  time  and  Crom- 
well's constant  efforts  to  extend  English  trade,  than  from  any  definite  evidence  which  our 
sources  oflt'er.  It  may  be  urged  against  this  view,  that  the  English  occupation  of  Bremen  was 
intended  to  be  only  temporary  (Jephson's  instructions,  par.  8)  unless,  indeed,  it  can  be  shown 
that  Cromwell  thought  the  Swedes  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  redeem  it.  Yet  the  position 
of  Bremen,  controlling  alike  the  Elbe  and  the  Weser,  was  exceedingly  favorable  to  such  plans. 

2Thurloe,  Foreign  Affairs  in  Cromwell's  Time,  referring  to  the  possession  of  Dunkirk,  etc. 

3  Jephson's  instructions,  par.  G.    Thurloe  Papers,  vi.,  478. 

» "Addebantur  rationes  :  earn  nimium  a  Svecia  remotam;  ac  posse  Regem  militc  prcesidiario 
alibi  uti :  idque  Belgarum  destinata  valde  turbaturum,  Danoque  scrupulum  injecturum  metu 
irruptionis  in  Jutiam :  denique  pnesentia  Anglorum  Protestantibus  animos  additum  iri  ad 
Pontificiis  eo  acrius  resistendum."    Pufendorft",  iv.,  §  79. 

"The  importance  of  the  Swedish  possession  of  Bremen  as  an  opening  into  Denmark  was 
well  understood  at  that  time.  "  By  which  the  Swede  *  *  *  has  betwixt  his  ancient  patri- 
mony on  the  one  side,  and  his  new  acquisitions  on  the  other,  as  it  were  enclosed  and  belea- 
guered Denmark."  Meadowe's  Narrative,  p.  2.  "*  *  *  het  Stift  Bremen,  het  welche  soo  is 
gelegen,  dat  het  seer  considerable  is  voor  den  Koningh  van  Denemarcken,  die  daer  door,  ende 
door  het  geene  hy  was  genooksaekt  gewest  aj^>n  Sweden  in  te  ruymen  door  het  gemelde 
Tractaet,  als  tusschen  den  haemer  ende  het  aenbeeldt  was  geklemt  geweest."  Nieupoort 
to  De  Witt,  July  29,  1G57.  The  significance  of  Charles  Gustavus'  marriage  with  the  daughter 
of  the  Duke  of  Holstein-Gottorp  must  not  l)c  forgotten  in  this  connection. 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  51 

anioiiii'  others  the  real  one,  and  was  iiiclintH;!  for  a  time  not  to  press  the 
matter  further. 

Yet  since  Cromwell  appeared  l)ent  on  getting  a  footing  in  Germany, 
it  mio-lit  he  possible  to  eome  to  an  agreement  with  him  at  the  expense 
of  someone  else.  A\\)uld  lie  not  take  forcible  possession  of  Emden 
and  East  Friesland,  or  Oldenburg ;  or,  if  he  considered  this  too  ditti- 
eult,  would  he  not  be  content  with  building  a  Ibrt  on  the  River  Stor, 
and  taking  possession  of  the  surrounding  country?  He  would  then 
have  no  need  of  Bremen,  which  on  account  of  its  supplies  of  money 
and  of  troops,  and  its  nearness  to  Denmark,  the  king  could  ill  spare. 
It  is  not  surprising  that  these  proposals  made  no  impression  on  the 
Protector.  It  was  one  thing  to  take  peaceful  possession  of  a  province 
for  furthering  a  definite  object.  It  was  quite  another  thing  to  turn 
freebooter  and  begin  a  war  of  wanton  aggression  against  powers,  with 
one  at  least  of  whom  he  was  on  terms  of  close  friendship.^  The 
propositions  were  therefore  declined. 

Jleadowe^s  and  Jephson's  Mediation. — The  relations  between  Eng- 
land and  Sweden  became  more  distant  for  a  time,^  vet  events  soon 
tended  to  draw  them  together  again.  In  spite  of  the  constitutional 
struo^o-les  in  which  Cromwell  was  involved,  he  found  time  to  come  to 
an  agreement  with  ^lazarin  for  the  invasion  of  the  Spanish  Xether- 
lands.  Three  days  later  the  emperor  of  Germany  died,  opening  a 
new  opportunity  for  hostile  action  against  the  house  of  Hapsburg. 
Both  Cromwell  and  Charles  Gustavus  were  extremely  interested  in 
bringing  the  imperial  crown  into  other  hands,^  and-  were  prepared  to 
second  France  in  its  efforts  to  accomplish  this  end,  although  it  must  be 
confessed  that  neither  of  them  was  in  a  position  to  make  his  influence 
very  much  felt  in  the  matter.     But   the  deciding  factor  in  uniting 

1  Various  passages  in  Masson  give  us  glimpses  of  CroniAveirs  relations  with  the  Count  ot  Old- 
enburg. As  early  as  the  middle  of  1651,  before  the  battle  of  Worcester,  we  find  an  envoy  from 
the  latter  in  London  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  good  understanding  with  the  Common- 
wealth. Their  relations  were  throughout  most  cordial,  and  in  1654  Count  Friederick's  son, 
Count  Antony,  visited  England.  It  was  with  a  team  of  spirited  horses  sent  as  a  present  from 
the  count  that  the  well  known  runaway  incident  in  Hyde  Park  occurred. 

-  Bedenken  des  Schwedischen  Senats  liber  die  Frage  :  Ob  sich  Konig  Carl  Gustav  in  Schwe- 
den  mit  Frankreich  und  Engelland  in  ein  Bundniss  wider  das  llaus  Oesterreich  einlassen  solle? 
de  annn  1657.  Liinig,  Staats-Concilia,  ii.,  593.  The  Council  thought  it  better  to  await  the  de- 
velopment of  the  plans  of  Austria. 

3  Lunig,  Staats-Concilia,  ii..  592  Carlson,  iv.,  192,  Anm.  Urk.  u.  Actenst,  vii.,  766.  Both 
suggested  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg  as  a  possible  candidate.  There  is  an  anonymous  manu- 
script in  the  British  Museum  (Add.  :)2093.  fol.  397)  advocating  England's  interference,  chiefly 
on  religious  grounds. 


52  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIO^'S    BETWEEN 

Cromwell  and  Charles  Gustavus  was  the  outbreak  of  the  Danish  war, 
closely  followed  by  the  formation  of  a  new"  alliance  between  Poland 
and  Austria.  Cromwell  informed  Charles  Gustavus  that  if  the  Dutch 
appeared  to  be  supporting  the  Danes  in  this  matter  he  would  take 
other  counsels/  and  he  pressed  again  for  possession  of  Bremen.  The 
Danes  would  hardly  have  ventured  in  their  present  course,  he  said,  if 
his  former  proposals  had  been  accepted.  He  even  reduced  his  demand 
to  the  possession  of  Stade  as  a  basis  for  military  o|)erations;  but  even 
this  Charles  Gustavus  was  unwilling  to  grant.  The  king  could  only 
bring  himself  to  offer  the  strongholds  of  the  Dutchy  A^erden,  although 
he  might  have  foreseen  that  the  possession  of  inland  forts  with  no  pos- 
sibility of  relieving  them  by  sea  in  case  of  siege,^  would  be  the  last 
proposal  that  Cromwell  would  accept.  The  negotiations  had  in  fact 
again  degenerated  into  mere  bargaining,  and  as  usual  Cromwell  deter- 
mined to  treat  through  his  own  envoys.  Philip  Meadowe  had  long 
been  intended  as  ambassador  to  Denmark,  and  now  Maj.-Gen.  Wm. 
Jephson  was  named  for  a  similar  mission  to  the  king  of  Sweden. 

The  objects  of  Meadowe's  mission  are  given  in  a  paper  entitled : 
"  Propositio  legati  protectoris  Anglise  ad  regem  Danise,"  which  was 
recently  discovered  by  Dr.  Joseph  Weiss,  and  published  in  Historisches 
Jahrbuch  (vol.  xiv.,  p.  608).  Meadowe  has  incorporated  the  contents 
of  this  paper  into  his  Narrative  in  the  following  words:  "England 
had  too  great  an  interest  in  the  Baltic  (the  Mediterranean  of  the 
Xorth)  to  sit  still  ^vithout  making  reflection  upon  those  commotions  in 
tlie  northern  kingdoms.  For  besides  the  general  concerns  of  a  free 
trade,  which  must  of  necessity  have  suifered  interruption  by  the  con- 
tinuance of  this  war,  England  being  at  that  time  engaged  in  a  war 
with  one  branch  of  the  Austrian  family,  viz.,  with  Spain,  would  rather 
the  Swedish  arms  had  been  at  liberty  to  give  check  to  the  other 
branch  in  Germany  as  occasion  might  offer,  than  to  be  diverted  there- 
from by  a  war  Avith  Denmark.  *  *  *  jjjg  [Meadowe's]  business 
was  to  remonstrate  how  unwelcome  it  was  to  them  in  England  to  un- 
derstand of  a  rupture  betwixt  the  two  crowns,  albeit  they  esteemed 
the  communication  thereof  bv  the  letters  and  manifest^  of  that  kins; 
as  an  expression  of  friendship.     That  besides  the  effusion  of  Christian 

1  Puf.,  iv.,  g  79.    Urk.  u.  Actenst,  vii.,  762. 

2  Jephson's  instructions,  par.  9. 
^Jusjeciale  armatx  Danix. 


CROMWKI-L    AND    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  53 

bloml  betwixt  two  nations  linked  tos^etlier  bv  the  common  l)on(ls  of 
nature  and  reliiiion,  and  both  of  them  leagued  in  amity  with  Entiland, 
the  continuation  of  that  war  miolit  in  so  perilous  a  juncture  consider- 
ably endanger  the  whole  Protestant  cause  and  interest;  and  nothing 
could  have  happened  more  advantageous  to  Spain,  with  whom  Eng- 
land was  in  open  hostility.  Besides,  his  majesty  of  Denmark  could 
not  but  be  sensible  how  much  the  freedom  of  navigation  and  commerce 
in  the  Baltic  would  be  impeached  thereby,  to  the  prejudice  of  the 
neighboring  nations,  but  of  none  more  than  England,  as  continually 
feti^hino;  naval  stores  from  those  countries.  He  was  therefore  sent 
on  the  part  of  England  to  that  king  to  offer  the  best  and  most 
friendlv  offices  for  the  accommodatins:  all  differences  betwixt  the  two 
crowns,  and  putting  a  stop  to  so  unhappy  a  w^ar,  and  to  assm'e  him 
that  they  would  employ  their  utmost  interest  with  the  king  of  Sweden 
to  dispose  him  thereto,  and  to  that  purpose  had  already  sent  a  gentle- 
man to  him."^  From  subsequent  negotiations,  it  appears  that  Crom- 
well intended  to  make  the  treatv  of  Bromsebro  the  basis  of  the  new 
peace. 

Jephson's  secret  instructions^  are  dated  August  22,  1657.  They 
recite  that  the  former  negotiations  with  Bonde  had  come  to  nothing 
because  Bonde  was  not  authorized  to  agree  upon  'Hhe  terms  of  that 
assistance"  Avhich  had  been  asked  for,  nor  to  place  at  the  Protector's 
disposal  any  "places  of  safe  retreat  for  his  men,  or  secure  harbours  for 
his  ships."  "Furthermore,  this  assistance  being  desired  by  the  king, 
and  wholly  upon  the  account  of  his  interest,  the  expense  and  charge  of 
such  an  undertaking  is  to  be  considered,  if  not  in  present,  yet  here- 
after, when  it  shall  please  God  to  put  his  majesty's  affairs  into  a  more 
peaceable  condition."  If,  now,  his  majesty  is  willing  to  place  Bremen 
at  the  Protector's  disposal  for  this  purpose,  the  Protector  will  send 
forces  to  take  possession  of  it,  and  will  agree  to  surrender  it  again  "at 
any  time  upon  demand  of  the  crown  of  Sweden,  being  first  paid  the 
charges  we  shall  be  at  over  and  above  what  shall  be  levied  upon  the 
country',  in  and  about  the  keeping  and  securing  the  said  dukedom." 
These  instructions  have  on  the  face  of  them  a  somewhat  different  as- 

1  Meadowe's  Narrative,  p.  10,  seq. 

-  Printed  in  Thurloe  Papers,  vi.,  478.  Tlie  original  manuscript,  in  the  handwriting  of  Thurloe, 
with  many  erasures  and  corrections,  evidently  tlie  first  draft,  is  in  the  British  Museum.  Add. 
MSS.  4157,  fol.  201. 


54  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

pect  than  the  foregoing,  but  in  reality  they  are  quite  in  keeping  with 
it.  For  if  the  king  had  acceded  to  this  demand,  Cromwell  would  have 
been  master  of  the  situation,  and  could  have  mediated,  as  it  were  with 
sword  in  hand,  and  with  some  prospect  of  success.  Yet  he  appears 
to  have  been  not  very  confident  that  the  proposal  would  be  accepted, 
for  Jephson  was  told  not  to  mention  the  matter  "unless  his  majesty 
should  administer  the  occasion  thereof,  and  express  himself  inclined 
to  put  it  into  our  hands.'' 

After  some  difficulty  in  ascertaining  the  whereabouts  of  the  two 
kings,  Meadowe  and  Jephson  were  received  at  Copenhagen  and  Wis- 
mar  respectively  with  special  marks  of  honor,  and  both  kings  signified 
their  readiness  to  accept  the  Protector's  mediation.  But  in  the  course 
of  the  proposals  and  counter-proposals  which  were  exchanged  during 
the  succeeding  months,^  it  soon  became  evident  that  neither  party  was 
willing  to  make  the  necessary  concessions.  Certain  details  could  not 
be  adjusted,  because  certain  vital  matters  of  policy  were  involved  in 
them.  The  place  of  meeting  for  the  commissioners  presented  the  first 
difficulty.  The  king  of  Denmark  proposed  Lubeck  as  a  convenient  and 
neutral  place,  trusting  to  have  the  presence  and  support  of  his  Polish 
and  Austrian  allies.  The  king  of  Sweden  proposed  some  place  on  the 
inaccessible  frontier  of  Denmark  and  Sweden,  according  to  ancient 
custom  and  the  treaty  of  Bromsebro,  in  order  that  the  ambassadors 
of  the  allies  of  Denmark  could  not  with  any  convenience  attend,  and 
he  might  thus  sow  jealousy  and  dissension  among  his  enemies  through 
a  separate  treaty.  From  this  arose  another  dispute.  The  mediation 
had  been  offered  between  Sweden  and  Denmark  alone,  but  in  his  dec- 
laration of  November  3  the  king  of  Denmark  demanded  that  Poland 
and  Brandenburg  be  included.  Much  anxiety  was  caused  in  .English 
councils  by  this  new  demand  and  Denmark's  cause  was  prejudiced  not 
a  little  by  it ;  but  Denmark  appeared  bound  by  treaty  not  to  make  a 
separate  peace.  Charles  Gustavus  was  willing  to  grant  the  ambassa- 
dors of  the  allies  licenses  to  be  present  as  spectators,  but  not  as  confed- 
erates and  principals,  and  on  this  point  no  agreement  could  be  reached. 
To  these  came  a  third  difficulty.  Charles  Gustavus  had  proposed  that 
the  good  officers  of  France  be  joined  with  those  of  England  in  the 

iMeadowe's  account  of  these,  Narrative,  p.  19,  seq.,  is  very  concise  and  clear.  See,  also, 
Meadowe's  and  Jephson's  dispatches  in  Thurloe  Papers,  Pufendorff,  iv.,  g  77,  Diarium  Euro- 
pseum,  etc. 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  55 

modiatKni.  Denmark  proposed  in  return  tlie  inelusion  of  the  States 
General  also.  This  Charles  Gustavus  would  admit  on  one  condition, 
that  they  first  ratify  tlie  treaty  of  Elbing.  But  Denmark  insisted  ' 
that  they  be  included  without  waiting  for  the  ratification.  So  bitter 
was  the  feeling  on  this  point  that  Avhen  Dutch  ambassadors  arrived  at 
the  court  of  Charles  Gustavus  he  at  first  refused  them  audience,  hoping, 
as  Jephson  thouglit,  to  drive  the  Dutch  to  espouse  openly  the  cause  of 
the  Danes,  which  would  force  the  Protector  against  his  will  to  the  side 
of  Sweden.  In  short,  the  attempt  at  mediation  failed  utterly,  because 
neither  party  desired  it.  Neither  the  king  of  Sweden  was  deterred  by 
the  formidable  combination  of  his  enemies,  nor  the  king  of  Denmark 
by  the  loss  of  Jutland,  and  each  hoped  for  a  favorable  turn  of  fortune. 
"Mediating  princes  are  most  welcome  and  successful  when  the  parties 
are  wearied  with  the  war,  as  those  physicians  are  most  happy  who 
come  in  the  declension  of  a  disease."  ^ 

Friesendroff^s  Iristructmis. — At  about  the  time  of  ^Nleadowe's  and 
Jephson's  departure,  a  Swedish  ambassador,  J.  F.  von  FriesendorfP, 
arrived  in  Eno-land  with  instructions  of  a  remarkable  character,  which 
for  disregard  of  the  accepted  rules  of  political  morality  can  hardly  be 
matched  among  the  papers  of  the  time.  They  reveal  a  characteristic 
trait  of  the  foreign  policy  of  this  prince,  who,  with  all  his  attractive 
personal  qualities,  cannot  be  acquitted  of  violence  and  lawlessness  in 
his  relations  with  his  neighbors. 

If  Cromwell's  hesitancy  in  engaging  in  the  northern  war  could  be 
overcome  by  oifers  of  territorial  acquisition  on  the  Baltic,  then  surely 
there  need  be  no  difficultv.  Friesendorif 's  secret  instructions^  con- 
tained  an  elaborate  system  of  proposals  and  alternatives  for  the  Eng- 
lish occupation  of  various  portions  of  German  and  Danish  territory 
in  order  to  induce  Cromwell   to   tinallv  lend  efficient  aid  to  Swedish 

1  Meadowe,  A  View  of  the  Suedish  and  other  Affairs,  p.  175. 

2  They  have  been  printed  by  Tresehow  in  Nye  Danske  Magazin,  Tredje  Bind  (1810),  p.  73, 
from  a  copy  in  the  Danish  archives.  Pnfendorff  gives  a  fairly  complete  abstract  of  them  (lib. 
iv.,  g  82).  "  In  irgend  einer  Weise  tiel  den  Danen  die  Instruction  in  die  Hande,  und  diese  beeil- 
ten  sich,  siein  Berlin  mitzutheilen  ;  der  Kurfiirst  wiederum  thcilte  sie,  wahrend  der  Friedens- 
verhandlungen  in  Oliva,  dem  kaiserlichen  Hofe  mit  (dat.  23.  Miarz  1660);  so  dass  also  diese 
schwedisch-englischen  Geheimnisse  sehr  bald  in  weitcu  Kreisen  bckannt  waren.  Ubrigens 
cursirten  Geriichte  nber  solche  schwedisch-englische  Abmachungen  schon  in  Septemberl656 
auf  dem  Reichsdeputationstag  in  Frankfurt ;  s.  Frk.  u.  Actenst.,  vii.,  077."  Erdmannsdorflfer, 
Deutsche  Geschichte,  i.,  285,  Anm.  2.  "  Le  diet  Sr.  Secretaire  d'Estat  commenca  par  me  desad- 
vouer  que  les  Ministres  de  Suede  eussent  fait  aucunes  offres,  soit  de  Glowstadt  ou  d'aucune 
autre  Place."    Bordeaux  to  Mazarin,  March  5,  1658. 


56  DIPLOMATIC   RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

arms.  The  proposals  were  as  follows :  For  the  first  part,  Cromwell 
should  unite  his  forces  with  those  of  Sweden  against  Denmark  until 
the  latter  had  been  brought  to  a  position  in  Avhich  it  was  no  longer  to 
be  feared  "and  the  freedom  of  commerce  and  free  passage  through  the 
Sound  was  restored  to  all  nations."  In  order  that  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  Sound  might  be  maintained,  it  was  proposed  that  Sweden 
resume  possession  of  its  ancient  provinces,  Schonen,  Blecking,  and 
Halland,  together  with  Christina  and  the  provinces  Bohus  and  Drunt- 
heim  as  protection  against  Danish  invasion,^  and  finally  that  the 
County  Pinneberg,  and  the  Kremper  and  Wilster  Marches,  which  had 
formerly  belonged  to  Bremen,  should  be  restored  to  it. 

As  soon,  now,  as  they  had  without  difficulty  set  their  house  in  or- 
der (for  surely  Cromwell,  too,  had  as  much  to  fear  from  Denmark  and 
Holland  as  from  Spain  and  Austria),  Charles  Gustavus  proposed  to 
accede  to  CromwelPs  long-cherished  desire  for  a  common  attack  against 
the  house  of  Hapsburg,  and  in  addition  to  make  certain  other  con- 
cessions which  would  serve  not  only  the  public  interests  of  England, 
but  Cromwell's  private  interests  as  well.  First,  the  king  agreed  to 
assist  in  the  conquest  of  Delmenhorst  and  Oldenburg  (his  claims  to 
the  former  he  abandoned  in  Cromwell's  favor),  which  Cromwell  should 
"hold  as  his  own";  and  that  Cromwell  should  be  free  to  take  posses- 
sion of  East  Friesland,  the  Bishopric  Munster,  and  as  much  of  the 
Westphalian  Circle  as  he  was  able  to,  as  quarter  for  his  troops,  which 
advantage  Charles  Gustavus  proposed  to  share  also  with  the  greater 
part  of  his  army.  The  possession  of  these  provinces  would  lend  Crom- 
well a  support  in  his  private  ambition  in  establishing  the  power  of  his 
house  such  as  England  did  not  offer,  and  would  give  him  the  oppor- 
tunity of  attacking  at  his  pleasure  either  the  Danes,  the  Dutch,  or  the 
house  of  Hapsburg.  A'^arious  pretexts  for  the  proposed  violence  were 
suggested,  as  well  as  methods  for  satisfying  the  injured  princes.  If, 
however,  this  was  not  sufficient,  and  Cromwell  desired  a  position  by 
which  he  could  bring  Poland  and  Danzig  to  account  for  past  injuries, 
and  in  conjunction  with  Sweden,  attack  Austria  from  the  side  of 
Silesia,^  the  fortification  Weichselmiuide  near  Danzig  could  be  given 

1  Bohus  and  Druntheim  were  then  being  used  by  the  Danes  as  bases  for  military  operations 
against  Sweden. 

2Droysen's  statement  (Geschichtc  d.  Preussische  Politik,  iii.,  2,  250,  2d  ed.),  that  Silesia  was 
offered  to  Cromwell  by  Charles  Gustavus,  probably  rests  upon  a  misunderstanding  of  this 
phrase.    Erdmannsdorffer,  Deutsche  Geschichte,  i.,  285,  Anm.  1. 


CRO^n\'ELL    AND    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  57 

him,  together  with  a  part  of  Ponmierelleii.      C'hark^s  Gustaviis  would 
also  assist  in  the  takiiiii;  of  Pntzke. 

All  these  advaiitaiies  were  offered  the  Proteetor  in  order  to  e:rant 
him  a  foothold  in  Germany  and  to  persnade  him  to  engage  in  the  com- 
mon struggle.  Yet  Charles  Gustavus  wonld  prefer  if  instead  ol'  this 
he  wonkl  take  part  in  the  conqnest  and  partition  of  Denmark.  In  this 
ease  his  share  ^^-ould  be  North  Jntland,  with  the  port  Listerdiep  and 
the  neighboring  islands,  which  would  be  more  advantageous  in  sup- 
porting the  English  fleet  than  the  proposed  parts  of  Germany.  From 
this,  however,  the  king  excepted  the  districts  Koldingen  and  Horsens, 
or  in  lieu  of  the  latter,  Ripen,  which,  with  the  remainder  of  Jutland, 
and  Schleswig,  Holstein,  and  Fiinen,  would  be  given  to  his  father-in- 
law,  the  duke  of  Holstein-Gottorp,  under  Swedish  and  English  guar- 
antee. The  three  districts,  Pinneburg,  Wilster,  and  Kremper  were, 
however,  to  be  detached  from  Holstein  and  reunited  with  Bremen. 
As  for  the  rest  of  the  Danish  dominions,  they  were  to  be  at  the  abso- 
lute disposal  of  Charles  Gustavus,  to  be  granted  to  whatever  person 
he  chose,  or  to  be  divided  into  small  portions  ''  as  might  best  serve  the 
common  interest." 

The  list  of  alternatives  was,  however,  not  yet  exhausted.  If  Crom- 
well demanded  Ditmarch,  with  Kremper,  Wilster,  and  the  islands 
about  Listerdiep  instead  of  Oldenberg  and  Delmenhorst,  this,  too, 
could  be  allowed  him,  together  with  Gliickstadt;  but  in  this  case  he 
must  resign  his  plans  on  the  Weser.  Yet,  finally,  if  it  appeared  that 
the  only  means  to  engage  his  assistance  was  to  give  him  a  foothold  on 
both  the  Elbe  and  AVeser,  Friesendoi'ff  was  authorized  to  gmnt  this 
also;  but  the  king  depended  upon  his  dexterity  to  avoid  such  extreme 
concessions  unless  they  proved  unavoidable. 

It  was  realized  that  such  proposals  were  of  a  nature  to  awaken 
grave  suspicions  on  Cromwell's  part,  and  Friesendortf  was  therefore 
instructed  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  Charles  Gustavus  did  not  intend 
to  assume  the  crown  of  Denmark  himself,  but  only  to  transfer  it  to 
some  friend,  as  the  duke  of  Holstein-Gottorp.  In  addition,  the  Eng- 
lish would  secure  free  passage  through  the  Sound  and  certain  privileges 
over  all  other  foreigners  in  the  lands  and  ports  belonging  to  Sweden. 
Finally,  Charles  Gustavus  was  prepared  to  surrender  his  claims  to 
Prussia  in  favor  of  some  Protestant  prince,  as  the  elector  of  Bran- 


58  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

denburg,  although  in  this  case  it  was  only  just  that  a  compensation  be 
given  Charles  Gustavus  for  his  sacrifices  in  the  Polish  war.  The 
equivalent  proposed  was  the  recognition  on  the  part  of  Poland  of 
Swedish  sovereignty  over  Liefland  and  Courland  and  the  payment  of 
a  large  sum  of  money,  and  the  cession  on  Brandenburg's  part  of 
Hinterpommerania,  with  something  more.^ 

If,  however,  the  Protector  could  not  be  moved  by  any  means  to  take 
part  in  the  conquest  and  partition  of  Denmark,  Friesendorff  must  fall 
back  on  the  old  proposition  of  an  alliance  against  Austria.  If  this 
were  refused,  the  king  would  be  forced  to  come  to  terms  with  them 
and  the  Dutch,  to  the  detriment  of  Protestant  interests  in  all  parts  of 
the  world.  At  the  very  least,  the  Protector  must  take  it  upon  him  to 
hold  the  Dutch  in  check,  and  to  this  purpose  send  a  fleet  into  the 
Baltic  in  case  they  made  any  signs  of  espousing  the  cause  of  Denmark. 
But  yet,  if  the  relations  of  England  and  Holland  were  such  that  there 
was  no  prospect  of  this,  Holland  could,  "for  the  sake  of  the  common 
interest  of  the  Protestant  religion,"  be  tolerated  in  the  general  alliance 
which  paragraph  11  of  Friesendorif  ^s  instructions  authorized  him  to 
propose. 

Friesendorff' s  first  efforts  were  to  be  directed  against  Denmark,  and 
in  order  to  further  this,  secondly,  against  Austria.  Paragraph  11  of 
the  instructions  contains  the  details  of  a  proposed  alliance  between 
Sweden,  England,  France,  and  Portugal,  also  Holland  it  might  be, 
against  the  house  of  Hapsburg  and  its  allies.  To  prevent  confusion 
and  disputes,  a  council  of  the  members  of  the  alliance  would  be  formed 
to  decide  upon  matters  which  should  arise.  Each  member  must 
furnish  his  appropriate  quota  of  ships,  which,  however,  were  to  be 
placed  under  a  single  command,  Cromwell  being  encouraged  to  believe 
that  he  would  be  chosen.  If  France  and  Portugal  desired  it,  the  op- 
erations on  land  could  be  continued  as  thev  then  were,  Eno;land  to  take 
position  in  Germany  as  proposed,  and  Sweden  to  act  as  a  reserve,  to 
be  supported  with  subsidies  in  case  its  forces  were  brought  into  action. 
Finally,  the  proposed  league  must  devise  and  execute  means  for  de- 
priving the  house  of  Hapsburg  of  the  imperial  crown. 

Friesendorff  was  ordered  to  sound  the  Protector  privately  before 

1  He  had  already  broached  this  to  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg.    Carlson,  iv.,  242  and  244, 
Anm.  2. 


CRO^nVELL    AND    CIIAIILES    GUSTAVUSj.  59 

makino;  his  mission  publicly  known,  and  if  ho  found  the  Protector  un- 
favorahly  inclined,  to  pretend  that  lie  was  on  his  way  to  Portuoal,  and 
had  only  been  accidentally  delayed  in  Knoland.  Tliis  he  should  do 
until  the  development  of  aifairs  made  further  "dissimulation''  unnec- 
essary. The  instructions  were  dated  at  W'edell  on  the  Elbe,  Aui2;ust 
3,  1657. 

I  regret  that  I  have  not  been  able  to  discover  exactly  how  Cromwell 
received  these  proposals.  There  were  some  parts  of  them  well  calcu- 
lated to  enlist  his  support.  If  only  the  matter  with  Denmark  could 
be  patched  up  and  the  Dutch  pacified,  the  great  Protestant  alliance 
would  seem  to  be  on  the  point  of  being  realized.  It  might  be  possible 
to  reconcile  Charles  Gustavus^  proposals  w^ith  those  for  an  alliance 
between  England,  Holland,  and  France,  which  the  Dutch  were  then 
pressing.  There  is  no  evidence,  however,  that  I  can  find,  that  he  ever 
seriously  entertained  Charles  Gustavus'  proposals  for  dividing  Ger- 
many and  Denmark.  That  these  proposals  did  not  coincide  in  the 
least  with  his  northern  policy  in  general  is,  I  think,  sufficiently  clear. 
^^^hat  would  have  become  of  the  Protestant  alliance?  AVhat  ^vould 
the  Dutch  have  had  to  say,  and  what  assistance  might  they  not  have 
given  Charles  II.  ?  Besides,  subsequent  events  showed  that  Cromwell 
had  no  desire  to  reduce  Denmark  to  a  "  position  in  which  it  need  no 
longer  be  feared."  The  proposals,  in  short,  quite  apart  from  all  moral 
considerations,  would  have  involved  a  radical  change  in  England's 
foreign  relations  such  as  a  clear-sighted  statesman  like  Cromwell 
would  not  lightly  undertake.  There  is  a  tendency  among  historians 
who  have  touched  upon  this  episode  to  link  Cromwell's  name  with 
that  of  Charles  Gustavus  in  the  tacit  rej^roach  with  w^hich  it  must  be 
regarded;  but  until  it  has  been  shown  that  Cromwell  actually  enter- 
tained the  plan  for  a  time,  this  would  seem  to  be  an  injustice  to  him. 
Course  of  the  Negotiations} — The  course  of  the  ensuing  negotiations 

1  Piifendorff,  iv.,  ??  84  and  85.  The  documents  for  the  succeeding  pages  are  so  scanty  that  it 
ig  difficult  even  to  keep  up  the  appearance  of  a  connected  narrative.  We  have  mere  frag- 
ments, which  "we  can  sometimes  piece  together,  sometimes  not.  From  English  sources  alone 
one  would  hardly  know  of  the  existence  of  Friescndortf;  for  in  the  few  cases  in  which  his 
name  is  mentioned,  it  is  usually  misspelled.  There  is  nothing  corresponding  to  Bonde's  diary 
to  give  one  a  thread,  however  slight,  to  string  fragments  together  upon.  Whitelocke  gives  us 
no  information.  The  dispatches  of  the  foreign  ambassadors,  even  of  Nieupoort,  are  of  little 
aid.  Even  Piifendorff,  who  is  often  our  only  guide,  seems  to  me  less  lucid.  He  evidently  bases 
his  narrative  on  the  letters  of  the  Swedi.sh  ambassadors,  Avho  appear  to  have  worked  largely 
in  the  dark.  An  examination  of  the  Swedish  archives  would  no  doubt  bring  new  material  to 
light,  but  as  is  the  case  with  so  many  of  Cromwell's  foreign  enterprises,  it  is  probable  that 
much  will  never  be  known. 


60  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

was  not  such  as  the  Swedish  ambassadors  desired.  Cromwell  showed 
Fleetwood  and  FriesendorfF  every  attention  and,  as  usual,  asked  for  a 
few  days  for  deliberation.  Then  followed  those  delays  and  excuses 
which  characterized  all  Cromwell's  negotiations,  and  which  ambassa- 
dors at  his  court  continually  complained  of.  The  Swedish  ambassa- 
dors found  it  impossible  to  discover  the  Protector's  real  motives. 
Though  English  sympathy  had  been  at  first  decidedly  against  Den- 
mark as  the  aggressive  party,  they  found  this  to  a  certain  extent 
changed.  Charles  Gustavus'  military  successes  had  in  fact  prejudiced 
his  diplomatic  prospects.  Following  their  instructions,  the  ambas- 
sadors proposed  an  oifensive  and  defensive  league  against  Austria, 
Spain,  Poland,  and  Denmark  and  whoever  might  join  them,  in  which 
Cromwell  was  asked  to  send  a  fleet  into  the  Baltic,  to  continue  his 
efforts  in  Flanders,  to  contribute  subsidies,  and  in  the  meantime, 
before  all  the  details  could  be  agreed  upon,  to  send  immediate  relief  to 
Gothenburg,  which  was  blockaded  by  a  small  Danish  fleet.  Cromwell 
complained  that  this  was  asking  too  much  of  him,  but,  as  usual,  prom- 
ised to  consider  the  matter.  He  appears  to  have  had  definite  reasons 
for  hesitating,^  but  what  they  were,  unless  it  was  waiting  for  the  result 
of  Meadowe's  and  Jephson's  mission,  or  inability  to  find  a  clear  thread 
in  the  tangled  skein,  is  not  clear.  In  order  to  whet  his  lagging  en- 
thusiasm, Charles  Gustavus  sent  another  proposal.  In  return  for 
£200,000,^  he  was  ready  to  surrender  Buxtenhude  and  the  fort  on  the 
Leber  as  security.  What  reception  this  proposal  met  with  I  cannot 
discover. 

For  a  long  time  the  relations  between  England  and  the  Netherlands 
had  been  growing  less  satisfactory.  The  ^^  marine  treaty,"  the  object 
of  unremitted  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  Dutch  since  the  close  of  the 
war  in  1654,  had  not  yet  been  brought  to  a  conclusion,  much  to  Xieu- 
poort's  chagrin.  On  the  other  hand,  not  only  did  England  suspect  the 
Netherlands  of  having  instigated  Denmark's  hostility,  but  had  grounds 
for  l)elieving  that  the  Dutch  equipments  then  in  progress  were  in- 
tended to  act  in  conjunction  with  Spanish  forces  against  Portugal. 
The  Protector  did  not  conceal  these  suspicions. 

De  Witt  adopted  a  policy  similar  to  the  one  which  had  succeeded  so 

1  Jephson  to  Thurloe.    Thurloe  Papers,  vi. ,  604  and  629. 

2  Carlson  says  £400,000,  iv.,  2i2. 


CROMWELL    AND    C'HAKLES    (U'STAVUS.  61 

well  a  low  months  before.  He  .siiixgosted  a  defensive  treaty,  this  time 
nut  between  England,  the  United  Provinces  and  Denmark,  l)ut  between 
England,  the  United  Provinces  and  Erance.'  The  idea  was  welcomed 
bv  the  Protector,  thougli  not  (|nite  so  warndy  as  the  former  one  had  , 
bei^i.  It  had  some  promise  of  the  great  alliance  in  it,  wiiicli  the  Pro- 
tector had  l)y  no  means  yet  abandoned.  Still,  the  relations  between 
the  two  powers  were  somewhat  straineil,  and  Xieiipoort  did  not  foi-  the 
time  being  share  the  Protector's  full  confidence. 

Alx)ut  the  beginning  of  October,  it  seemed  as  if  Cromwell,  moved 
by  the  critical  condition  of  Swedish  affairs,  had  decided  that  some 
show  of  armed  interference  was  necessarv.  Under  date  of  Octol>er 
9,"  Fleetwood  and  Friesendorff  inform  the  king  "  in  hochster  eyl,'^ 
that  through  the  grace  of  God  and  their  unflagging  industry  they  had 
at  last  brouo-ht  the  Protector  to  a  certain  resolution.  He  had  decided 
to  come  to  the  king's  assistance  and  to  form  a  close  alliance  with  him 
against  Austria  and  its  allies  (for  reasons  of  state,  and  to  appease  the 
prejudices  of  the  English  people,  he  must  call  the  child  by  that  name), 
and  commissioners  would  be  appointed  to  confer  with  the  Swedish 
ambassadors  concerning  the  matter.  He  desired  only  a  week's  delay 
to  equip  a  fleet  and  to  put  hLs  affairs  in  order ;  an  envoy  would  1)6 
sent  to  Holland  to  warn  the  Dutch  against  the  course  they  were  pur- 
suing. He  had  not  taken  this  course  before  from  lack  of  money;  but 
he  thought  he  now  had  good  prospects  of  removing  this  difficulty. 

Already,  on  October  3,  Cromwell  had  issued  a  warrant  for  the 
equipment  of  a  fleet.  It  w^as  to  consist  of  twenty  ships,  to  be  ready 
in  fourteen  davs  at  farthest,  and  to  be  furnished  with  at  least  three 
months'  provisions.^  ''The  design  for  the  shijis,"  wrote  Thurloe,^  "is 
to  give  countenance  to  Sweden,  whose  affairs  are  in  a  dangerous  condi- 
tion, being  left  alone  in  the  midst  of  very  many  powerful  enemies,  [the] 
Pole,  the  king  of  Hungary  and  [the]  ^luscovite  and  the  Dane,  and 
fears  also  the  Hollander,  who  gives  money  and  if  need  be  will  send 

1  Nieupoort's  and  De  Witt's  letters  of  May  4  and  following,  though  without  the  authority  of 
the  States  General.    It  was  as  first  a  suggestion  merely,  not  a  formal  proposal. 

2 The  letter  is  printed  in  Handlingar  roraiule  Skandinavions  Historia,  v.,  205-213. 

3  Carte  MSS.,  Ixxiii,  fol.  132.  The  names  of  the  vessels,  their  rates  and  the  number  of  seamen 
are  given,  aggregating  816  guns  and  4,020  men. 

<  Carte  MSS..  Ixxiii.,  fol  138.  Thurloe  to  Montague,  October  9,  16.57.  Holograph,  chiefly  in 
cipher,  imperfectly  deciphered,  and  hard  to  read.  It  is  printed,  with  some  changes,  in  Thurloe 
Papers,  vi.,  582,  under  the  heading,  "  Draught  of  a  letter  concerning  Swedish  affairs,  to  Gen- 
eral Montague." 


62  .  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

the  Dane  the  ships  [eighteen  in  number]  which  were  appointed  to  lie 
upon  the  Dogger  Bank.  The  ministers  of  Sweden  are  of  opinion  that 
if  ships  [were]  sent  that  way  to  wait  upon  the  motions  of  [the]  Hol- 
landers, though  no  act  of  enmity  past,  it  would  keep  the  Hollander 
from  him.  And  for  this  piu'pose  and  no  other  are  these  ships  pre- 
pared. *  *  *  This  is  under  absolute  secrecy  and  is  not  to  be 
communicated  to  any." 

The  tone  of  this  letter  contrasts  strangely  with  the  boyish  precipi- 
tation of  Fleetwood  and  Friesendoi-if 's  letter  to  Charles  Gustavus, 
while  their  contents  would  hardly  allow  us  to  believe  that  they  referred 
to  the  same  matter.  But  the  cautious  and  diplomatic  Thurloe  is  a  safe 
guide  in  matters  of  this  sort  (Cromwell  in  his  enthusiasm  often  said 
too  much)  and  it  is  probable  that  there  was  not  very  much  behind  this 
incident  which  raised  Swedish  hopes  so  high.  At  any  mte,  when  the 
Dutch  did  not  send  their  fleet  into  the  Sound,  the  English  refrained 
from  further  demonstration.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  Cromwell 
was  actuated  at  this  time  by  other  considerations  than  relations  in  the 
IS^orth.  His  struggle  against  Spain  and  the  house  of  Hapsburg  was 
still  the  chief  point  of  his  foreign  relations,^  and  his  whole  aim  in  the 
North  was  to  bring  affairs  in  this  part  in  accord  with  this  great  issue. 
It  is  significant,  therefore,  that  the  only  remonstrance  which  was  made 
to  Nieupoort  in  connection  with  this  incident  was  against  Holland's 
negotiation  with  Spain  and  its  hostility  towards  Portugal.^  The  affairs 
of  Sweden  were  not  mentioned.  When  the  Dutch  did  not  send  their 
fleet  to  the  Baltic,  as  was  expected,  but  called  it  quietly  home,  the 
Protector  on  his  part  was  willing  to  let  the  matter  drop.  To  have 
acted  otherwise  would  have  transferred  the  center  of  his  foreign  policy 
from  Spain  to  the  North. 

But  the  Protector  had  expressed  himself  so  unreservedly  to  Fleet- 
wood and  Friesendorff  that  he  felt  it  necessary  to  propose  terms  for  a 
treaty,  although  he  did  so  only  after  what  seemed  to  the  Swedes  an  inex- 
cusably long  delay,  and  in  terms  very  different  from  those  they  thought 
themselves  justified  in  expecting.  He  proposed  an  offensive  and  de- 
fensive alliance  against   ''the  kings  of  Spain,  Hungary,  and   Poland 

1  "  The  Protector  in  all  these  cases  governs  himself  by  the  Protestant  cause,"  wrote  Thurloe 
on  October  2,  "  and  he  thinks  a  peace  between  the  two  northern  crowns  is  best  for  that,  if  it  may 
be  had."    Thurloe  Papers,  vi.,  547. 

*  Nieupoort  to  De  Witt,  November  12. 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  63 

and  the  house  of  Austria,"  which  France,  the  Netherhuids,  and 
others  were  to  be  invited  to  j<»in.  Tlic  king  of  Sweden  must  make 
an  attack  on  Austria,  strengthened  by  troops  furnislic<l  l)v  the  allies, 
but  maintained  at  his  e)wn  expense.  The  Protector  woukl  wage  war 
at  sea  against  Spain,  to  whicli  purpose  the  king  must  agree  to  furnisii 
naval  material  in  such  quantities  and  at  such  rates  as  might  ])e  agreed 
upon  in  the  articles  of  the  treaty.  Cromwell  bound  himself  to  send 
a  tieet  into  the  Baltic  if  it  were  necessary.  The  allies  would  be  asked 
to  contribute  monev.^ 

But  this  proposal,  it  will  be  noticed,  looked  entirely  away  from  the 
complications  in  the  North  and  contained  no  reference  to  them.  It 
was  merely  a  plan  of  action  for  the  following  sunnner,  and  cooll\' 
avoided  the  pressing  issue  then  at  hand.  The  Swedes  complained 
bitterly.  Even  the  English  felt  guilty.  Thurloe  wrote  apologetically 
to  Jephson  on  December  18,  "If  the  king  be  disposed  to  the  same 
thing,  you  may  take  occasion  to  tell  him  that  this  is  but  an  essay  and 
is  intended  only  as  a  foundation  to  begin  upon,  and  if  he  please  to 
declare  himself  for  the  general  good  you  are  authorized  and  charged 
to  perfect  it  with  him.^'^  So  loud  were  Friesendorif  ^s  protestations 
that  the  Protector  promised  in  an  evil  hour  to  furnish  the  king  with 
£30,000,  with  a  prospect  of  more  if  he  could  raise  it.^ 

The  Swedes  submitted  with  an  ill  grace.  Yet  what  must  have  been 
their  indignation  when  even  this  promise  was  not  kept.  "  I  have  had 
many  discourses  with  Mons.  Frohendorf  [Friesendorff],  one  of  his 
ministers  here,"  wrote  Thurloe  to  Jephson,  "  whom  I  find  a  very  ready 
man,  but  am  somewhat  doubtful  how  he  represents  things  to  his  mas- 
ter. I  fear  the  worst.  I  informed  vou  bv  mv  former  letter  that  H. 
H.  had  promised  £30,000  by  monthly  [)ayments;  one  month  is  past 

1  Pufendorff,  iv.,  g  84.  These  proposals,  so  far  as  they  are  given  by  Pufendorff,  are  the  same 
as  those  contained  in  the  paper  "  Heads  of  a  treaty,  to  be  made  witli  the  king  of  Swetlen,  for 
a  nearer  union,  etc.,"  printed  in  Thurloe  Papers,  vii.,  23,  under  the  date  of  March  25, 1658,  and 
they  would  appear  to  be  practically  if  not  absolutely  identical.  This  would  suggest  the  possi- 
bility of  error  in  the  date  of  the  printed  paper,  else  the  English  wore  making  the  same  pro- 
posals after  the  treaty  of  Roeskilde  as  before,  which,  however,  is  by  no  means  impossilile.  But 
I  cannot  verify  this  point,  as  it  is  not  known  where  the  original  paper  is  preserved.  Mr.  Gar- 
diner tells  me  he  thinks  it  is  in  private  possession.  I  am  not  in  a  i)osition  to  say  whether  the 
paT)er  printed  in  Lunig's  Staats-Concilia,  ii.,  G13,  "Bedenken  Konig  Carl  Gustavs  in  Schwe<len 
iiber  das  Formular  des  ihme  vou  England  offerirten  Bundnisses,  de  Anno  KwS,"  complaining 
of  the  unreasonable  trading  privileges  demanded  by  the  English,  refers  to  these  proposals  or 
to  some  others  of  which  I  have  found  no  further  account. 

2 English  Historical  Review,  vii.,  727. 

3 Pufendorff,  iv.,  g  81,  with  the  marginal  date  November  9. 


64  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

and  none  paid,  which  he  speaks  so  freely  of,  and  of  the  great  disap- 
pointment his  master's  affairs  are  put  under  thereby,  that  truly  his 
expressions  are  hardly  borne."  ^  He  explains  that  the  reason  for  the 
non-payment  was  that  a  part  of  the  fleet  had  come  in  unexpectedly 
and  large  sums  Avere  necessary  to  pay  the  men,  who  Avould  otherwise 
mutiny.^  The  Protector  was  in  fact  struggling  to  keep  his  head  above 
water  by  means  of  small  loans,  and  the  payment  of  the  promised  sub- 
sidy was  utterly  impossible. 

It  was  not  likely  that  the  Protector's  efforts  to  come  to  an  agree- 
ment on  the  basis  of  an  unkept  promise,  and  without  first  settling  the 
Danish  matter,  Avould  be  of  much  avail.  His  efforts  to  negotiate 
through  Jephson  instead  of  with  Fleetwood  and  FriesendorfF  had  from 
the  first  met  with  little  success.  The  king  was  waiting  for  the  result 
of  his  proposals  in  London,  Jephson  thought.  Now  the  matter  of  the 
promised  subsidy  presented  a  new  hinderance.  Both  Jephson,  and 
afterwards  Meadowe,  constantly  urged  its  payment.  "  I  do  confess,'' 
wrote  Jephson  February  12,  1658,  "I  could  wish  the  money  had 
either  never  been  promised,  or  paid  at  the  time  appointed.  =k  *  * 
I  have  mucli  reason  to  believe  that  this  is  the  only  cause  why  they 
proceed  not  with  me  in  the  treaty." 

Gothenburg  and  Fredericia  ;   the  Partition  of  Denmarh  Again. — In 

1  English  Historical  Review,  vii.,  727.  Friesendorff  was  the  only  one  of  the  Swedish  ambas- 
sadors who  aroused  the  least  ill-will  in  London.  All  the  others  appear  to  have  been  excep- 
tionally popular,  even  though  their  northern  vigor  did  occasionally  get  the  better  of  their  cour- 
tesy. This  letter  to  Jephson  contains  the  following  ugly  passage,  which  shows  how  much 
personal  bitterness  had  entered  into  the  negotiations :  "This  long  story  I  have  told  you  to  pre- 
vent any  misrepresentation  formed  by  IMonsr.  Frohendorf,  Avho  I  fear  is yet  enough  for 

these  things,  and  I  hear  labours  to  disgrace  my  Ld.  G.  Fleetwood  with  the  king,  which  I  should 
much  desire  might  be  prevented  by  you.  If  you  can  perceive  anything  of  the  kind  the  [re] .  it 
will  be  a  great  disservice  to  the  king's  affairs  if  anything  of  the  kind  should  be,  for  Avhatever 

Monsr.  Frohendorf  apprehends  he  is  beholden  to  him  for  all  the ?  he  hath,  and  you  know 

the  interest  the  Lord  Deputy  hath  in  the  state  and  if  he  should  [?  see  his  hoorn  put  out  by 
other]  I  believe  Monsr.  Frohendorp  would  soon  find  himself  disabled  ever  to  do  the  least  thing 
here  in  any  of  his  affairs.  The  truth  is,  had  it  not  been  [for]  my  Lord  G.,  Avho  solicited  coun- 
cil here,  there  never  had  been  a  man  obtained  hence  out  of  the  old (?)."    It  would  thus 

seem  to  be  an  error  for  Pufeudorff  to  accredit  these  negotiations  entirely  to  Friesendorff.  It 
will  be  noticed  that  in  documents  and  letters  signed  by  Fleetwood  and  Friesendorff,  the  name 
of  the  former  comes  first,  indicating,  I  take  it,  precedence  in  rank  as  ambassador.  Fleetwood 
appears  not  only  to  have  played  the  chief  part  in  these  negotiations,  but  also  a  very  important 
part  in  the  preceding  ones.  His  family  connections  gave  him  great  advantages  over  the  other 
ambassadors,  who  besides  must  have  found  the  language  a  serious  drawback  in  a  court  which 
did  not  speak  Latin.  Jephson  mentioned  this  accusation  against  Friesendorff"  to  Charles  Gus- 
tavus  only  to  be  assured  that  it  had  no  foundation  in  fact.    Thurloe  Papers,  vi.,  7is. 

^This  was  not  a  feigned  excuse.  Sir  Christopher  Pack  loaned  the  government  £4,000  to  pay 
the  wages  of  the  fleet.  Die.  Nat.  Biog.  Also  some  others  advanced  money.  Cal.  S.  P.  Dom. , 
May  11,  1658. 


CROMWELL    AND    (  HAHLKS    (iUSTAVrs.  05 

our  sketch  of  the  negotiations  in  London,  wc  have  Ixcn  cairicd  ])ast  a 
striking;  diplomatic  incident  of  which,  unfortunately,  we  liave  hut  the 
merest  hint.  Jephson  had  througliout  shown  nnich  partialitv  towards 
Charles  Gustavus.  He  was  convinced  tliat  he  sincerely  desired  peace, 
but  doul)ted  whether  Denmark  did.  He  tliouirht  notliiuL'"  woidd  <o 
soon  incline  Denmark  to  it  as  "  a  strict  and  speedy  conjunction  l)etween 
England  and  Sweden,"  and  urged  that  a  few  frigates  woidd  be  a  cogent 
arirnment  airainst  Danish  obstinacy.'  These  views  were,  of  course, 
very  favorable  to  Charles  Gustavus,  and  we  need  not  be  surprised  to 
find  that  Jephscai  received  in  return  an  accurate  knowledge,  at  least 
in  outline,  of  the  king's  plans  with  regard  to  Denmark. 

On  Xovember  2  Jephson  sent  the  Council  "the  relation  of  an  ac- 
tion perhaps  as  extraordinary  as  may  fall  out  in  an  age";*"  but  the 
letter  is  unfortunately  lost.  In  his  next  dispatch  he  refers  to  it  as 
containing  his  "sense  of  the  whole  state  of  affairs  in  these  parts,  ujxjn 
the  taking  of  Frederieksode  [Fredericia],"  and  continues:  "I  know 
nothing  in  my  poor  opinion  were  more  worthy  his  Highness,  than  (at 
this  time  when  he  hath  ministers  with  all  the  most  considerable  Protest- 
ant princes  and  states)  to  propose  a  general  meeting  for  the  advancement 
of  the  common  interest  of  religion,  and  the  civil  interest,  and  rec(jncil- 
ing  of  differences;  for  (until  both  religion  and  the  civil  interest  of  every 
state  be  something  secured)  I  fear  particular  treaties  will  not  do  the 
work."^  At  last  in  an  important  letter  of  the  24th  of  Xovember,  he 
gives  some  clue  to  the  contents  of  his  letter  of  Xovember  2.  After 
urging  again  "a  general  treaty  betwixt  all  tlie  Protestants,"  lie  ])ro- 
ceeds,  "Sir,  my  meaning  by  joining  with  Sweden  was,  that  if  by  the 
king  of  Denmark's  obstinacy  the  pow^r  of  the  Baltic  Sea  shall  b(^ 
devolved  to  other  hands,  you  would  so  oblige  the  king  of  Sweden  by 
assisting  him,  that  he  might  put  a  part  of  it  in  your  hand.  Tlie  places 
I  mentioned  in  my  letter  of  the  2d  instant,  and  my  oi)inion  of  them, 
according  to  my  best  intelligence,  which  1  sui)pose  you  had  not  then 
received,  they  were  Gott(Mil)urg  and  Frederieksode.  I  assure  myself 
you  were  not  l)efbre  ignorant  of  tlie  conveniences  and  inconveniences 
behmging  to  them,  which  I  will  not  i)resume  to  judge  of."*      "1  sliall 

1  See  Jephson's  dispatches  in  Thurloe  Papers. 
^Thurloe  Papers,  vi.,  597. 

3  Ibid.,  004.    He  was  again  urging  Charles  Gustavus'  policy,  it  will  be  noticed. 
*Ibid.,  629. 
5 


66  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

not  sail  punctually,"  he  says  in  this  same  letter,  "  to  observe  his  High- 
ness' command  to  the  king  of  Sweden  concerning  the  business  of 
Fredericksodde." 

The  thread  of  evidence  offered  by  this  passage  is  slight,  yet  taken 
in  connection  with  accompanying  circumstances,  it  seems  clear,  that  in 
answer  to  the  Protector's  constant  demand  for  "  security  "  and  a  mili- 
tary base  before  undertaking  a  distant  campaign,  Charles  Gustavus 
had  suggested  that  Fredericia  and  Gothenburg  might  serve  this  pur- 
pose. The  mention  of  Fredericia  had,  of  course,  reference  to  its  re- 
cent capture  and  may  possibly  have  been  intended  to  whet  Cromwell's 
appetite  for  the  whole  of  Jutland.  I  find  it  difficult  to  believe,  how- 
ever, that  the  king  was  willing  to  surrender  so  important  a  port  as 
Gothenburg,  the  only  Swedish  port  without  the  Sound,  in  anything 
like  permanent  possession,  especially  after  the  efforts  which  had  just 
been  made  to  increase  its  importance.^  It  would  seem  more  probable 
that  it  was  proposed  as  temporary  headquarters  for  the  English  fleet, 
for  which  it  was  admirably  suited,  and  had  little  value  to  the  Swedes 
at  the  time  from  the  ease  with  which  it  could  be  blockaded  by  the 
Danes. 

That  proposals  of  this  kind  were  made  is  not  of  itself  improbable. 
Pufendorff  gives  an  account^  of  still  more  remarkable  proposals, 
which  resemble  those  of  Friesendoi'ff 's  instructions.  If  Cromwell 
would  undei-take  to  support  Sweden  without  reserve  and  strike  Den- 
mark to  the  ground,  Charles  Gustavus  would  agree  to  its  partition  in 
the  following  terms :  Norway,  Schonen,  Seeland,  and  Funen  should 
be  incorporated  with  Sweden,  while  Cromwell  should  have  the  whole 
of  Jutland  and  Bremen  ;  the  passage  of  the  Sound  would  be  free  to 
all  nations,  and  the  prospect  was  offi?red  of  an  attack  on  Austria.  Or, 
if  Cromwell  preferred,  Sweden  would  take  only  Norway  and  Schonen, 
and  allow  Cromwell  Bremen,  while  the  crown  of  Denmark  would  be 
given  to  another.  The  plan  of  giving  Jutland  to  the  Duke  of  Hol- 
stein-Gottorp,  Cromwell  taking  Oldenburg  and  Delmenhorst,  was  also 
mentioned.  But  Cromwell's  answer  must  be  given  soon  and  his  ac- 
ceptance unreserved,  else  so  important  a  position  as  Bremen  could  not 
be  surrendered.     I  have  not  found  the  slightest  reference  to  these  pro- 


1  Fries,  Erik  Oxenstierna,  p.  132. 

2  Lib.  iv.,  I  '^■(S,  undated,  but  they  must  have  come  at  about  this  time. 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLI-:S   GUSTAVUS.  G7 

posals  among  English  records,  unci  so  cannot  tell  wiiat  impression 
they  made.  They  had,  however,  the  ver}-  serions  drawback  of  jTJving 
Sweden  absolnte  control  of  the  su})j)lies  for  ship-l)uildinir,  which  was 
considered  a  power  too  great  to  be  intrusted  to  one  hand.  'riii>  was 
considered  a  matter  of  vital  importance  at  the  time  and  is  often  men- 
tioned  in   the  diplomatic  correspondence  relating  to  the  North. 

It  would  be  to  no  purpose  to  trace  further  the  details  of  the  ensuing 
negotiations.  They  present  nothing  new.  One  meets  the  same  diffi- 
culties, the  same  arguments,  and  delays  for  much  the  same  reasons.' 
The  only  episode  worth  mentioning  is  Cromwell's  speech  to  both 
Houses  of  Parliament  on  January  25,"  which  throws  a  flood  of  light 
on  the  Protectoi-'s  feelings  at  this  time.  "  I  do  believe,  he  that  looks 
well  about  him,  and  considereth  the  estate  of  the  Protestant  affairs  all 
Christendom  over  :  he  must  needs  sav  and  acknowledw  that  the  "rand 
design  now  on  foot,  in  comparison  with  which  all  other  designs  are 
but  low  things,  is,  Whether  the  Christian  world  shall  be  all  popery? 
*  *  *  I  have,  thank  God,  considered,  and  I  would  beg  of  you  to 
consider  a  little  with  me:  What  that  resistance  is  that  is  likely  to  be 
made  to  this  mighty  current,  which  seems  to  be  coming  from  all  parts 
on  all  Protestants?  AMio  is  there  that  holdeth  up  his  head  to  oppose 
this  danger?  A  poor  prince; — indeed  poor  ;  but  a  man  in  his  person 
as  gallant,  and  truly  I  think  I  may  say  as  good,  as  these  last  ages  have 
brought  forth ;  a  man  that  hath  advanced  his  all  against  the  i)0})ish  in- 
terest in  Poland  and  made  his  aquisition  still  good  ^  there '  for  the 
Protestant  religion.  He  is  now  reduced  into  a  corner;  and  that  wliich 
addeth  to  the  grief  of  all, — more  than  all  that  hath  been  spoken  of 
before  (I  wish  it  may  not  be  truly  said !) — is.  That  men  of  our  relig- 
ion forget  this,  and  seek  his  ruin.  *  *  *  It  is  a  design  against 
our  verv  being ;  this  artifice,  and  this  complex  design,  against  the 
Protestant  interest, — wherein  so  manv  Protestants  are  not  so  riirlit  as 
were  to  be  wished!  If  they  can  shut  us  out  of  the  Ixiltic  S-a,  and 
make  themselves  master  of  that,  where  is  your  trade?  W'liere  are 
vour  materials  to  preserve  your  shij)ping?  When*  will  you  l)e  al)le 
to  challenge  anv  ri^^ht  bv  sea,  or  justifv  yourself  against  a  foreiiiii  iu- 
vasion  in  your  own  soil?     Think  upon  it;  this  is  in  design!" 

1  Pufendorff's  account  is  very  full  here.    Lib.,  iv.,  g  86.    Lib.,  v..  §§  73,  74.  and  75.    I  have 
nothing  of  importance  to  add  to  it. 

2  Reported  in  Burton's  Diary,  ii.,  35L    Also  Carlyle,  Speech  XVII. 


68  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

Surely  it  was  no  fault  of  intention  that  the  Protector  did  not  take 
a  more  active  part  in  this  business  !  But  with  the  imminent  dangers 
on  every  hand,  a  bankrupt  treasury,  the  army  and  civil  service  unpaid, 
Ireland  unsettled,  Scotland  in  great  suiFering,  England  impatient,  and 
the  two  Houses  disputing  about  titles  and  refusing  to  come  to  busi- 
ness,^ Avhat  could  the  Protector  do?  His  efforts  to  mediate  had  come 
to  a  standstill,  yet  he  could  not  bring  himself  to  adopt  a  different 
course.  A\  hile  he  was  hesitating  and  waiting  for  a  favorable  turn  in 
the  course  of  events,  an  unpropitious  Providence  paved  the  way  for 
Swedish  successes  ^vhich  rendered  hopeless  his  plan  of  reconciling  the 
two  nations,  even  for  the  preservation  of  their  faith. 

Treaty  of  Roeskilde. — It  is  of  course  impossible  to  give  here  any 
account  of  the  negotiations  which  preceded  and  followed  the  treaty  of 
Roeskilde,  or  of  the  exceedingly  complicated  events  attending  Crom- 
well's attempt  to  mediate  a  new  peace  after  the  outbreak  of  the  second 
war  in  August ;  but  it  is  of  great  interest  to  observe  how  Cromwell's 
attitude  towards  both  nations  was  changed  by  these  startling  events, 
and  liow  his  general  policy  was  affected  by  the  altered  state  of  politics 
in  the  North. 

There  are  no  special  instructions  to  Meadowe  concerning  the  treaty 
of  Eoeskilde,  but,,  fortunately,  both  Thurloe  and  Meadowe  have  told 
us  of  the  objects  sought  by  the  Protector  with  a  candor  and  directness 
which  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired.  ^'  The  Protector,"  says  Thurloe," 
'^though  he  wished  in  general  the  prosperity  of  the  Swede,  his  ally, 
hoping  that  at  last  his  arms  might  be  directed  the  right  Avay,  yet  did  not 
like  that  tlie  Swede  should  conquer  the  Dane,  and  possess  all  those  coun- 
tries, and  being  thereby  become  powerful,  engross  the  whole  trade  of  the 
Baltic  Sea,  wherein  England  is  so  much  concerned,  and  therefore  he  in- 
terposed in  most  serious  terms  with  both  the  kings  to  make  peace,  Avhicli 
was  accepted  by  both."  ^'The  English  mediator,"  writes  Meadowe, 
^'  liad  two  parts  to  act  in  this  scene;  one  was  to  moderate  the  demands 
as  far  as  he  could  in  favor  of  the  sufferer,  w^ithout  disobliging  the 
Swede  by  a  too  notorious  partiality.  The  other  \vas  to  watch  lest 
anything  be  stipulated  betwixt  the  tAVO  kings  pr*:judi('ial  to  the  inter- 
ests of  England.     It  was  moved  that  the  whole  kingdom  of  Norway 

1  Inderwick,  Studies  in  the  Great  Rebellion,  27. 

2  Foreign  Affairs  in  Cromwell's  Time. 


CR<>>rWKLL    AND    CIIARI.KS    CT'STA VT'S:.  (J9 

should  1)0  rent  off  from  Denmark  and  united  to  Sweden,  with  wliieli 
it  lav  eoutiiiuous:  This  entrenelied  ui)()n  I'jiuland  as  irivinir  the 
Swede  the  sole  and  entire  possession  of  the  cliiet"  materials,  as  masts, 
deals,  piteh,  tar,  eopper,  iron,  ete.,  needfid  for  the  a[)parel  and  ((Hiip- 
age  of  our  ships,  too  great  a  treasure  to  be  entrusted  in  one  liand. 
The  mediator,  in  avoidanee  of  this  was  the  first  who  insinuated  the 
})roposal  of  rending-  Seonen  and  l^leeking  to  the  Swede,  which  would 
cut  off  that  unnecessary  charge  hoth  crowns  sustained  in  giirrisoning 
a  frontier  each  against  other,  by  enlarging  the  Swedisli  dominions  to 
the  bank  of  the  Sound,  the  ancient  and  natural  boundary  of  Sweden. 
This  though  uneasv  to  the  Dane  because  of  the  vicinity  of  those 
provinces  to  Co^xnihageu  the  metropolis,  yet  was  safe  for  P^ngland, 
because  by  this  means  the  Swede  is  become  master  of  one  bank  of 
the  Sound  as  the  Dane  is  of  the  other,  though  the  accustomed  duty  of 
passage  (the  best  flower  in  the  Danish  garland)  was  reserved  by  the 
treaty  wholly  to  the  Dane.  Thus  the  power  over  that  narrow-  entry 
into  the  Baltic  being  balanced  lietwixt  two  emulous  crowns,  will  be 
an  effectual  preventive  of  any  new  exactions  or  usurpation  in  the 
Sound."  ^ 

Thus  the  efforts  of  the  English  mediator  were  directed  chiefly,  almost 
exclusively,  to  the  preservation  of  English  commercial  interests.  This 
need  occasion  no  surprise,  since  the  Protector  had  no  other  rule  to  guide 
him  in  case  of  a  conflict  between  these  two  Protestant  powers,  \\1iile, 
of  course,  the  interests  of  religion  requireil  that  Protestant  nations 
should  not  turn  their  arms  ao^ainst  each  other,  vet  it  was  the  interests 
of  trade,  not  of  religion,  vAnch.  was  the  Protector's  incentive  for  pre- 
serving the  stabi.s  quo  in  the  Baltic, — alwavs,  as  we  have  seen,  a  vital 
point  of  his  policy.  If  he  could  not  share  in  the  paititiou  of  Den- 
mark for  fear  of  giving  too  much  }>ower  t(>  Sweden  in  the  lialtic,  nuich 
less  could  he  allow  Denmark  to  be  entirely  swallowed  ui)  l)y  Sweden 
without  a  share  in  the  booty.  Yet  lie  liad  no  objection  to  Denmark's 
beinu;  partially  absorbed  by  Swe<len  in  so  far  as  English  interests 
would  be  benefited  by  it.     The  P^nglisli  were,  indivd,  far  from   di<in- 

1  Narrative,  p.  58.  See,  also.  View  of  the  Suedish  and  Other  Aflairs,  p.  169,  «<•'/.  "  For  'tis  evident 
that  the  dividing  the  banks  of  the  Sound  betwixt  the  two  emulous  crowns,  as  it  was  done  by 
the  Roschild  treaty,  is  greater  to  the  security  and  benefit  of  England,  etc."  "  I  am  making  all 
the  haste  I  can  to  the  king  of  Swede,  as  conceiviui;  his  lliLrhiioss  nut  a  little  comerned  in 
these  affairs,  especially  in  the  interest  of  the  Sound,  and  the  trullie  of  the  Baltic  Sea."  .Jephson 
to  Henry  Cromwell,  February  22,  16oS.    Landsdowne  MSS.  822.  fol.  l\\\. 


70  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

terested  mediators.  "The  Swedish  propositions,  I  confess,  are  very 
high,''  wrote  Meadowe,^  "but  their  advantages  are  likewise  very  great." 

Yet,  in  view  of  the  circumstances,  the  conditions  of  the  treaty,  while 
severe,  were  favorable  to  Denmark,  which  was  due  in  no  small  meas- 
ure to  the  offices  of  the  mediators,  particularly,  it  would  appear,  of 
Meadowe.  Frederick  III.  sent  a  letter  to  Cromwell  thanking  him  for 
his  good  offices  and  commending  Meadowe,  who  also  received  the  ex- 
traordinary honor  of  the  Order  of  the  Elephant,  the  highest  order  in 
Denmark,  together  with  the  offer  of  a  pension,  which  he  tells  us  he 
refused.  There  were  many  scandalous  reports  concerning  Meadowe 
circulated  at  that  time  by  the  Swedes  and  others,  which  may  or  may 
not  have  been  true,^  but  they  have,  at  least,  the  significance  of  showing 
how  bitter  was  the  resentment  felt  against  him. 

After  the  Treaty  of  Roeskilde. — The  relations  between  England  and 
Sweden  were  not  altered  by  the  treaty  of  Eoeskilde  so  much  as  one 
might  have  expected.  The  Swedes  seemed  not  to  cherish  their  resent- 
ment and  the  negotiations  in  London  proceeded  much  as  before.^  I 
shall  not  trouble  the  reader  with  an  account  of  them,  for  I  have  noth* 
inff  to  add  to  what  Pufendorff  tells  us.^  Thev  illustrate  how  Crom- 
well's  foreign  efforts  were  hampered  by  internal  difficulties,  but  have 
little  further  significance.  The  Swedes  urged  to  the  last  the  payment 
of  the  £30,000  which  Cromwell  had  promised  in  the  preceding  No- 
vember, but  Parliament  had  been  dissolved  without  obtaining  a  grant, 
and  though  Cromwell  repeated  his  promise,  he  Avas  never  in  a  position 
to  fulfil  it.  In  short,  Cromwell  was  laboring  under  such  insuperable 
difficulties  that  no  definite  action  could  be  reasonably  expected  of  him. 
The  various  proposals  which  were  made,  none  of  which  had  anything 
novel  about  them,  are  therefore  of  little  interest. 

One  notices  distinctly,  however,  this  difference  in  Cromwell's  treat- 
ment of  Sweden,  that  he  is  more  ready  to  give  way  to  the  demands  of 

1  Meadowe  to  Thiirloe.    Thurloc  Papers,  vi.,  802. 

2  It  is  difficult  to  get  at  the  truth  of  these  stories,  which  are  to  be  fouud  at  sufficient  length  in 
Pufendorff.  We  should  not,  I  think,  lend  them  too  ready  credence,  since  they  rest  on  the 
authority  of  Meadowe's  political  enemies.  Pufendorff  tells  us,  for  example,  that  certain  Dan- 
ish noblemen  objected  to  one  of  Meadowe's  station  being  made  a  member  of  the  Order  of  the 
Elephant,  and  that  Meadowe  resigned  the  Order  for  a  sum  of  money.  But  on  May  31  (Meadowe 
to  Thurloe,  Eng.  Hist.  Rev.,  vii.,  732)  he  was  still  in  possession  of  the  Order.  However,  he  seems 
at  best  to  have  escaped  Avith  some  loss  of  dignity,  and  felt  called  upon  to  explain  in  various 
letters  to  Thurloe. 

3  See  note,  page  63. 
4Puf.,v.,gg  76-83. 


CKOMWELL    AND    CHARLES    (JUSTAVUS.  71 

Charles  Gustavus  tlian  before.  He  has  lost  his  conti-nl  «»t'  iitVairs  in 
the  North,  which  is  nowhere  shown  more  eleaily  tlian  in  this,  that 
he  is  now  prepared  to  yield  to  Sweden  the  j)ossession  of  Prussia. 
Meadowe's  instructions  of  April  9,  1658/  in  view  of  the  expected  ne- 
gotiations between  Charles  Gustavus  and  the  other  powers  at  Braunsberg 
for  the  purpose  of  the  further  pacification  of  the  North,  reads  :  ''  *  * 
as  to  his  retaining  of  Prussia,  you  are  very  well  to  understand  tlie 
mind  of  the  kins:  of  Sweden  therein,  and  in  ciise  vou  find  hi  in  fixed 
thereupon,  you  shall  then  endeavour  in  the  treaty,  yet  with  that  circum- 
spection and  prudence  that  becomes  a  mediator,  that  Prussia  ma\'  l)e 
quitted  to  him  by  the  king  of  Poland  and  to  that  purpose  endeavour 
by  all  befitting  wariness  to  incline  the  ministers  of  the  States  General 
thereunto,  who  are  most  likely  to  oppose  it  upon  the  interest  of  trade, 
to  satisfv  whom  you  may  procure  such  assurance  from  the  king  of 
Sweden  in  that  of  trade  in  reference  to  his  and  that  state  as  may  re- 
move that  difficulty.  *  *  *  And  as  the  matter  of  commerce, 
you  are  not  to  be  wanting  there  to  inform  yourself  therein  and  to  pro- 
vide for  the  same,  and  the  interest  of  this  state  therein,  so  far  as  you 
shall  have  opportunity. " 

One  might  infer  from  this  and  other  references  that  interests  of 
trade  were  dominant  in  the  Protector's  mind,  and  that  the  matter  of 
the  great  Protestant  alliance  had  been  driven  entirely  into  the  back- 
ground. This  is  certainly  true  to  a  certain  extent  and  lay  in  the  gen- 
eral state  of  northern  politics.  "That  war,  wliilst  it  laste<l,  discom- 
posed aifaii-s  so  much,  as  they  could  never  be  composed  again,"  siud 
Thurloe.^  Yet  a  truer  statement  of  the  case  would  be  this,  tliat  the 
real  motive  of  Cromwell's  policy  was  still  antagonism  to  the  house  of 
Austria,  but  there  had  arisen  a  new  and  more  important  issue  in  the 
trade  of  the  Baltic.  Instead  of  the  l^iedmont  massacres  iukI  mere 
vague  alarms,  they  had  now  a  definite  and  tangible  bone  of  conten- 
tion. "It  being  the  design  of  the  Imperial  House  to  get  these  coun- 
tries and  to ?  you  the  ]>altic  Sea  under  pretence  of  giving  aid  to 

the  king  of  Denmark."^     "The   Protector  very  nuich  apprehende<l 

1  S.  p.,  Sweden,  ix.  They  are  dated  April  9,  1656,  but  thoxigh  this  is  an  original  dating,  the 
context  shows  it  to  be  an  error.  It  should  be  1658.  Among  other  things  the  treaty  of  Roes- 
kilde  is  referred  to.  They  are  printed  in  Thurloe  Papers,  vii..  (H,  where  the  correct  date  is 
given. 

2  Burton's  Diary,  iii.,  378. 

^Thurloe  to  Meadowe,  November  27, 1657.    Eng.  Hist.  Rev.,  vii.,  1'1\. 


72  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

the  issue  of  this  conj unction;  he  thought  it  equally  dangerous  for 
England  that  the  Swede  should  be  ruined  and  the  Dane  preserved  by 
such  saviours,  who  after  they  had  broken  the  king  of  Sweden  would 
also  make  a  prey  of  the  Dane  himself,  the  emperor  in  his  assistance  he 
gave  against  the  Swede,  revived  the  old  design  of  the  Austrian  [eagle] 
stretching  her  wings  towards  the  eastern  sea,  and  planting  herself 
upon  the  Baltic."  ^ 

When  the  war  between  Sweden  and  Denmark  was  begun  again  in 
Au2'ust  bv  Charles  Gustavus,  as  usual  without  consultiup;  the  Pro- 
tector,^  the  latter  renewed  his  efforts  to  restore  the  peace.  That  his 
policy  had  not  undergone  any  material  change  by  the  treaty  of  Roes- 
kilde  is  shown  by  the  similarity  between  these  two  attempts  at  media- 
tion. '^The  Protector  in  this  whole  business  laid  this  for  a  founda- 
tion, that  it  was  not  for  the  interest  of  this  nation  that  either  the  Swede 
or  Dane  should  be  ruined  in  this  war,  and  that  it  was  ever  safest  for 
England  that  the  Sound  and  those  countries  should  remain  in  the  hands 
of  the  Dane,  and  therefore  as  he  had  interposed  in  the  first  war  to 
preserve  the  Dane,  so  he  resolved  by  the  same  measures  to  proceed  and 
so  to  manao;e  these  affairs  that  this  mio;ht  receive  no  alteration  in  those 
parts."  ^  This  had  been  the  starting  point  of  the  first  mediation. 
Again,  as  before,  the .  mediation  was  offered  between  Sweden  and  Den- 
mark alone,  and  without  including  other  powers,  which  would  compli- 
cate and  delay  matters.  "That  which  the  Protector  pitched  upon  in 
this  great  occasion  was  to  endeavour  a  present  peace  between  the 
Dane  and  the  Swede,  upon  the  late  treaty  of  Roskild,  made  by  his 
own  mediation  without  taking  in  the  differences  between  Poland  and 
Sweden,  or  the  Swede  and  Brandenburg,  or  comprehending  the  pre- 
tences of  the  Dutch  and  the  Emperour,  which  having  many  intrica- 
cies in  them  would  require  time.  This  the  Protector  did  to  obviate 
the  designs  of  the  Dutch,  as  also  to  keep  open  the  door  for  making  use 
of  the  arms  of  the  Swede  another  wav.  This  was  liked  bv  none  of 
the  contending  parties,  the  Swede  though  thus  beset,  yet  having  got 
into  his  possession  the  Sound  and  all  Denmark  but  the  town  of  Co- 
penhagen, and  believing  that  France  and  England  would  not  suffer 
him  to  flinck  was  unwilling  to  be  brought  back  again  to  the  treaty  of 

iThurloe,  Forei§:n  Affairs  in  Cromwell's  Time.   Also  Cromwell's  speech  quoted  on  page  67. 
2  The  Protector  never  learned  the  exact  causes  of  this  war. 
^Thurloe,  Foreign  Affairs  in  CromweL's  Time. 


CRO>nVET.T.    AXP    rilART.ES    (aSTAVLS.  T-i 

RoskiUl.  Till'  Daiio  was  more  adverse  tlian  lie,  not  (l(Hil)tiii<z:  l>iit  l)v 
the  aid  of  his  eontederates  to  recover  all  a^iaiii,  and  the  cont'cdrrates 
opposed  it  or  any  treaty  w  ithout  coni})reiien(lin«::  all  their  interests,  and 
the  Dutch  most  of  all  infested  here,  the  meaning  whereof  was  that 
they  had  all  agreed  totally  to  ruin  the  Swede,  and  tlic  Dutch  douljtcd 
not  of  his  part  in  the  advantage."^ 

These  last  efforts  to  restore  the  ])eace  in  the  North   could  not,  from 
the  difficidties  with  which  Cromwell  was  surrounded  and  his  own  fail- 
ing health,  be  other  than  lame  and  without  result.     They  are  interest- 
ing, not  from  their  results,  but  as  showing  what  Cromwell  tried  to  do. 

The  New  Protector;  Cronenhurg. — It  would  hardly  be  justitial)le  to 
close  this  narrative  without  some  notice  of  tlie  affairs  after  Cromwell's 
death,  since  Thurloe  remained  secretary  of  state,  and  in  only  one  re- 
gard did  the  administration  of  the  foreign  office  suffer  a  material  change. 
Richard  announced  that  his  father's  policy  in  the  North  woidd  he 
continued  ;"  yet  in  one  point,  unconsciously,  perhaps,  he  departed  from 
it.  The  outbreak  of  the  war  between  Sweden  and  Denmark  had  so 
confusetl  northern  affairs  that  the  Protector's  plan  for  a  great  Protestant 
alliance  had  been  driven  entirely  into  the  background.  It  had  become, 
in  fact,  impracticable,  and  no  longer  coincided  with  the  actual  trend  of 
European  politics.  Yet  he  clung  to  it  with  the  greatest  persistence, 
and  as  long  as  he  lived  the  religious  controversy  was  still  a  factor  in 
Eiu'opean  politics  which  could  not  be  ignored.  After  his  death,  how- 
ever, it  ceases  to  become  so.  The  habit  of  referring  to  the  ^'Protestant 
interest "  continued  for  a  time  in  England,  as  might  be  expecteil,  yet 
not  only  do  these  phrases  occur  less  frequently,  but  on<>  feels  instinct- 
ivelv  that  thev  were  less  sincere.  The  proof  that  thev  were  so  lies  in 
the  fact  that  the  controlling  motive  in  English  foreign  jxditics  was  no 
longer  hostility  to  the  Catholic  house  (►f  Ilapsburg,  but  the  commercial 
rivalrv    of  their    Protestant    kinsmen,  the   Dutch.      It   is  hardly  an 

1  Thurloe,  Foreign  Affairs  in  Cromwoirs  time.  The  rolaticms  with  the  Netherliuuls  are  a  kind 
of  barometer  which  indicate  the  ebbs  and  tluws  of  motives  uf  trade  in  Kiiglisli  for«.'i.i,Mi  iM)lities. 
In  the  increased  hostility  here  shown,  we  have  an  indication  that  commercial  interesUs  were 
of  increasing  importance,  and,  as  we  know,  became, ;  fter  the  Protector's  deatli,  the  sole  sprini? 
of  English  action  in  the  North.  We  must  bear  in  mind,  in  usiin,' Thurloe' .s  account,  that  It 
was  written  in  16GU,  when  the  domiiumt  feulure  of  Eni:l:sli  foreign  policy  was  the  rivalry  of  the 
Dutch.  His  whole  account  is  colored  by  it.  This  was  by  no  means  so  important  a  feature  of 
the  Protector's  policy  as  one  would  gather  from  his  paper,  and  I  liavi-  not  always  felt  justitied 
in  accepting  his  statements.  But  with  thisqualiticatioii.  it  is  of  course  a  source  of  th.'  liiudifst 
value. 

2  Pufendorff,  v.,  §  115. 


74  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS    BETWEEN 

exaggeration  to  say  that  the  death  of  Cromwell  marks  an  epoch  in 
European  history,  the  close  of  the  period  of  religious  wars. 

When  Charles  Gustavus  landed  in  Seeland  he  sent  a  special  envoy, 
John  Leyenbergen,  to  England  with  an  explanation  of  the  causes  of  the 
war,  and  a  request  for  at  least  twenty  ships,  in  return  for  which  he  was 
ready  to  grant,  in  addition  to  certain  staple  rights,  that  English  ships 
enjoy  equal  privileges  in  Sweden  with  Swedish  unarmed  ships,  and 
that  certain  quantities  of  shipping  materials  be  fm-nished  England  at  a 
lower  price. ^  But  Cromwell  died  before  receiving  this  message.  I 
have  found  two  references  to  another  concession  not  mentioned  by  Pufen- 
dorff  which  Charles  Gustavus  is  said  to  have  proposed,  presumably  in 
this  connection.  On  February  23,  1659,  Mr.  Topham,  a  burgess  for 
York,  informed  Parliament  that  he  had  been  told  by  a  merchant  who 
had  carried  dispatches  between  the  English  government  and  Charles 
Gustavus,  that  Charles  Gustavus  had  made  offer  of  Elsinore  Castle  as 
security  for  the  loan  of  twenty  English  frigates.^  The  subject  is  men- 
tioned again  in  a  tract  by  Slingsby  Bethel,  entitled  ^'  The  AVorld's  ^lis- 
take  in  Oliver  Cromwell,''  which  was  printed  anonymously  in  1668.^ 
Bethel  tells  us,  referring  to  it  as  a  sufficiently  well  known  matter,  that 
Cromwell  and  Charles  Gustavus  had  agreed  to  divide  the  control  of 
the  Baltic  between  them,  and  that  Cromwell's  share  was  to  be  Elsinore 
Castle  and  Cronenburg,  '^the  Gibraltar  of  the  North,"  together  with 
the  tolls  of  the  Sound.  Bethel  shows  himself  throughout  this  tract  so 
Avell  informed^  that  I  was  at  first  inclined  to  accept  his  statement,  but 
after  discovering  the  passage  in  Burton  it  seems  to  me  not  improbable 
tliat  this  is  the  source  of  Bethel's  information.  If  this  is  true,  and 
Bethel   is   merely  repeating  a  general   rumor  which  originated   with 

1  Pufendorff,  v.,  114. 

2 "Two  masters  of  Hull  were  at  the  Baltic,  in  October  last,  being  laden  with  corn.  One  of 
them  carried  a  packet  from  the  king  of  Sweden,  and  brought  one  back  again.  He  affirmed 
that  the  king  offered,  if  his  Highness  of  England  would  but  lend  him  twenty  frigates,  he  would 
deposit  in  our  hands  Elsinore  Castle  for  his  security,  and  I  believe  we  might  have  our  own 
terms.  Nothing  under  Heaven  concerns  the  English  so  much  as  that  channel.  Let  us  plant 
our  ships  in  time  there,  and  we  may  have  advantage  enough  of  the  Hollander."  Burton's 
Diary,  iii.,  436. 

3 It  is  printed  in  Harleian  Miscellany,  i.,  287,  and  in  S  ate  Tracts,  part  i.,  376.  I  have  printed 
the  passage  under  consideration  as  Appendix  (B)  to  this  work. 

<  Compare,  for  example,  his  statements  with  regard  to  Ostend,  Newport,  and  Dunkirk  with 
those  of  Thurloe  in  Foreign  Affairs  in  Cromwell's  Time.  I  have  found  the  statement  of  Crom- 
well's Avillingness  finally  to  yield  Prussia  to  Charles  Gustavus  only  in  the  original  instruc- 
tions, in  Pufendorff  and  in  this  tract.  Bethel  stood  in  well  with  the  Republicans  and  was  in  a 
position  to  receive  much  information.  I  have  been  able  to  verify  several  statements  which  I 
found  first  in  this  pamphlet. 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLES   GUSTAVUS.  75 

Topham's  statement  to  Parliament,  which  in  turn  rested  upon  the 
statement  of  a  merchant  carrying  scvret  dispatclies  and  not,  so  far  as 
we  can  see,  in  a  position  to  know  their  contents,  then  the  whole  story- 
rests  upon  a  very  slender  footing.  These  suspicions  must  be  strength- 
ened by  the  fact  that  when  Meadowe,  in  the  spring  of  1659,  hinted  at 
the  English  possession  of  Cronenburg  and  the  island  Hewen,  Charles 
Gustavus  seems  not  to  have  entertained  the  proposal  for  a  moment.^ 
If  he  himself  had  made  the  same  proposal  a  few  months  before,  one  is 
at  a  loss  to  account  for  so  sudden  a  change  in  his  attitude,  since  there 
appears  to  be  no  diplomatic  or  military  event  which  would  explain  it. 
Yet  Charles  Gustavus  did  somethnes  change  his  plans  for  no  very 
great  reason,  and  he  may  have  done  so  in  this  vcase.  It  is  impossible 
to  decide  the  matter  definitely  without  fuller  information.  In  the 
meantime,  those  interested  in  the  subject  may  be  glad  to  have  their 
attention  called  to  these  passages. 

The  Partition  of  Denmark  Again. — The  ill  success  of  Charles  Gus- 
tavus' second  invasion  of  Denmark  and  the  desperate  state  of  his  for- 
tunes in  consequence  of  it,  made  him  more  willing  than  he  had  ever 
been  before  to  concede  real  advantages  to  England  if  English  support 
could  be  obtained  by  it.  Even  before  Cromwell's  death,  Pufendorif 
tells  us  of  a  proposal  that  Cromwell  occupy  Emden  or  Meppen  in 
order  to  hold  the  Dutch  in  check  and  prevent  the  Austrians  from  rais- 
ing recruits  in  Westphalia.  As  soon  as  Charles  Gustavus  heard  of 
Cromwell's  death,  he  sent  another  ambassador,  Gustavus  Duval,  to 
Richard  with  a  request  for  aid  against  the  Dutch  similar  to  the  one 
sent  through  Leyenbergen,  but  though  Richard  declared  his  readiness 
to  enter  into  an  offensive  alliance  w4th  Sweden  against  Austria  and  a 
defensive  alliance  against  the  rest  of  the  world,  yet  he  gave  various 
excuses  for  not  furnishing  the  twenty  ships  asked  for.  In  October 
Friesendorff  received  secret  orders  to  offer  Bremen  and  Verden  to 
Richard  if  he  would  assist  in  the  Swedish  conquest  of  Denmark  and 
Norway,  but  with  the  proviso  that  the  provinces  should  not  be  delivered 
into  English  possession  until  after  the  surrender  of  Copenhagen.  P>oth 
ambassadors  were  authorized  to  offer  freedom  from  tolls  in  the  S(jund 

^  Pufendorff;  vi.,  g  21.  Downing  wrote  Thurloe  from  the  Hague  that  the  Dutch  were  trying 
to  secure  the  same  prize  from  the  Danes.  Downing  to  Thurloe,  Thurloe  Papers,  vii.,  427,  469, 
506.  and  515.  Thurloe  evidently  believed  this.  "*  *  *  and  as  now.  in  fact,  they  [the  Dutchl 
had  in  mortgage  a  part  of  the  king  of  Denmark's  dominions,  they  were  also  to  have  Cronenburg 
Castle  into  their  hands  as  security  for  the  money  expended  in  the  war."  Foreign  Affairs  in 
Cromwell's  Time. 


76  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIOXS    BETWEEN 

and  in  Iceland  in  return  for  money  and  sliips.^  These  offers  were  not 
without  attraction  for  the  English  court.  In  case  their  policy  of 
mediation  proved  fruitless,  they  were  willing  to  assist  the  king,  but 
only  defensively,  and  on  condition  of  some  advantage  for  their  costs. 
Meadowe  mentioned  Stade  and  Landscrone  as  suitable  for  this  purpose,^ 
and  during  the  summer  Richard  had  proposed  an  alliance  on  the  basis 
of  freedom  from  tolls  in  the  Sound  for  English  commerce,  equal  rights 
with  Swedes  in  all  Swedish  ports  and  the  closing  of  the  Sound  to  Eng- 
land's enemies.^  To  this  Charles  Gustavus  made  a  counter-proposal, 
that  England  take  possession  of  Gliickstadt,  Krempen,  and  AVilsteren, 
and  as  security  for  loans,  Iceland,  with  the  jurisdiction  over  Berghen, 
the  claims  of  Norway  to  the  Orkney  Islands,  and  in  addition  Stade 
and  Swingen,  except  the  sovereignty  over  this  city.  Meadowe  sug- 
gested that  Cronenburg  and  the  island  Hewen  would  be  more  accept- 
able, which  embarrassed  the  king  greatly,  since  the  cession  of  these 
places  could  not  be  thought  of.  He  was  driven,  therefore,  to  recur  to 
his  old  plan  of  dividing  Denmark.  Friesendorff  was  empowered  to 
offer  Bremen  and  Verden  and  the  assistance  of  Sweden  in  obtaining 
Iceland  and  Greenland,  provided  Richard  would  aid  in  the  conquest 
of  Norway.  If  Richard  were  willing  to  go  further  and  partition  Den- 
mark, England  would  receive  in  addition  to  the  above  all  of  Jutland 
except  the  dominions  of  the  Duke  of  Holstein-Gottorp,  together  with 
freedom  from  tolls  in  the  Sound.  Norway,  Seeland,  Fiinen  and  the 
other  islands  would  go  to  Sweden.  But  the  abdication  of  Richard 
put  an  end  to  these  schemes.'* 

It  would  be  an  injustice  to  Richard,  however,  to  emphasize  these  ad- 
venturous plans  unduly.     They  occupied  at  best  but  a  secondary  place 

1  Pufendorff,  v.,  g  115. 

2 Ibid.,  §  118.  "Therefore  in  case  of  an  obstinate  repugnancy  to  the  peace  on  the  Danish 
part  upon  the  terms  aforesaid,  to  assist  the  Swede  in  a  defensive  way  under  certain  cautions 
and  restrictions.  In  which  the  case  of  assistance,  for  in  war  many  things  may  be  supposed 
and  provided  against  whicli  never  come  to  pass,  the  Swede  was  to  give  real  gages  and 
pledges  for  the  garantie  of  his  faith.  To  which  end  the  English  mediator  had  often  and  closely 
remonstrated  to  him  that  'twas  not  reasonable  to  put  a  sword  into  another's  hand  without  a 
previous  assurance  of  its  not  being  made  use  of  against  one's  yelf.  And  used  it  also  as  an  argu- 
ment to  dispose  the  otherwise  unwilling  Swede  to  a  peace  with  the  Dane  (for  a  war  with  Den- 
mark was  of  all  wars  the  most  commodious  for  him)  because  he  was  not  to  expect  an  assist- 
ance from  England  which  should  cost  him  nothing.  And  to  forecast  the  temper  of  affairs, 
proceeded  so  far  as  to  nominate  Stade  upon  the  Elbe,  and  Landscroon  in  the  Sound,  to  be  put 
in  case  of  such  assistance  into  English  hands  ;  which  taking  vent  afterwards,  gave  occasion  to 
that  frivolous  report  how  tliat  England  and  Sweden  had  agreed  together  to  share  Denmark 
betwixt  them."     Meadowe's  Narrative,  p.  119. 

3  Putendorff,  vi.,  g  20,  with  the  marginal  date  May  7.    Carlson,  iv.,  331. 

*  Ibid.,  g  21.    Carlson,  iv.,  334.    Soon  after  Charles  Gustavus  tried  the  effect  of  similar  pro- 


CROMWELL    AND    CHARLES    GUSTAVUS.  77 

in  his  thoughts,  and  were  only  an  alternative  in  case  his  plan  of  mediat- 
ing a  peaee  should  tail.  It  was  to  give  emphasis  to  this  attempt  at 
mediation  that  a  fleet  had  been  sent  to  the  Sound  in  the  autumn  of 
1659  under  Goodson,  hut  it  was  forced  to  return  without  aecomplisiiing 
anything,  owing  to  the  lateness  of  the  season.  In  the  following  sj)ring 
another  fleet  was  sent  out  under  Admiral  ^lontiigue,  who  appeared 
before  Copenhagen  in  April,  not  for  the  purpose,  as  both  the  Swedes 
and  Danes  at  fii'st  supposed,  of  unconditionally  supporting  the  Swedish 
cause,  but  to  force  them  to  accept  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  treaty  of 
Koi'skilde,  and  to  lend  aid  to  Charles  Gustavus  only  in  so  far  as  it  might 
appear  necessary  from  the  attempts  of  the  Dutch  or  of  the  confeder- 
ates of  the  Danes  to  defeat  this  object.  When  one  considers  the  great 
difficulties  under  which  Richard  labored  and  his  constant  struggles 
with  Parliament,  his  effective  interference  in  the  Baltic  really  does 
him  great  credit.  A  war  with  Holland  over  the  matter  was  at  first 
by  no  means  impossible,  and  the  presence  of  the  English  fleet  in  the 
Baltic  not  only  prevented  a  more  active  interference  by  the  Dutch  in 
behalf  of  the  Danes,  but  persuaded  them  that  independent  action  in 
the  Baltic  was  im})racticable.  The  first  Concert  of  the  Hague  was 
therefore  by  no  means  a  concession  to  the  Dutch,  but  was  quite  in 
accordance  with  the  English  policy  of  armed  mediation,  and  was 
moreover,  although  the  Swedish  king  bitterly  resented  this  attempted 
dictation,  in  reality  an  act  of  friendship  towards  Sweden.  The  second 
and  third  Concerts  of  the  Hague,  however,  concluded  by  the  Parlia- 
ment after  Richard's  abdication,  show  clearly  how  England's  foreign 
influence  was  paralyzed  by  internal  difficulties.  It  would  take  us 
too  far  from  our  subject  to  discuss  the  negotiations  leading  up  to  the 
treaty  of  Oliva,  which  form,  moreover,  a  chapter  in  Dutch  rather  than 
in  English  history,  since  the  Parliament  had  lost  its  influence  over  the 
course  of  affiiirs,  and  was  compelled  to  resign  the  conduct  of  the  me- 
diation into  the  hands  of  its  rivals.  "The  truth  is  they  made  no 
great  scruple,  at  least  for  that  one  time,  to  come  under  the  stern  of 
their  neiffhbourino;  CommouAvealth,  therebv  to  have  hettev  leisure  to 
recollect  and  refit  the  scattered  planks  and  pieces  of  their  own  broken 
Repu])lic."^ 

posals  in  Holland.    Erdmannsdorffer,  Deutsche  Geschichte,  i.,  337.    Carlson,  iv.,  342.    Charles 
Gustavus'  plan  was  to  unite  Norway  with  Sweden,  together  with  Cronenburg,  in  order  to  con- 
trol the  Sound. 
1  Meadowe's  Narrative,  p.  122. 


APPENDIX. 


A. 

Extract  from  Foreign  Affairs  ix  Cromwell's  Time,  as  Given 

BY  Thurloe,  1660. 

(Stowe  MSS.,  clxxxv.,  fol.  187.) 

The  State  of  the  Northern  Affairs . — In  the  year  [1655]  the  war 
broke  out  between  Sweden  and  Poland,  which  Sweden  undertook 
without  jyiy  counsel  of  the  Protector  but  after  he  was  engaged  therein 
he  sent  an  extraordinary  ambassador  to  desire  aid  from  the  Protector 
for  carrying  on  that  war  as  directed  by  him  for  the  advantage  of  the 
Protestant  interest. 

In  the  debate  of  that  aifair  it  came  to  a  proposition  and  an  agree- 
ment, that  the  Swede  should  carry  his  arms  against  the  emperor  and 
house  of  Austria,  and  that  upon  the  foundation  thereof,  and  the  war 
which  England  and  France  had  with  Spain  (the  other  branch  of  the 
house  of  Austria  in  the  west)  a  league  offensive  and  defensive  should 
be  made  between  England,  France,  and  Sweden,  whereunto  should  be 
invited  the  states  of  Holland,  king  of  Denmark,  and  the  elector  of 
Brandenburg  and  other  states  and  a  concept  of  articles  was  drawn 
and  debated  between  the  commissioners  of  the  Protector  and  the 
ambassador  of  Sweden,  and  communicated  to  the  Dutch  and  French 
ambassadors. 

The  Dutch  declared  their  unwillingness,  and  apprehended  danger 
to  themselves  from  the  success  of  the  Swede  in  Poland,  and  took  reso- 
lutions underhand  to  give  him  troubles,  and  by  great  promises  of 
assistance  to  the  king  of  Denmark,  and  by  rewards  to  his  councilors, 
engaged  that  king  contrary  to  his  own  interests,  to  invade  the  king  of 
Sweden  in  his  Duchv  of  Bremen. 

This  dre\f  the  king  of  Sweden  out  of  Poland  and  set  the  war 
wholly  on  a  new  foot,  and  most  of  the  princes  of  states  in  Europe 
found  themselves  concerned  to  intermeddle  in  it. 

(79) 


80  APPENDIX. 

The  principal  combatants  were  the  king  of  Sweden,  Poland,  and 
Denmark,  the  duke  of  Brandenburg  who  at  firet  joined  with  Sweden, 
fell  off  to  Poland,  the  emperor  also  declared  with  him. 

The  Dutch  underhand  irritate  the  aforesaid  princes  against  the 
Swede,  though  openly  they  were  in  treaty  with  him  for  adjusting  their 
own  interests. 

The  Swede  had  nevertheless  that  success  against  the  Dane,  that  they 
had  almost  made  a  conquest  of  all  Denmark  and  was  bringing  the 
Sound  under  his  power. 

The  Protector  though  he  wished  in  general  tlie  prosperity  of  the 
Swede,  his  ally,  hoping  that  at  last  his  arms  might  be  directed  the 
right  way,  yet  did  not  like  that  the  Swede  should  conquer  the  Dane, 
and  possess  all  those  countries,  and  being  thereby  become  power- 
ful, eno;ross  the  whole  trade  of  the  Baltic  Sea,  wherein  Eno^land  is  so 
much  concerned,  and  therefore  he  interposed  in  most  serious  terms 
with  both  the  kings  to  make  peace  whicli  was  accepted  by  both,  and 
peace  ensued,  thereupon,  called  the  peace  or  treaty  of  Roskild.  But  the 
war  being  renewed  again  the  next  autumn  the  matter  became  more 
entangled.  The  emperor,  duke  of  Brandenburg,  kings  of  Poland  and 
Denmark  entered  into  a  league  of  offensive  and  defensive  [  ] 

against  the  Swede,  the  Dutch  also  declare  the  same  way,  and  prepare 
a  fleet  and  land  forces  for  the  assistance  of  the  Dane. 

The  Protector  very  much  apprehended  the  issue  of  this  conjunction, 
he  thought  it  equally  dangerous  for  England  that  the  Swede  should  be 
ruined  and  the  Dane  preserved  by  such  saviours,  who  after  they  had 
broken  the  king  of  Sweden,  would  also  make  a  prey  of  the  Dane 
himself,  the  emperor  in  his  assistance  he  gave  against  the  Swede,  re- 
vived the  old  design  of  the  Austrian  [eagle]  stretching  her  wings 
towards  the  eastern  sea,  and  planting  herself  upon  the  Baltic. 

The  Dutch  aimed  at  the  command  of  the  Sound  and  under  pre- 
tence that  the  Dane  was  too  weak  to  keep  it  against  his  neighbours, 
would  have  kept  it  for  him,  and  had  already  swallowed  up  [Drunt- 
heim]  a  place  of  great  importance,  mortgaged  to  them  by  the  king  of 
Denmark  for  money  to  support  him  in  his  wars,  and  was  agreed  to  be 
delivered  into  his  hands,  so  that  the  price  of  the  king  5f  Denmark's 
deliverance,  was  like  to  be  the  resigning  himself  up  into  the  hands  of 
the  Dutch  as  his  guardians. 


APPENDIX.  81 

That  whit'h  the  Protector  pitched  upon  in  this  great  occasion  was 
to  endeavour  a  present  peace  between  the  Dane  and  the  Swede,  upon 
the  late  treaty  of  Roskild,  made  by  his  own  mediation  without  taking 
in  the  ditterenoes  bt^twtvn  Poland  and  Sweden,  or  the  Swede  and  Bran- 
denburg, or  comprehending  the  pretences  of  the  Dutch  and  the  em- 
perour,  which  having  many  intricacies  in  them  would  require  time. 

This  the  Protector  did  to  obviate  the  designs  of  the  Dutch,  as  also 
to  keep  open  the  door  for  making  use  of  the  arms  of  the  Swede  in 
another  way. 

This  was  liked  by  none  of  the  contending  parties,  the  Swede 
though  thus  beset,  yet  having  got  into  his  possession  the  Sound  and 
all  Denmark  but  the  town  of  Copenhagen,  and  believing  that  France 
and  England  would  not  suffer  him  to  flinck  was  unwilling  to  be  brought 
back  again  to  the  treaty  of  Roskild.  The  Dane  was  more  adverse 
than  he,  not  doubting  but  by  the  aid  of  his  confederates  to  recover  all 
again  and  the*  confederates  opposed  it,  or  any  treaty  without  compre- 
hending all  their  interests,  and  the  Dutch  most  of  all  infested  here^ 
the  meaning  whereof  was,  that  they  had  all  agreed  totally  to  ruin  the 
Swede,  and  the  Dutch  doubted  not  of  his  part  in  the  advantage. 

The  Protector  in  this  whole  business  laid  this  for  a  foundation,  that 
it  was  not  for  the  interest  of  this  nation  that  either  the  Swede  or  Dane 
should  be  ruined  in  this  war,  and  that  [it]  was  ever  safest  for  England, 
that  the  Sound  and  those  countries  should  remain  in  the  hands  of 
the  Dane,  and  therefore  as  he  had  interposed  in  the  first  war  to  pre- 
serve the  Dane,  so  he  resolved  by  the  same  measures  to  proceed,  and 
so  to  manage  these  affairs  that  this  might  receive  no  alternation  in  those 
parts. 

And  having  communicated  with  France  herein  and  finding  that 
Court  to  have  the  same  sentiments,  they  entered  into  a  treaty  for  the 
mutual  management  thereof,  wherein  it  was  agreed  that  France  and 
England  should  propound  to  the  two  kings  of  Sweden  and  Denmark 
the  renewing  the  treaty  of  Roskild  without  comprehending  any  of  the 
confederates. 

2dl\'.  That  they  should  declare  themselves  enemies  to  him  that  re- 
flise  it,  and  assist  him  that  accept  it. 

3dly.  That  both  should  send  to  the  Dutch  to  induce  them  to  join  in 
this  mediation. 
6 


^2  APPENDIX. 

4thly.  If  a  war  should  happen  to  England  by  reason  of  any  assist- 
ance to  be  o^iven  in  this  case  that  France  should  declare  the  enemies  of 
England  enemies  of  France,  and  make  war  against  them,  and  e  contra 
England  to  do  the  same  for  France. 

5thly.  That  the  peace  being  made  between  the  Dane  and  Swede, 
France  and  England  shall  interpose  to  reconcile  the  Swede  to  the 
king  of  Poland  and  duke  of  Brandenburg. 

The  ambassadors  of  France  and  England  at  the  Hague  propounded 
the  terms  aforesaid  to  the  Dutch,  but  they  refused,  and  instead  thereof, 
prepared  a  general  fleet  and  land  forces  to  assist  the  Dane. 

England  finding  words  would  not  prevail,  prepared  also  a  good  fleet, 
and  sent  word  to  the  Dutch  that  his  fleet  was  prepared  for  the  Sound, 
whither  it  should  sail  the  first  opportunity,  that  upon  the  arrival  of 
it  there,  France  and  Eno;land  would  offer  the  mediation  to  Sweden  and 
Denmark  to  agree  with  them  on  the  treaty  of  Roskild,  and  endeavour 
to  compel  the  opposing  party  by  force,  at  the  same  time  the  French 
and  English  at  the  Hague  in  the  [name]  of  both  their  masters  de- 
manded of  the  states  their  declaration  that  no  aid  or  assistance  should 
be  sent  to  the  contending  parties  to  enflame  that  war,  and  that  they 
should  call  back  such  as  they  have  already  sent. 

This  being  done  in  vigorous  terms  brought  the  Dutch  to  a  temper 
and  persuaded  them  to  agree  to  join  in  the  mediation  on  the  aforesaid 
terms,  and  a  treaty  was  thereupon  entered  into  between  all  the  three 
states  for  managing  this  affair  and  the  fleets  of  both  states  to  sail 
thither  as  common  friends  to  both  kings,  to  bring  them  to  a  peace  in 
the  manner  before  expressed. 

At  the  same  time  a  treaty  was  made  between  England  and  S^^'eden, 
that  in  case  the  king  of  Denmark  was  refractory  and  refused  the  peace, 
that  then  England  would  assist  Sweden  against  them,  and  in  recom- 
pense of  the  charges  and  hazards  of  the  war,  a  sum  of  money  was  to 
be  paid  England  and  freedom  to  the  English  forever  from  paying  toll 
in  their  passages  to  and  from  the  Baltic  Sea  in  case  of  success  against 
the  Dane,  for  the  performance  whereof  security  was  to  be  given  to 
England. 

In  pursuance  of  this  treaty  the  English  fleet  sailed  to  the  Sound  and 
soon  after  arrived  the  Dutch,  and  then  the  mediation  was  offered  to 
both  the  kings  in  the  name  of  the  three  states,  and  a  certain  day  pre- 


APPENDIX.  83 

fixed  \vhether  they  would  accept  the  })eace  upon  the  terms  propounded, 
both  made  great  difficulty  therein,  and  the  Dutch  who  openly  joined 
witli  the  French  and  English  ambassadors  did  yet  miderhand  dissuade 
the  Dane  from  accepting,  and  spun  out  the  treaty  into  a  length,  until 
the  English  tleet  returned  home  from  the  necessity  of  their  own 
atiliirs,  leaving  the  treaty  unfinished,  the  management  whereof  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  Rump,  then  entered  of  others  who  took  different 
measures  of  this  affair. 

The  Dutch  had  discovered  in  this  and  other  affairs  a  fixed  desi^^n 
to  monopolize  all  trade  into  their  own  hands,  that  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean they  hoped  to  obtain  by  occasion  of  that  war  between  England 
and  Spain,  and  having  the  carriage  of  all  Spanish  goods,  and  to  man- 
age their  trade  to  and  from  the  Indies  in  their  ships,  they  endeavoured 
to  put  such  articles  upon  England  under  the  notion  of  a  free  ship 
free  goods  in  the  marine  treaty,  as  nu'ght  free  their  ships  from  all 
search  and  molestation,  whereby  enemy's  goods  might  have  been  car- 
ried with  all  safety,  desiring  thereby  to  draw  all  traffic  into  their  own 
ships,  and  so  infinitely  increase  their  own  shipping  and  navigation. 

By  occasion  of  the  wars  in  the  eastern  parts  they  endeavoured  to 
engross  the  trade  of  the  Baltic  Sea,  for  having  engaged  the  Dane  to 
make  war  with  the  Swede,  under  pretence  of  giving  him  assistance, 
they  designed  to  draw  him  into  an  absolute  dependence  upon  them,  and 
be  means  hereof  to  have  the  same  power  upon  the  Sound  as  in  their 
own  hands,  a  thing  formerly  attempted  by  them  by  taking  the  farm  of 
that  passage  raising  themselves  and  raising  other  nations  at  their 
pleasure,  and  as  now  in  fact  they  had  in  mortgage  a  part  of  the  king 
of  Denmark's  dominions,  they  were  also  to  have  Cronenburg  Castle 
into  their  hands  as  a  security  for  the  money  expended  in  the  war. 

As  to  the  trade  in  the  East  Indies  where  they  were  superior  at  sea, 
they  had  in  their  [own]  intentions  swallowed  all  ;  their  method  in 
those  parts  was  this,  if  the  English  or  any  other  nation  had  driven  a 
good  trade  with  any  of  those  people,  their  manner  was  presently  to 
proclaim  war  with  that  people,  and  lay  a  ship  or  two  at  sea  before  the 
ports  where  the  trade  was,  which  they  called  a  blocking  up,  and  by 
colour  thereof  seized  on  all  ships  and  goods  going  in  or  out  of  those 
parts,  as  trading  in  an  enemy's  country,  and  on  this  pretence  seized  on 
three  English  [ships]  in  the  East  Indies,  richly  laden,  and  converted 


84  APPENDIX. 

them  to  their  own  use,  the  news  hereof  came  about  the  same  time 
when  these  negotiations  were  in  the  Sound,  and  satisfaction  being  asked 
of  them,  they  at  first  justified  the  fact,  but  being  told  in  plain  terms 
that  if  the  true  value  of  the  goods  and  ships  according  as  they  had 
been  worth  in  case  they  had  arrived  safe,  in  Europe,  were  not  paid  at 
the  day  prefixed,  that  England  would  take  their  own  satisfaction  by 
force,  they  complied  and  paid  to  the  merchants  concerned  the  full  value 
in  ready  money. 

There  were  no  greater  considerations  in  England  in  reference  to  for- 
eign interests,  than  how  to  obviate  the  growing  greatness  of  the  Dutch. 
This  state  of  affairs  in  the  Sound  though  raised  by  themselves  seemed 
to  give  an  occasion  of  doing  something  in  it.  The  Swede  was  incensed 
against  them  as  the  authors  of  ruining  his  designs  in  Poland  and  else^ 
where,  and  would  have  proclaimed  war  against  them,  if  England 
would  have  engaged  with  him  therein.  The  king  of  Denmark  grew 
weary  of  his  assistance,  and  expressed  great  discontent  towards  them, 
seeing  that  in  the  end  though  he  should  be  preserved  from  the  Swede, 
he  should  be  left  in  the  power  of  the  Dutch,  and  swallowed  up  with 
their  pretenses. 

England  was  at  that  time  in  amity  with  both  those  kings,  that  of 
Sweden  was  not  assured,  but  nothing  of  offence  had  happened  with 
Denmark  since  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  1654.  But  on  the  con- 
trar}",  that  king  took  acceptably  the  mediation  of  England,  on  which 
the  peace  of  Roskild  ensued,  and  sent  letters  of  thanks  for  the  good 
offices  towards  that  crown. 

That  which  seems  to  be  England's  true  interest  in  this  occasion, 
was  to  employ  their  utmost  efforts  to  accommodate  the  differences  be- 
tween these  two  crowns,  the  means  whereof  after  the  Dutch  did  mani- 
festly cross  that  in  private  which  they  had  agreed  to  by  treaty  were 
these. 

That  England  and  France  should  use  their  joint  endeavours  to  bring 
the  Swede  to  abate  of  his  demands  to  the  Dane,  which  he  could  not 
prosecute  without  offence  to  all  his  neighbours,  and  instead  thereof  to 
prosecute  his  first  designs  against  the  house  of  Austria,  following 
therein  the  example  of  great  Gustavus,  and  wherein  France  and  Eng- 
land would  ffive  him  e^reat  assistance  both  of  monev  and  forces. 

The  Dane  being  thus  delivered  from  this  dangerous  war  [  ] 


APPENDIX.  85 

be  induced  to  a  coujunction  Avith  Swedon  and  to  favour  his  designs  the 
others,  England  and  France  becoming  the  sponsors  of  the  peace  and 
amitv  between  them. 

To  let  the  king  of  Denmark  see  the  ill  effects  of  his  friendship  with 
the  Dutch,  who  had  many  times  engaged  him  to  the  hazard  of  his 
crown,  merely  to  serve  their  interests,  thus  they  engaged  him  against 
England  in  1622  and  now  against  Sweden,  and  when  he  was  thus  en- 
gaged, they  imposed  on  him  unreasonable  terms  of  assistance,  at  other 
times  would  assist  against  him  as  in  1654  when  they  helped  the 
Swede  against  him,  and  obliged  the  Danes  to  yield  up  part  of  his  do- 
minions to  the  Swede,  which  he  holds  at  this  day. 

And  thereupon  to  offer  him  the  friendship  of  England  instead  of 
the  Dutch,  as  that  which  he  might  depend  upon  in  any  rencontres  with 
his  neighbours  contrary  to  the  peace  to  be  agreed  upon  by  any  one  side 
or  the  other,  and  thereby  be  freed  from  his  dependence  on  the  Dutch, 
who  under  pretence  of  friendship  would  oppress  him. 

The  elector  of  Brandenburg  was  to  be  invited  into  this  league,  and 
to  draw  him  off  from  those  alliances  which  were  contrary  thereunto. 

There  was  a  particular  treaty  on  foot  with  Sweden  and  Poland,  that 
a  good  correspondence  might  be  held  with  that  kingdom,  being  the 
ancient  ally  with  France  and  useful  to  England  in  respect  of  our  trade 
to  Danzio;  and  the  towns  in  the  Rea^all  Prussia, 

England,  France,  Sweden,  Denmark,  and  Brandenburg  being  thus 
allied  together  upon  their  common  interests,  this  was  thought  the  best 
way  that  these  affairs  could  be  put  into  a  reference  to  the  interest  of 
England  in  those,  and  the  king  of  England  being  at  that  time  upon 
solid  terms  of  friendship  with  France,  and  having  the  advantage  of 
ports  on  both  sides  the  narrow  seas,  whence  they  could  easily  disturb 
their  navigation  through  the  channel,  there  was  no  doubt  but  the  state 
of  things  would  bring  the  Dutch  either  by  fair  means  or  force  to  live 
by  their  neighbours  upon  just  and  reasonable  terms. 


86  APPENDIX. 

B. 

Extract  from  The  World's  Mistake  ix  Oliver  Cromwell. 

(Harleian  Miscellany,  i.,  287.    State  Tracts,  part  i.,  376.) 

But  this  man,  who,  through  ignorance,  is  so  strangely  cried  up  in  the 
world,  was  not  guilty  of  this  error  in  state  only,  but  committed  as  great 
a  solecism,  in  his  designing  the  outing  of  the  king  of  Denmark,  and 
setting  up  the  king  of  Sweden.  For  had  the  Swedes  but  got  Copen- 
hagen (as  in  all  probability,  had  Oliver  lived,  they  would  have  done,) 
they  had  wanted  nothing  of  consequence,  but  the  cities  of  Lubeck  and 
Danzig  (which,  by  their  then  potency,  they  would  easily  have  gained), 
of  being  masters  of  the  whole  Baltic  Sea,  on  both  sides,  from  the 
Sound  or  mouth  down  to  the  bottom  of  it ;  by  which,  together  with  all 
Denmark,  Norway,  and  the  Danes'  part  of  Holstein,  which  would  con- 
sequently have  been  theirs  (they  then  having,  as  they  still  have,  the  land 
of  Bremen),  there  would  have  been  nothing,  but  the  small  countries  of 
Oldenberg  and  East  Friesland,  which  would  easily  have  fallen  into 
their  mouths,  betwixt  them  and  the  United  Netherlands,  whereby 
Sweden  would  on  the  one  side,  to  the  north  and  north-east,  have  been 
as  great,  as  France  on  the  other,  to  the  south  and  south-west ;  and  they 
two,  able  to  have  divided  the  western  empire  betwixt  them. 

And  whereas  it  had  in  all  ages  been  the  policy  of  the  northern  states 
and  potentates,  to  keep  the  dominion  of  the  Baltic  Sea  divided  among 
several  petty  princes  and  states,  that  no  one  might  be  sole  master  of  it ; 
because,  otherwise,  most  of  the  necessary  commodities  for  shipping, 
coming  from  thence  and  Nor^vay,  any  one  lord  of  the  whole  might 
lay  up  the  shipping  of  Europe,  by  the  walls,  in  shutting  only  of  his 
ports,  and  denying  the  commodities  of  his  country  to  other  states : 
Cromwell  contrary  to  this  wise  maxim,  endeavoured  to  put  the  wliole 
Baltic  Sea  into  the  Swedes'  hands,  and  undoubtedly  had  (though,  I 
suppose,  ignorantly)  done  it,  if  his  death  had  not  given  them  that  suc- 
ceeded him,  the  Long  Parliament,  an  opportunity  of  prudently  pre- 
venting it.  For,  if  he  had  understood  the  importance  of  the  Baltic 
Sea  to  this  nation,  lie  could  not  have  been  so  impolitic,  as  to  have  pro- 
jected so  dangerous  a  design  against  his  new  Utopia,  as  giving  the 
opening  and  shutting  of  it  to  any  one  prince.     I  am  not  ignorant,  that 


APPENDIX.  87 

this  error  is  excused,  by  pretending  that  we  were  to  have  had  Elsinore 
and  Cronenburg  Castle,  (the  first,  the  town,  u^wn  the  narrow  entrance 
of  the  Baltic,  calletl  the  Sound,  where  all  shii)s  ride,  and  pay  toll  to 
the  king  of  Denmark ;  and  the  latter,  the  fortress,  that  defends  both 
the  town  and  ships,)  by  which  we  should  have  been  masters  of 
the  Sound,  and  consequently  of  the  Baltic :  but  they  that  know  those 
countries,  and  how  great  a  prince  the  Swede  would  have  been,  had  he 
obtained  all  the  rest,  besides  those  two  baubles ;  must  confess,  we  should 
have  been  at  his  devotion,  in  our  holding  of  any  thing  in  his  countries. 
And  further,  if  the  dangerous  consequence  of  setting  up  so  great  a 
prince  had  not  been  in  the  case,  it  had  been  against  the  interest  of 
England,  to  have  had  an  obligation  upon  us  to  maintain  places  so  re- 
mote, against  the  enmity  of  many  states  and  princes ;  and  that  for  these 
reasons : 

First,  because  the  ordinary  tolls  of  the  Sound  would  not  have  de- 
frayed half  the  charge  ;  and,  to  have  taken  more  than  the  ordinary  tolls, 
we  could  not  have  done,  without  dra^^nng  a  general  quarrel  upon 
us,  from  most  of  the  princes  and  states  of  the  northern  parts  of 
Europe. 

Secondly,  etc. 


88  APPENDIX. 


C. 

Extract  from  Thurloe's  Speech  to  Parliament, 

February  18,  1859. 

(Burton's  Diary,  iii.,  380,  seq.) 

This  was  the  state  of  thins^s  in  October  last.  His  His^hness,  that 
now  is,  took  these  considerations : 

1.  The  continuance  of  a  war  in  these  parts  would  infinitely  hmder 
our  trade,  and  be  of  very  great  prejudice  to  this  nation;  many  of  our 
manufacturers  being  transported  and  vented  thither,  and  many  of  our 
materials  for  shipping  and  navigation  being  carried  from  thence, 
hither. 

2.  Considering  what  the  issue  of  this  war  might  be,  that  the  Sound " 
was  likely  to  be  put  into  the  hands  of  those  that  would  exclude  the 
English,  or  put  us  in  such  a  condition,  as  we  should  be  as  bad  as  ex- 
cluded ;  the  consequence  of  which  would  be  the  ruin  of  our  shipping ; 
hemp,  pitch,  tar,  cordage  and  mast,  coming  all  from  thence,  and  an 
obstruction  there,  would  endanger  our  safety. 

We  had  experience  of  this  in  our  war  with  the  Dutch,  when  the 
Dane  did  prohibit  our  access  thither,  which  put  us  to  great  distress, 
having  none  of  those  commodities,  but  what  came  from  our  enemies 
at  double  rates. 

3.  His  Highness  considered  that  the  emperor  was  likely  to  arrive 
at  the  design  of  the  house  of  Austria,  to  command  the  Baltic,  and  the 
eastern  seas,  as  the  Spaniard  already  hath  the  command  of  the  western 
seas.  Thus,  they  Avould  command  all  the  trade  of  the  world.  Of 
this  the  Dutch  were  so  sensible  before,  as  they  engaged  the  Swede  to 
come  to  hinder  the  progress  of  the  emperor,  who  is  now  fairer  in 
hopes  of  it  than  ever  he  was  in  the  world,  they  having  greater  posses- 
sions there  than  formerly,  as  two  or  three  principal  places  in  Holstein, 
by  the  delivery  of  Denmark,  are  already  garrisoned  by  the  emperor's 
forces. 

And  I  think  the  king  of  Denmark  is  in  more  danger  from  those 
that  are  allied  with  him  than  from  his  open  enemies. 

4.  He  considered  that  when  the  emperor  had  done  his  business  there, 
he  and  his  confederates  would  next  pour  themselves  into  Flanders,  and 


APPENDIX.  89 

from  thenre  hither  into  this  Comiiioiiwealth,  where  thev  intend  to 
bring  in  another  government,  when  they  are  ready  for  it.  Such  coun- 
sels, we  know,  are  on  foot,  de  facto ,  already. 

%5.  The  great  danger  of  overthrowing  the  Protestant    interest,  in 
general,  which  we  have  so  much  reason  to  j)reserve  and  promote. 

His  Highness,  considering  these  mischiefs,  thought  himself  concerned 
to  obviate  them  as  far  as  he  could.  We  are  yet  in  friendship  with  all 
these  princes,  and  have  no  enmity  with  the  emperor;  nor  would  his 
Highness  have  it  otherwise.  He  therefore  thought  fit  to  interpose 
upon  the  account  of  amity. 

You  should  make  it  your  fii-st  step  to  endeavour  to  reconcile  those 
two  fighting  kings,  thinking  it  to  be  our  interest  rather  to  preserve  both, 
than  to  sutfer  either  to  be  destroyed ;  and  that  France  and  you  would 
join  to  take  olf  the  Dutch  and  Brandenburg,  if  possible  to  reconcile  the 
Pole  and  Sweden. 

To  promote  the  success  of  this  mediation,  and  luring  all  parties  to  a 
reconciliation,  not  excluding  the  house  of  Austria,  too,  his  Highness 
thought  fit  and  meet  to  send  a  fleet  into  those  parts  of  twenty  ships,  to 
the  intent  to  make  a  peace  between  the  two  kings,  and  of  this  he  ac- 
quainted the  States  General. 


Gay  lord  Bros. 

Makers 

Syracuse,  N.  ^' 

PAT.  JAN.  21.  1908 


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